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5Foreword  
In this report we review the developments in the neuroscience of addiction, explore 
how they might affect the way we view and treat drug problems, and consider the 
ethical issues that they raise for drug policy in Europe. The reader will find that it is 
difficult not to be both excited and apprehensive when considering the implications 
of the developments occurring in this field. Neuroscience provides us with a better 
understanding of how people become addicted to drugs and why they find it so 
difficult to stop, even when experiencing severe negative consequences. It also 
holds out the prospect of providing us with some novel approaches to both the 
prevention and treatment of drug problems. It may also lead to developments that 
— if misused — could have serious negative consequences, such as the unrestricted 
use of sensitive screening techniques or invasive and potentially dangerous surgical 
interventions. 
The focus in this report is on illicit drugs, but natural laws are not bound by the 
same conventions as human ones. The understanding that neuroscience brings is 
relevant to all drugs that have an abuse potential. Across Europe, a heavy price is 
paid from the addiction many of our citizens have to illicit drugs, alcohol or tobacco. 
Despite advances that have resulted in improvements in our ability to treat some 
drug problems, overall our therapeutic arsenal in this area still remains insufficient. 
For many, their addiction will constitute a long term and damaging problem where 
relapse is common and recovery difficult to achieve. Developments in neuroscience 
raise the exciting hope that a better understanding of the biological mechanisms of 
dependence will result in much needed new therapeutic opportunities and allow us 
greater success in reducing the health and social burden that this problem causes.
These potential benefits are clearly attractive but can lead to over-optimistic, 
misleading and even potentially damaging conclusions. The history of medicine 
provides us with many examples of how a desire to do good can result in harm. Our 
excitement for new approaches to a historically inextricable problem must therefore 
be tempered by the knowledge that any new approach requires rigorous testing 
before being introduced and there is always a need to consider equally the potential 
costs as well as benefits of any innovation. The rationale behind this report is that 
it is not only important to understand the basis for a neurobiological perspective 
on addiction, but equally important to understand the ethical and policy issues that 
developments in this area raise. 
On a conceptual basis, neurobiology presents us with a powerful argument that 
addiction has a medical basis and addicts are in need of treatment rather than 
punishment. However, an over-simplistic interpretation of this view could lead to 
approaches that could undermine the basic principles on which health care is 
6Addiction neurobiology: Ethical and social implications
provided in Europe — the right of patients to make informed choices about the 
treatment they receive. A major challenge for drugs policy will be to develop 
approaches that benefit from the advances offered by an understanding of the 
neurobiological basis of addiction, but that are also sensitive to the complex nature of 
drug problems. It is important to recognise that drug use and addiction are affected 
by individual and social choices as well as any underlying biological processes. 
Wolfgang Götz 
Director, EMCDDA
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Executive summary 
European burden of addiction and drug abuse
Addiction and drug abuse impose an enormous social and economic burden upon 
European society. Illicit drug use, whilst at lower prevalence than the use of alcohol or 
tobacco, has been estimated as accounting for approximately 2 % of the total burden 
of disease in Europe. Estimates for the proportion of the total burden of diseases 
associated with tobacco and alcohol are around 12 and 10 % respectively. 
Neuroscience research on addiction
Neuroscience and genetic research of addiction are beginning to make significant 
progress in understanding the changes in the brain that underlie drug use and 
addictive behaviours. Neuroscientists now understand how addictive drugs produce 
neurochemical changes in the brain’s reward pathway that make their use so 
appealing, and that drive some to use them repeatedly despite the harm that they 
cause. Neurobiological research also suggests that chronic drug use can produce 
long-term disruptions of neurocognitive circuits involved in motivation and attention, 
decision-making and the ability to inhibit impulses or urges. These changes focus 
addicts’ attention on drug use, increase their craving for drugs, impair their 
appreciation of the consequences of their drug use, and make it more difficult 
for them to resist urges to use drugs. 
Neuroimaging of the addicted brain has also identified persistent changes in 
the areas responsible for learning and memory. Chronic drug use produces 
neuroadaptation as well as persistent molecular and cellular changes in these neural 
circuits. These plastic changes can leave addicted persons vulnerable to relapse to 
drug use after months and even years of abstinence. Addiction research has also 
provided a deeper appreciation of how social factors, such as socio-economic 
status, upbringing, and exposure to abuse or violence, particularly while young, can 
interact with individuals’ genetic make-up, leaving them at a higher risk of using 
drugs, and more vulnerable to developing addiction if they use drugs. Both genes and 
environment can have a significant impact on the neurobiology and psychology of the 
individual. Studies have also suggested explanations of why adolescents and young 
adults appear to be more susceptible to the negative effects of drug abuse, and are at 
higher risk of engaging in harmful drug use. 
New technologies for the treatment of addiction and drug abuse
The emerging understanding of the neurobiological basis of addiction opens up the 
possibility of powerful new technologies for the treatment and, more controversially, 
the prevention of addiction or even to develop less harmful substances. Although some 
12
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of these developments remain speculative at present and others may prove politically 
unattractive, nonetheless developments in this area now raise the possibility of:
•	 novel	pharmacotherapies	targeted	at	specific	neurotransmitter	systems	and	
behaviours;
•	 new	formulations	of	these	drugs,	such	as	drug	implants	or	slow	release	formulations	
which may last up to 6 months;
•	 drug	vaccines	which	block	the	effects	of	addictive	drugs;
•	 neurological	treatments,	such	as	deep	brain	stimulation	and	transcranial	magnetic	
stimulation, that may ameliorate addictive behaviours;
•	 neuroimaging	and	genetic	technologies	to	identify	individuals	who	have	a	
vulnerability to develop addiction, or to target appropriate treatments to individuals 
and possibly;
•	 the	development	of	less	harmful	and	safer	forms	of	psychoactive	drugs.
Ethical implications for the treatment of addiction and drug abuse
Addiction neuroscience also has the potential to change how we think about 
addiction and consequently the types of policies that may be adopted to deal with 
it. Neuroscience and genetic research could arguably transform the long running 
debate between moral and medical models of addiction by providing a detailed 
causal explanation of addiction in terms of brain processes, often referred to as 
the ‘chronic and relapsing brain disease’ model of addiction. It has been assumed 
by some addiction neurobiologists that this model will lead to public support for 
less punitive ways of dealing with addiction and increased access to more effective 
and affordable addiction treatments. However, causal models of addiction, if 
misinterpreted, could also lead to the neglect of social policies for reducing addiction 
and drug use and to more coercive policies towards addicted individuals. 
Addiction is a highly stigmatised condition which causes significant harm across the 
EU. Strong moral disapproval of drug use can lead to discrimination against those 
with an addiction, possibly resulting in violations of their human rights. It could be 
argued, for example, that the existence of a minority within the European population 
who are genetically vulnerable to developing an addiction justifies:
•	 an	increased	use	of	legally	coerced	treatment,	including	the	coercive	use	of		 
long-acting pharmacotherapies, drug vaccines, and neurosurgical technologies;
•	 a	greater	reliance	on	medical	approaches	to	treating	addicted	individuals,	
at the expense of social and population strategies that aim to reduce drug use 
or drug-related harm;
13
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•	 preventing	such	individuals	from	consenting	to	participate	in	further	addiction	
research or clinical trials;
•	 discrimination	against	vulnerable	populations;	and
•	 the	promotion	of	inappropriate	diagnostic	tests	and	unevaluated	treatments	that	may	
be attractive to desperate and vulnerable persons and their families, suffering from 
addiction.
Advances in genetic testing and neuroimaging that potentially enable us to identify ‘addicts’ 
or to predict future risk of addiction in adolescents also raise ethical concerns that include: 
•	 invasion	of	privacy;	
•	 the	third	party	use	of	genetic	and	neuroimaging	data;	
•	 the	powers	of	courts	to	coerce	defendants	to	undergo	tests;	and	
•	 consumer	protection	against	the	misinterpretation	of	test	results.	
In order to fully realise the potential for these new developments in the treatment and 
prevention of addiction, the EU will need to consider the potential ethical and social 
consequences of these new technologies and the impact that addiction neuroscience may 
have on how drug use and addiction are viewed and responded to by society. The ethical 
and social ramifications of this knowledge need to be considered to ensure that the rights 
of those with an addiction are upheld, and a balance is found between providing effective 
medical care and protecting European society from drug-related harm. Failure to do so 
could lead to unanticipated consequences which could affect the public’s perception and 
acceptance of these technologies. Any inappropriate uses made of newer technologies could 
even work to the detriment rather than the benefit of those requiring treatment for addiction. 
Given significant public and media interest in the results of addiction research, a strong 
case can be made that neuroscientists and geneticists have both a moral obligation and a 
professional interest in avoiding popular misunderstandings of their work in the media. 
An ethical approach to addiction research 
There are a number of approaches which may be applied to ethical issues in addiction 
research. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to necessarily affirm any 
one of them, a broad conception of human rights has been used to frame the ethical 
discussions. The framework adopted here is that European policies towards the treatment 
of addiction and drug abuse, and the use of neuroscience and genetic research, 
should consider the following ethical values:
1) Autonomy — a person’s capacity for self-determination;
2) Liberty — a condition in which an individual has the ability to act according to his or 
her own will within a coercive — but stabilising — framework of law;
14
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3)  Privacy — the ability of an individual or group to keep their lives and personal 
affairs out of public view, or to control the flow of information about themselves;
4) Consent — intentional mediation of relationships with one another and putting in 
place new relationships, and signalling their intentions and wishes; and
5) Equality — equal treatment by the law and in medical care.
These ethical values connect human rights to the wider-community interests, and may be 
used to establish a balance between the individual’s rights and the ‘public interest’ or 
the ‘public good’ (1).
Policy issues arising for the treatment of addiction and drug abuse
Neuroscience research on addiction has the potential to significantly affect both the way 
in which we think about addiction and those that suffer from it. In light of recent research 
on the neurobiology and genetics of addiction, balancing these core ethical values with 
the broader interests of the European community has the following policy implications for 
the treatment of addiction and drug abuse:
1) More work is likely to be required to explore the ethical and policy implications of 
addiction neuroscience research to ensure that these developments are taken forward 
in ways that adequately safeguard human rights and protect the ethical values of 
consent, liberty, equality and privacy;
2) Appropriate responses to the drug problem will need to take into account emerging 
neurobiological ‘disease’ models of addiction;
3) As novel neurobiological and genetic technologies are developed for the treatment 
of addiction, policy responses will need to consider public health issues, as well as 
criminal justice ones;
4) The autonomy of addicts is variable so care is required in using medical, paternalistic 
and criminal measures;
5) Measures are required to educate the public about the neurobiological and genetic 
contribution to addiction while recognising that addiction is nonetheless affected by 
individual and social choices; and
6) Neuroscientists and geneticists should be encouraged to disseminate their findings 
responsibly and accurately, and in ways that avoid potential misinterpretations.
(1) The ‘public good’ and ‘public interest’ are sometimes treated as synonymous in the 
philosophical literature. The latter tends to be predominantly found in legal terminology. 
For simplicity, we refer to the ‘public interest’ throughout this report (see Capps, Campbell, 
ter Meulen, 2008).
Fo
rm
at:
(16
0.0
0x
23
9.9
8m
m)
;D
ate
:A
pr
03
,2
00
90
1:1
2:5
8;
Ou
tpu
tP
rof
ile
:S
PO
TI
C3
00

17
General introduction 
Over the last 20 years, the development of new techniques for studying the brain has 
led to a dramatic breakthrough in our understanding of neurobiological processes. 
The period 1990 to 2000 was designated ‘the decade of the brain’, and from this time 
onwards an increase in funding for neuroscience has been accompanied by growing 
professional and public interest in this subject. One of the issues identified as potentially 
fruitful for inquiry is: why, in both animals and man, do some substances result in a 
compulsion to use, even if they are harmful or result in negative consequences? 
Historically, the nature of dependence and addiction has been as much an area for 
philosophical as scientific discourse. Indeed some have, and continue to, argue that 
the notion itself is a social rather than biological construct. However, this debate has 
been enriched by our ability to understand better the mechanism of the brain and 
neuroscience is now providing us with a growing understanding of the neurobiological 
basis for addiction. This understanding is important as it is likely to have implications 
for both how we understand, and respond to, the drug problems that modern societies 
face. There is now increasing evidence that many addictive phenomena have a genetic 
and neurobiological basis. Research in this area offers the promise of identifying 
the neural correlates of compulsive behaviour in addiction which could lead to more 
effective treatments for addiction and as a consequence increased investment in 
addiction treatment and further research (McLellan et al., 2000; Dackis and O’Brien, 
2005; Volkow and Li, 2005). It can also be argued that an increased understanding 
of the neurobiological basis of addiction or drug dependence (1) will lend support for 
more humane social policies that recognise addiction as a neuropsychiatric condition 
that should be treated therapeutically (Dackis and O’Brien, 2005; Volkow and Li, 2005). 
This can be contrasted to the historically more punitive approach to addiction where it is 
viewed largely as a moral failing best dealt with by the criminal justice system. 
Optimism about the benefit that a better understanding of the biological basis for 
addiction may bring needs to be tempered by more critical considerations, as overly 
simplistic or reductionistic interpretations of what this kind of approach reveals about 
addiction could result in less welcome consequences, especially if inappropriate use 
is made of some of the novel approaches emerging in this field. Indeed, some of the 
earlier pronouncements made about the implications of the decade of the brain for 
addiction treatment now appear overly optimistic. Even today, some proponents in this 
area appear to let their enthusiasm for promoting potentially useful new approaches 
run ahead of the emerging science and the need for appropriate testing and clinical 
scrutiny. This report attempts to tread a middle line, alerting the reader to the potential 
benefits emerging from this exciting area of new research but also arming them with an 
(1) The terms addiction and drug dependence are used interchangeably in this report.
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understanding of the issues involved, the uncertainties that still exist, and the potential 
pitfalls that could result from the inappropriate use of some of the approaches that this 
research may soon make possible.
To achieve this aim, this report provides the latest understanding of attempts to get 
to grips with the brain changes that accompany illicit drug use, most notably in 
those that become addicted. We have tried to make the science understandable to a 
general audience although by necessity some of the concepts addressed are complex 
ones. The report investigates here both the possible welcome and unwelcome uses 
of neurobiological research with the aims of highlighting ways that will maximise the 
benefits that may arise, while minimising any unanticipated harms. The focus is on illicit 
drugs, rather than licit psychoactive substances, as this is the remit for the work of the 
EMCDDA. This distinction, from a neurobiological perspective, is to a large  
part arbitrary and much of the general argument applies equally to all substances 
with a potential to cause dependence. However, this approach is not without value as 
other reports have focused on the implications of neurobiological research on alcohol 
(Midanik, 2006) and tobacco (Hall, 2007), and the illicit nature of the drugs covered 
here has important implications for some of the ethical concerns explored.
This report falls naturally into two parts. First, a concise and accessible summary of the 
key findings of recent research on the genetics and neuroscience of addiction to illicit 
drugs is provided. Central to this is the delineation of the structures that make up the 
circuits within the brain that give rise to a system that is fundamental for our survival, 
reward processing. A number of key chemical neurotransmitters are pivotal in enabling 
this system to operate with dopamine playing a central role. The understanding that 
neuroscience provides of the importance of the reward system in addictive behaviour 
now means it may be possible to develop novel pharmacological treatments that could 
impact not only on the reward system per se but also on those systems that sub-serve 
cognitive functions such as learning and memory.
The second part of this report explores some of the key social and ethical issues raised 
by neurobiological research (a term used as shorthand here to cover both genetic and 
neuroscience research). This includes a discussion of how this research may influence the 
way that modern societies think about drug use and addiction and deal with the ethical 
issues raised by technological applications of this knowledge. The report also considers 
the more speculative possibility that addiction neurobiology may improve our ability 
to prevent the development of addiction (e.g. by using genetic screening to identify 
individuals at high risk of addiction and ‘drug vaccines’ to prevent these individuals 
from using drugs). The analysis is limited to the use of medical (e.g. neurological, 
immunological, and pharmacological) treatments of addiction. However, an important 
caveat is that psychosocial therapies, although not addressed in detail in this report, 
play an important part in the treatment of addiction, and are a critical adjunct to the 
effectiveness of existing medical treatments. This should not be taken as an indication 
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that psychosocial treatments will not continue to play a significant role in the future of 
addiction treatment, rather that the major ethical issues raised by developments in the 
neuroscience of addiction involve the application of medical technologies. 
Any report on this topic risks becoming quickly outdated as new scientific findings 
emerge. Some of the approaches described here have already advanced to the stage of 
clinical trials and may make an important contribution to the future treatment of addicted 
individuals. Other approaches may fall by the wayside as further investigation reveal 
them to have limited potential or practical application. For this reason it is not the aim of 
this report to make any definitive conclusion on the issues raised. Rather by highlighting 
recent advances in neurobiology of addiction, and the ethical issues that arise from 
such knowledge, the aim is to encourage a more informed discourse on the implications 
of neurobiological research on addiction within the European Union. To this end, the 
report concludes with some general suggestions about the directions in which this debate 
is likely to develop and those areas that will clearly require further consideration and 
investigation. Some observations are also elaborated, within a general context of human 
rights and good clinical practice that are relevant to any future policy consideration 
of how new approaches might be applied. Genetic predisposition and the information 
from genetic treatment, the use of drug vaccines and coercive treatment are just a 
sample of the issues that both the public and politicians alike will have to contend with 
in the coming years as our understanding of the neuroscience and genetics advances. 
It has been an amazing achievement to begin to unravel the complexities of the brain 
and understand the insights that this knowledge provides for our understanding of drug 
dependence. But the complex issues in this area are not all biological ones, perhaps an 
equal challenge will be ensure these findings are applied in ways that maximises benefits 
and avoids unintended or unwelcome consequences. 
Richard Muscat, Adrian Carter, Paul Griffiths, Dominique Lopez and Wayne Hall 
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Chapter 1
What is addiction?
Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall and Benjamin Capps
Introduction
Addiction and drug abuse exact an enormous toll upon European society, largely as a 
result of premature death, physical harm and increased health care costs, violence and 
crime. A significant proportion of the European population will become addicted to licit 
or illicit drugs during their lifetime. Given the health and social burden of addiction, 
there is strong public interest in preventing addiction and improving the chances that 
addicts will stop using drugs. The policies that are often used to pursue these goals 
depend critically on how drug use and addiction are understood.
Drug addiction is a pattern of behaviour in which an individual uses a drug despite 
the harm that its use causes, and despite often wanting to stop. Many addicts report 
they find it difficult to stop using drugs and they are likely to relapse to drug use if they 
succeed in stopping. There has been significant controversy about the nature of addiction 
between supporters of two dominant models. Medical models hold that addiction is a 
psychiatric disorder that requires treatment. In contrast, moral models are sceptical about 
the existence of an addictive disorder and see drug use as a choice that individuals make 
and for which they should be punished if the drug use is illegal or if they engage in 
criminal behaviour to fund their drug use. 
Neuroscience research promises to clarify our understanding of drug use and addiction 
by showing how drugs affect brain function and how chronic drug use changes the 
brain in ways that make it more difficult for addicts to stop using drugs. The chronic use 
of addictive drugs produces enduring changes in the motivation, learning and decision-
making centres of the brain that focus attention on drug use and impair the ability 
to choose not to use drugs (see Chapter 2). This research has led to the ‘chronic and 
relapsing brain disease’ model of addiction. 
This research has the potential to significantly impact upon the way in which we treat 
addiction. Scientific knowledge about the neurochemical changes underpinning addiction 
promises to improve our ability to treat, and possibly, prevent addiction. Neuroscience 
research may also change the way in which society thinks about addiction and the legal 
and social policies that are appropriate to deal with it. If addiction is a brain disease that 
impairs behaviour, it may lead to more humane treatment of those with an addiction. 
Conversely, it may also be used to increase support for more coercive use of medical 
technology to treat or more controversially ‘cure’ addiction. 
22
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This section outlines the social and economic burden of drug use and addiction in 
Europe. It also outlines the very different ways in which drug use and addiction have 
been understood and discusses how this understanding has changed in response 
to addiction neuroscience research. The sections that follow will explore the impact 
of neuroscience on addiction in greater detail, and analyse the ethical and social 
implications of this research for European policy.
The cost of addiction
Addiction, or drug dependence, is a chronic condition which has an enormous adverse 
impact on society. In most western countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), United 
States (US) and Australia, a significant proportion of the population will develop an 
addiction to illicit drugs during their lifetime (lifetime prevalence range 4–6 %) or alcohol 
(8–15 %) or both (AIHW, 1999; Kessler et al., 2005; SAMSHA, 2006; McKeganey et 
al., 2007) (1). A wider range of prevalence estimates have been reported in European 
countries, with point prevalences for illicit drug dependence ranging from 0.1–2 %, and 
0.1–7 % for alcohol (Andlin-Sobocki and Rehm, 2005) (2). 
By definition, addiction is the habitual use of a substance (or engaging in an activity such 
as compulsive gambling) despite the harms caused and impaired control over use, as 
indicated by failed attempts to stop. Addiction is commonly understood as a disorder (3) 
in which an individual’s control over their drug use is impaired. People with an addiction 
continue to use drugs in the face of enormous negative consequences, and despite 
often expressing a wish that they could stop. This definition is codified in the DSM-IV-TR 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Illness, 4th edition Text Revised) and ICD-10 
(International Classification of Diseases, 10th edition) diagnostic criteria for substance 
dependence or addiction, which describe it as a ‘loss of control’ over drug use, where 
drug taking becomes ‘compulsive’ and consumes a great deal of an individual’s time and 
resources, to the detriment of other important social roles, such as working or caring for 
children (World Health Organization, 1993b; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Drug abuse and addiction lead to increased deaths from suicide, overdose and 
drug-impaired driving. There are also increased health costs from the toxic and 
psychopathological effects of chronic drug use (e.g. liver cirrhosis from alcohol 
abuse, drug-induced psychoses, cognitive impairments and drug-related injuries), 
(1) These statistics do not include addiction to substances such as nicotine and caffeine. 
(2) Prevalence data varies considerably, and is plagued with methodological inconsistencies. 
Levels of dependence and substance abuse can differ significantly between countries, 
and the types of drugs abused may vary across Europe. The EMCDDA website provides 
more detailed data on drug use prevalence in all EU Member States: http://www.emcdda.
europa.eu/ 
(3) The term ‘disorder’ may be seen as implying a disease model of addiction, but in this 
instance the term is being used in its weakest sense to describe patterns of behaviour that 
commonly co-occur, are statistically uncommon and are associated with social and personal 
impairment.
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and the complications of injecting drug use that include thromboses, septicaemia 
and the transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and other blood borne 
diseases. It is estimated that there are between 6 500 and 8 500 acute drug-related 
deaths (e.g. overdoses) in Europe every year (approximately 3.5 % of all deaths 
in European adults aged 15–39 years in 2005–06) adding up to about 130 000 
deaths since 1990–2005 (EMCDDA, 2008). These figures do not include deaths 
attributed to drug-related accidents, violence, suicides or chronic illnesses. Within 
some European cities, approximately 10–23 % of the overall mortality among young 
adults (15–49 years old) can be attributed either directly or indirectly to opioid use 
(EMCDDA, 2008). 
Addicted illicit drug users also often engage in crime and violence to finance their drug 
use. This leads to substantial judicial and prison costs. Illicit drug abuse is associated 
with increased criminality, with 65–80 % of arrestees in the UK having used illicit drugs 
in the 12 months prior to being arrested (McKeganey et al., 2007). Chronic use of some 
substances (e.g. cocaine and methamphetamine) can also produce neuropsychological 
changes associated with impulsive violence. Drug abuse leads to lost employment and 
increased social welfare, and broader adverse impacts on families and relationships 
(EMCDDA, 2006; Hall et al., 2006).
The social and economic costs of drug abuse and addiction in European nations are 
substantial (EMCDDA, 2008). There is limited consistent data on the cost of drug abuse 
in Europe, as Member States differ significantly in what they report as a drug-related 
cost (EMCDDA, 2008). While the economic burden of drug abuse and addiction can be 
difficult to quantify, (4) it has been estimated that 10 % of the overall burden of disease 
in Europe is attributable to substance use disorders and addiction (Rehm et al., 2005). 
In the UK, where reporting includes a broad range of drug-use associated costs, the 
estimated current economic burden of illicit drug use is GBP 13 billion/year, largely due 
to costs associated with crime. Alcohol contributes a further GBP 20 billion/year (Nutt et 
al., 2007a). Studies suggest that the burden of drug use is rising because of increases 
in the number of people abusing drugs and in the quantity of drugs that they use 
(EMCDDA, 2007a; McKeganey et al., 2007). 
Despite the enormous costs of addiction and drug use, a minority of those with addiction 
receive treatment, and often this treatment is only modestly effective (McKeganey et 
al., 2007). Of those that did receive treatment in 2006, half were treated primarily for 
opioid use (principally heroin), and increasingly given access to effective treatments, such 
as methadone and buprenorphine maintenance (EMCDDA, 2008). However, the majority 
of individuals with a drug addiction do not receive treatment for their condition in the US 
(Demyttenaere et al., 2004), or the UK (McKeganey et al., 2007).
(4) Not only do countries differ in what they report as a burden on drug use or addiction, 
but it can be difficult to distinguish between what is a burden of a substance use disorder, 
and what is a consequence of non-addicted drug use (Andlin-Sobocki and Rehm, 2005).
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The non-therapeutic use of opiates (e.g. heroin or morphine) and psychostimulants 
(e.g. cocaine or methamphetamine) is prohibited in all European countries. Cannabis is 
illegal in most European countries although laws on possession and use are often not 
rigorously enforced. The distribution of these drugs is illegal and many individuals may 
be charged with an offence, and possibly imprisoned as a result of criminal activities 
(such as drug selling or property crime) that are engaged in to fund the use of an 
expensive illegal substance. 
Understanding addiction
The way in which society has traditionally understood addiction, and thought of those 
who are addicted, has changed over many decades (White, 1998). Addiction is a 
complex behavioural disorder that is influenced by biological, psychological and 
sociological factors. It is the prototypical biopsychosocial disorder. As our understanding 
of how each of these elements impacts on addiction changes, so do our social policies 
to deal with it, as well as the treatments that are used to reduce or prevent it. This 
section describes two competing models of addiction — the medical and moral, or 
sceptical models of addiction. These two models represent the extremes of perceptions 
of addiction and provide a useful construct with which to think about governing views of 
Figure 1: Governing ideas about drug use 
This is a schematic diagram depicting 
the develop ment of dominant attitudes 
towards drug use dur ing the twentieth 
century. The trajectory of the line was 
determined from an expert committee’s 
judgements about the ‘ideological 
“centre of gravity”’ in the US, based on 
canonical historic texts (Gerstein and 
Harwood, 1990). Arguably, since this 
study was conducted, there has been 
a considerable shift back towards the 
medical model of addiction, largely 
due to advances in the neuroscience 
research of addiction.
 
Reprinted with permission from Treating Drug 
Problems © edited by Gerstein and Harwood, 
US Institute of Medicine; Committee for the 
Substance Abuse Coverage Study, National 
Institute on Drug Abuse, 1990 by the National 
Academy of Sciences, Courtesy of the 
National Academies Press, Washington, DC.
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addiction (5) (see Figure 1). This section analyses the ability of each model to explain the 
phenomenology of addiction and highlights some of the potential consequences of each 
approach for social policies and treatment outcomes.
 Sceptical versus medical models of addiction
The dominant ‘moral’ or ‘sceptical’ view of addiction holds that ‘addicts’ are simply drug 
users who knowingly and willingly choose to use drugs without regard for the adverse 
consequences that their actions bring upon themselves and others. In this sceptical view, 
‘addiction’ is an ‘excuse’ for continuing to use drugs while ‘avoiding responsibility’ for 
the consequences of doing so (Szasz, 1975; Davies, 1997).
Sceptical views make sense of one of the key features of ‘addictive behaviour’: drug 
use is initially a voluntary choice that develops into an addictive pattern in a minority 
of those who use most drugs, including the most addictive illicit drugs such as heroin, 
and cocaine (Anthony et al., 1994). Proponents of this view argue that even among the 
significant minority of drug users who do become addicted, most succeed in stopping 
their use by themselves (Peele, 2004). 
Sceptical views of addiction, however, are inconsistent with a number of reliable 
empirical observations about drug use and addictive behaviour. First, a significant 
minority of people who use drugs become addicted and the size of that minority 
depends on the way that the drug is consumed and its pharmacological actions, e.g. 
its rapidity of onset and duration of effect (Anthony and Helzer, 1991). Hence, short-
acting opioids like heroin that are injected are more likely to result in addiction than 
drugs like alcohol that people drink. Second, there is also an identifiable subset of 
individuals who are more likely to develop an addiction. This includes people who have 
more contact with drugs or peers who use drugs, who use drugs at an earlier age, who 
are from socially disadvantaged backgrounds or perform poorly in school, who have 
a family history of addictive behaviour, or suffer from a mental disorder (Hawkins et 
al., 1992). Third, the use of drugs in the face of often serious negative health and social 
consequences and in the absence of any pleasure derived from their use, suggests that 
addiction is more than mere wilful bad behaviour. These observations have led to a 
‘medical centred’ model of addiction, according to which heavy drug use over long 
periods of time produces physiological and psychological changes in the individual that 
progressively override the degree of ‘choice’ they are able to exercise in using the drug.
The worldwide prevalence of sceptical views of addiction, and the significant personal 
and social harm that drug abuse causes, have led to punitive laws to discourage drug 
use, and a comparative lack of investment in medical research into addiction or the 
development of interventions to treat it. Despite the broad acceptance of these policies, 
(5) It is important to note they these two models are generally only theoretical constructs for 
understanding addiction. Most real-world views on addiction lie somewhere along  
a continuum between these two views.
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efforts have largely proven ineffective in reducing drug use and addiction, and have 
often contributed to the social cost of addiction by leading to the imprisonment of many 
drug users who typically return to drug use and re-offend upon release (Gerstein and 
Harwood, 1990; National Research Council, 2001). These policies have also led to 
discrimination and inappropriate restriction or derogation of the rights of those who are 
addicted. The fact that these policies have been largely unsuccessful in reducing drug 
use or addiction indicates that alternative explanations are required that consider the 
effect that repeated drug use has on an individual’s ability to choose whether or not to 
take that drug. Such explanations increasingly appeal to neurobiological theories of 
addiction, which lend support more readily to ‘medical centred’ policies. Although such 
policies still advocate predominately punitive measures, medical treatment and social 
support and action are also encouraged to deal with addicts and problem drug users.
The ‘Chronic and Relapsing Brain Disease’ model of addiction
Neuroscience research of addiction is challenging traditional notions of addiction 
as a purely voluntary choice. Studies are beginning to show that chronic drug use 
can produce long-lasting changes in brain function that make drug use a central 
preoccupation and undermine the capacity of individuals to refrain from using 
drugs. A theory that is gaining widespread attention, particularly in the US, is 
the ‘chronic, relapsing brain disease’ model first described by the former Director 
of the National Institute on Drug Addiction (NIDA), Dr. Alan Leshner (1997). 
According to NIDA, addiction is caused by chronic self-administration of drugs 
that produce enduring changes in brain neurotransmitter systems, leaving addicts 
vulnerable to relapse after abstinence has been achieved (Leshner, 1997; Volkow 
and Li, 2005). In the same way that cardiovascular disease is a result of abnormal 
heart tissue, the chronic disease model of addiction holds that addiction is the 
result of abnormal neural tissue (Volkow and Li, 2004). 
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Chapter 2
The neurobiology of addiction
Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall and David Nutt
Introduction
Neuroscience is beginning to uncover the neurochemical changes that occur within 
particular functional regions of the brain that are responsible for the behaviour in 
addiction. In doing so, neuroscience research is beginning to help us see that those who 
are addicted to drugs suffer from neurocognitive and motivational impairments that 
require treatment. 
Our cognitive abilities enable us to quickly discern which activities are worth pursuing in 
our environment. We engage in activities that are ‘rewarding’ and serve survival values 
such as obtaining food, shelter, or sex. These rewards are generally experienced as 
pleasurable and motivate behaviour. We quickly learn which activities are rewarding 
and what environmental cues are associated with receiving these rewards. These cues 
acquire an incentive or motivating quality that ensures that we pursue the goals that they 
signal in the future. 
Highly motivating goals or events become deeply engrained in our thinking, allowing us 
to respond to these rewards quickly and effortlessly, habitually and without conscious 
thought. This learning increases the efficiency and power of thought by focussing our 
attention and energy on what is relevant in the environment, making it more likely that 
we will achieve our goals with a minimum of effort. 
Not all forms of learned and rewarding activities are desirable. In addiction, drug use 
becomes over-learned because repeated drug use over-activates the central reward 
systems in the brain, enabling drug use to take precedence over all other goal-directed 
activities that are essential to survival. This ability for addictive drugs to strongly activate 
the reward pathway is commonly referred to as their reinforcing effect. Chronic use 
of addictive drugs can also dampen the central reward pathway’s responsiveness 
to everyday rewarding activities that motivate us and give life meaning, such as 
relationships, work and education. These changes are also believed to explain why the 
pursuit of drugs can come to dominate the lives of many addicts, at the expense of most 
other interests.
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Addiction also impairs a number of other cognitive processes that perpetuate drug use. 
Many of these are included in the diagnostic criteria for drug dependence or addiction 
(World Health Organization, 1993b; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). They 
include: 
•	 a	feeling	of	compulsion	to	use	drugs;
•	 an	impaired	ability	to	avoid	using	drugs	when	opportunities	arise;
•	 an	impaired	understanding	of	the	consequences	of	continued	drug	taking;	and
•	 the	ability	for	cues	associated	with	drug	use	(e.g.	location,	time	of	day,	or	activities)	
and stress to produce a relapse to drug use in an abstinent individual, even months 
or years after stopping. 
Addiction neurobiology is beginning to uncover how chronic use of addictive drugs can also 
disrupt other important neural pathways in the brain that lead to these cognitive deficits. 
Chronic drug use can produce neurochemical changes in the higher cortical regions 
of the front of the brain (the frontal cortex), that make drug use so appealing, and can 
impair the ability to override impulses not to use drugs. This has the effect of focussing 
the attention of the addicted individual on drug use, and can make decisions not to 
use drugs more difficult. These changes are also believed to explain the emergence of 
intense cravings for the drug of addiction, and continued drug use despite enormous 
negative consequences for the addict. Neuroadaptations within other parts of the frontal 
cortex are also understood to be involved in the impaired ability to appreciate the 
consequences of continued drug use.
The discovery of persistent changes within the regions of the brain responsible for 
learning and memory also helps to explain why relapse to drug use is so common, even 
despite months and sometimes years of abstinence. Neuroadaptations at the synapses 
within these regions give memories of drug use a heightened salience. Consequently, 
events or cues that recall these memories (e.g. an image of injecting equipment or the 
drug itself; revisiting places where the drug was consumed), have the ability to trigger 
intense cravings for the drug of addiction, which often results in a relapse to drug 
use. These neuroadaptations have been seen in addicted individuals who have been 
abstinent for months (Volkow and Fowler, 2000). Stress is a potent trigger of relapse, 
and neuroscience is also beginning to explain how chronic drug use can leave addicted 
individuals vulnerable to relapse when under stress.
Research has also identified neuropsychological and genetic differences in individuals 
that may influence their chances of developing addiction if they use drugs. By providing 
a better understanding of how addiction develops, this research highlights the potential 
for new psychological and pharmacological treatments to treat and, more speculatively, 
prevent addiction (see Chapter 3). 
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Neuroscience suggests that addiction is a pathological behaviour in which addictive drugs 
co-opt normal learning and motivating pathways in the brain so that drug taking comes to 
dominate all other goal-directed activities. Such a view has the potential to not only unlock 
a wide array of new and powerful treatments of addiction that target or ameliorate these 
changes, but also has the potential to change how we think about and treat those with an 
addiction (see Chapter 1 and this chapter). Given the central importance of the brain and 
the strong moral attitudes that many people feel towards those who abuse or are addicted 
to drugs, the nature and impact of these changes needs to be considered. Such an analysis 
will need to critically examine the emerging neuroscience research on addiction. This 
research also has implications for the types of social policies we use to reduce addiction 
and harmful drug use. The social and ethical implications of this research are explored 
in Chapter 5. This section will review current neuroscience research of addiction, and will 
explain how the chronic abuse of addictive drugs can alter the neurochemical structure 
and function of the brain in ways that lead to the psychology of addiction.
The neuroanatomy of addiction
Addiction is a quintessentially complex behavioural disorder that operates at the 
biological, psychological and social levels. This complexity is reflected in the number of 
neurocognitive systems that are affected by drug addiction. These systems have often 
been studied in isolation, leading to the development of competing partial models that 
purport to explain all of addiction. A more complete picture of the neuroanatomy of 
addiction is beginning to emerge from the convergence of these different approaches.
Neuroimaging, using technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
and positron emission tomography (PET), has provided critical insights into the way in 
which drug-induced changes in the brain can produce the type of cognitive deficits seen 
in drug-addicted people. The ability to directly visualise the brain of addicted individuals 
has identified changes in multiple brain systems that may explain loss of control and 
compulsive drug taking. These changes may also explain why abstinence is difficult to 
achieve and why relapse so often occurs after long periods of abstinence.  
The neurocognitive systems that are affected by addictive drugs include:
•	 reward	and	reinforcement	—	in	the	nucleus	accumbens	(NAcc)
•	 compulsion,	craving	and	inhibitory	control	—	in	the	orbitofrontal	cortex	(OFC)	and	
anterior cingulate gyrus (aCG)
•	 executive	control	and	cognitive	impairment	—	in	the	prefrontal	cortex	(PFC)
•	 memory,	learning	and	habits	—	in	the	amygdala,	hippocampus	and	striatum
•	 representation	of	bodily	urges	—	in	the	insula	cortex
•	 stress	—	in	the	hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal	(HPA)	axis.
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Changes to the dopaminergic reward pathway, with its dense connections to the forebrain 
and the higher cognitive centres of the frontal cortex, are central to the development 
of addictive behaviours (see Figure 2). However, this is not the complete picture. This 
research is still only in its infancy and there is still considerable uncertainty about the 
degree to which these neural regions are involved in addiction. It is also unclear how the 
activities in these various brain regions differ between individuals. In particular, there is 
debate within the field as to whether addiction results from (1) abnormally strong urges, 
drives or motivation that overcome our normal ability to inhibit behaviour or exercise 
executive control, or (2) cognitive impairment that reduces the ability to inhibit everyday 
impulses, or (3) some combination of the two.
This section briefly reviews neuroanatomical and neurochemical changes that underpin 
these cognitive behaviours and how they develop and maintain the cycle of addiction.  
It concludes with a brief review of individual differences in genetic and neuropsychological 
make-up that can leave some vulnerable to drug use, or developing an addiction if 
they use drugs. The impact that social events can have on how these vulnerabilities are 
expressed is also briefly discussed.
Reward and reinforcement: the ‘Dopamine Hypothesis’
In 2007, neuroscientists celebrated the 50th anniversary of the discovery of the key 
neurotransmitter, dopamine, by Arvid Carlsson who won the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 
2000 (Bjorklund and Dunnett, 2007). It is probably the most widely studied neurochemical, 
and it has had a greater impact on biological psychiatry and psychopharmacology than any 
Figure 2: Projections from midbrain and NAcc to forebrain
Dopaminergic neurons from the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra, project to the central 
reward area, the nucleus accumbens and to the cortical areas primarily responsible for making 
decisions, such as whether to use drugs (e.g. the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate 
gyrus). Projections from the midbrain also make connections with the striatum (e.g. caudate and 
putamen). Source: (Hyman et al., 2006).
Reprinted, with permission, from the Annual Review of Neuroscience, Volume 29 © 2006 by Annual Reviews 
(www.annualreviews.org).
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other neurotransmitter (Iversen and Iversen, 2007). Dopamine is a central neurotransmitter 
that serves a variety of functions. These include: the fine-tuning of motor control and 
cognitive function; modulating the salience of events and attention, learning and memory; 
bonding and attachment in relationships; and the planning and motivation of behaviour. 
Many of the most widely used medications in psychiatry act on the dopaminergic system. 
It is now widely accepted that dopamine also plays an important role in addiction to most 
drugs of abuse (Volkow and Li, 2004), although the nature of this role remains a subject for 
debate and further study. Research is beginning to show that addiction also involves changes 
within a number of neurochemicals and neurotransmitter systems such as the endogenous 
opioids, glutamate and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) (Goodman, 2008), some of which 
are discussed below. While changes in these systems are indeed important in a variety of 
addictions, they nearly all appear to exert their influence through the dopaminergic reward 
system (Goodman, 2008). A complete discussion of all the neurochemicals involved in 
addiction is beyond the scope of this report. Those interested in the neurochemical activity 
of other molecules in addiction, in particular the important roles of norepinephrine and 
serotonin should refer to the comprehensive review by Goodman (2008) (1).
Amphetamines, cocaine, alcohol, nicotine and cannabis, directly or indirectly, act on a 
forebrain structure known as the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) producing large and rapid 
releases of dopamine (Robbins et al., 2007). This increase in dopamine is central to the 
development of addiction. The signal produced by these drugs originates in the neurons 
of the midbrain ventral tegmental area (VTA), which release dopamine into synapses 
in the NAcc (Wise and Bozarth, 1987; Koob and Bloom, 1988; Di Chiara, 1998), as 
shown in Figure 2. Cocaine, amphetamines, and ecstasy directly increase the amount of 
dopamine available for post-synaptic signalling either by increasing dopamine release 
or by reducing dopamine reuptake from the synapse (Hutcheson et al., 2001) (2). (See 
Figure 3). Alcohol, cannabis and nicotine (3) increase dopamine activity indirectly, by 
stimulating neurons that influence dopaminergic neurons (Koob and Le Moal, 1997; 
Nisell et al., 1994). For example, as shown in Figure 4, alcohol binds to GABA receptors 
that reduce the inhibitory influence of GABAergic neurons on dopamine-firing cells. 
(1) Since 2005, pharmacological and genetic studies have highlighted an important role for 
norepinephrine and serotonin in the development and maintenance of addictive behaviours 
(Salomon et al., 2006). It has even been suggested that these changes could occur 
independently of dopamine (Lanteri et al., 2007). Such research appears to contradict studies 
that block dopamine during the self-administration of addictive drugs in animals (Koob and 
Le Moal, 2006). There is considerable debate in this area and more research is required. 
Interested readers are directed to a recent article in Biochemical Pharmacology (Tassin, 2008).
(2) Dopamine reuptake is reduced by blocking the dopamine agonist transporter (DAT), which 
increases the amount of dopamine in the synapse, and therefore dopamine signalling.
(3) It must be noted that nicotine appears to be an atypical addictive drug as the increases in 
dopamine as a result of nicotine ingestion are not as high as those seen with other addictive 
substances (e.g. psychostimulants and opiates). There is some evidence to suggest that the 
addictive capacity of nicotine may depend in part on other chemicals contained in tobacco, 
such as the monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs) (see Villegier, 2006).
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Figure 3: Psychostimulant increase of dopamine activity at the accumbens
Stimulants such as cocaine and amphetamine increase synaptic dopamine at the nucleus accumbens 
by: (a) blocking the dopamine agonist transporter (DAT) (i.e. cocaine) which reuptakes dopamine 
from the synapse, thus increasing the amount of dopamine active in the synapse thereby increasing 
dopamine signalling; or (b) entering the dopamine neurons via the DAT (i.e. amphetamine) and 
causing an increase in dopamine released by the neuron (Hyman et al., 2006).
Reprinted, with permission, from the Annual Review of Neuroscience, Volume 29 © 2006 by Annual 
Reviews (www.annualreviews.org).
Abbreviations: DA: dopamine; VMAT: vesicular monoamine transporter.
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Figure 4: Actions of a variety of drugs on accumbal dopamine activity
Reprinted, with permission, from the Annual Review of Neuroscience, Volume 29 © 2006 by Annual 
Reviews (www.annualreviews.org).
Nearly all drugs of addiction act by increasing the release of dopamine in the nucleus 
accumbens (here indicated as NAc; bottom right). This increase may be direct, such as the case 
with stimulants, which increases the release of dopamine by neurons of the ventral tegmental 
area (VTA; bottom left). Other drugs of addiction (e.g. alcohol, cannabis and nicotine) increase 
dopamine activity indirectly, by influencing neurons which then change the amount of dopamine 
released into the NAcc. This may be the result of an inhibition of a disinhibiting response, such 
as occurs with opiates, as well as an excitatory response (e.g. nicotine). Note: ‘+’ refers to an 
excitatory response, ‘-’ denotes inhibition (Hyman et al., 2006).
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Dopamine, reward and learning
The NAcc is a critical part of the neural system that is involved in learning, reward 
and motivation. Everyday rewarding activities, or natural reinforcers, such as food, 
relationships and sex, produce much smaller increases in dopamine in the NAcc than 
drugs of addiction (Kelley and Berridge, 2002). Some addictive drugs produce over 
10 times more dopamine in the NAcc than natural reinforcers, and the increased 
dopamine response to drugs lasts much longer. It is this excess release of dopamine by 
addictive drugs that is thought to make drug use so much more appealing than everyday 
rewarding activities (Hyman, 2005) (see Figure 5).
The increase in dopamine signalling in the NAcc was believed to give drugs their 
rewarding or euphoric affects. Imaging of brain function during intoxication shows that 
increases in accumbal dopamine are correlated with subjective reports of euphoria 
(Volkow et al., 2004a). This is clearest for stimulant drugs where the greater the 
dopamine release in the NAcc, the greater the euphoria that is reported (Laruelle et al., 
1995; Drevets et al., 2001). This is not always the case, however. There are many studies 
which show a poor correlation between subjective states of pleasure and drug-taking 
(Robinson and Berridge, 2000). As addiction progresses, the consumption of larger 
amounts of drugs does not increase the pleasure experienced; in fact in most cases, 
rewarding or euphoric experiences decrease with increasing use. Moreover, nicotine is 
a highly addictive drug that increases dopamine release in the NAcc in the absence of 
Redrawn from NIDA ‘Drugs, brains and behavior: The science of addiction’, Washington DC, 2007.
Figure 5: Rewarding activities increase dopamine signalling
Drugs of addiction act on the brain’s reward pathway to cause enormous increases in dopamine 
activity in the nucleus accumbens. Everyday activities also increase dopamine activity in this 
reward pathway, but to a much smaller extent. The exaggerated release of dopamine due 
to drugs such as cocaine produces changes in other parts of the nervous system that focuses 
attention on drug use.
Dopamine 
Transporters
Dopamine
Dopamine 
Receptors
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any significant euphoric effects (Nisell et al., 1994; Balfour, 2004; Koob and Le Moal, 
2006). Recent research has suggested that dopaminergic release within the NAcc may 
in fact reflect the salience, or significance, of stimuli, irrespective of their rewarding or 
euphoria-inducing capacity (4). Chronic drug use produces changes in the motivation 
or reward pathway that sensitise the reward system to addictive drugs and drug-stimuli. 
These systems do not mediate the pleasurable or euphoric aspect of drug-taking so 
much as a ‘subcomponent of reward’ that is called salience (Robinson and Berridge, 
2000, p. s94). By associating large increases in dopamine with drug taking and drug 
stimuli learning drives the motivation to take drugs, independently of any pleasure that 
their use may bring. Thus, events may be perceived as salient not just because of their 
rewarding effects, but because they are novel or grab attention. This property may 
explain why aversive or unpleasant stimuli are also able to motivate behaviour (Robinson 
and Berridge, 2000), why drug use persists long after its immediate effects cease to be 
rewarding, and why nicotine increases dopamine release without producing euphoric 
effects (Robbins et al., 2007). 
This research suggests that dopamine functions as a signal for learning about 
experiences. It is released when a rewarding experience is new, better than expected, 
or unanticipated (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2006). It is important in identifying 
and remembering which activities or experiences are worth pursuing and repeating. 
Dopamine signalling motivates the repetition of behaviour that increases its release 
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998). Hence, when the dopamine system becomes over-
aroused by drug use, pursuit of the repetition of these effects can dominate other 
important goal-directed activities. Drugs of addiction exploit this natural reward pathway 
to motivate repeated use of a drug. 
The ability for the consumption of an addictive drug to reinforce or motivate repeated 
drug use by increasing dopamine activity, is the result of acute rewarding events that 
occur against a background of a normal functioning dopaminergic reward system. While 
drug use initially increases dopamine release, chronic drug use dramatically decreases 
dopamine release. The repetitive increase in dopamine release and signalling in the 
reward pathway leads to a down-regulation of dopamine signalling, and a dampening 
of activity in the reward pathway. The neurochemistry of the reward pathway appears 
to adapt to the repeated abnormal elevations in dopamine release by compensatory 
down-regulation. This is largely the result of a decrease in the number of post-synaptic 
dopamine receptors in regions such as the striatum (Volkow and Li, 2004) (see Figure 6). 
(4) There is some controversy about the specific role that dopamine plays in these processes 
of addiction (e.g. reward, incentive salience or motivation, or learning). Nonetheless, 
it is likely that changes in dopamine activity as a result of drug use are central to the 
development of addictive behaviours. This review will not attempt to resolve these debates, 
but will rather focus on areas where there is consensus. For a thorough discussion, see 
the 2007 review and commentary in Psychopharmacology (Berridge, 2007; Robbins and 
Everitt, 2007), or (Kelley and Berridge, 2002).
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These effects significantly reduce activity in the dopaminergic reward system. In these 
ways, the repeated use of drugs appears to reset the threshold for activating the reward 
system so that the NAcc becomes less sensitive to the rewarding effects of everyday 
activities in chronic drug users. However, increased doses of addictive drugs can 
still produce large dopamine increases that are able to activate the reward centres. 
As repeated drug use gains enhanced salience over normal or everyday reinforcing 
activities, the conditioned learning of the association between the drug’s effects and 
associated external cues is strengthened. This reduced activity in the dopamine reward 
circuit can persist for months after abstinence, and may be one reason why abstinent 
addicts can relapse months or even years after becoming abstinent (Volkow and Fowler, 
2000; Volkow et al., 2004a). The dampening of the dopamine activity within the reward 
pathway is also understood to lead to the onset of withdrawal symptoms (see below).
Dopamine and withdrawal 
The changes in the dopaminergic reward system produced by chronic drug use may also 
explain the process of drug withdrawal (Hyman, 2005; Hyman et al., 2006). Abrupt 
cessation of chronic drug use leads to a decrease in dopamine release and elevated 
thresholds of reward that may lead to drug seeking to relieve the aversive state of 
withdrawal. In this way, relief of withdrawal symptoms can become a motivational state 
like thirst or hunger (Hutcheson et al., 2001) that motivates drug seeking  
(Koob and Le Moal, 1997). 
Figure 6: Decreased dopamine receptors due to drug abuse
Reprinted with permission from the American Journal of Psychiatry (© 2001), American Psychiatric 
Association.
While initial drug use produces large increases in dopamine activity, chronic drug use eventually 
leads to a significant reduction in dopamine activity. Abuse of the stimulant methamphetamine 
produces significant decreases in the density of dopamine receptors in the striatum. Such persistent 
changes in dopamine signalling are thought to explain why individuals with an addiction become 
so motivated to consume drugs.
Healthy Control Drug Abuse
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The dopamine theory of addiction is often referred to as an hedonic model of addiction. 
That is, it assumes that individuals use addictive drugs in order to experience pleasure 
and avoid withdrawal symptoms. While withdrawal partially explains the desire of addicts 
to take drugs, it does not explain the compulsion or loss of control over use in addiction 
(Tiffany, 1990; O’Brien et al., 1998). Nor does it explain why addictive drugs like cocaine 
and amphetamines that do not produce intense withdrawal symptoms, are nonetheless 
highly addictive. In seeking to explain these phenomena, recent neurobiological research 
has focused on the effects that chronic drug use has on the functioning of parts of the 
brain involved in behavioural control, memory, cognition and decision-making.
The endogenous opioid system 
The brain’s endogenous opioid system is another system that also plays a role in addiction. 
This is a peptide neurotransmitter system that comprises a number of different peptides (the 
endorphins, enkephalins and dynorphin) that interact with one of the three opioid receptors 
— mu, delta and kappa. Mu receptors mediate the pleasurable effects of both opiate drugs, 
such as heroin and morphine (5) as well as endogenous opioids, such as the endorphins.
The identification of the mu receptor as the site of action for heroin and other opioids led 
to the use of antagonists (drugs like naloxone and naltrexone that prevent the rewarding 
effects of heroin by binding to the same receptors) to treat opiate addiction (see p. 60). 
These antagonists are also clinically useful in alcohol addiction, probably because alcohol 
also releases endorphins in the brain. Changes in brain opioid receptors may also play 
a part in addiction to other drugs (6), which may explain why opioid antagonists, such as 
naltrexone, appear to be effective in the treatment of other addictions (see p. 61).
Research has shown that changes in dopamine and opioids in response to drug use 
appear to be necessary for developing addiction (7). But large increases in dopamine 
activity in the limbic regions are not sufficient for the development of addiction because 
they can occur in both addicted and non-addicted individuals. Dopamine release 
explains why drugs of addiction are rewarding or reinforcing, but it does not explain 
why some users stop while others continue to use these drugs after their rewarding 
effects have ceased and in the face of negative social and physical consequences of 
use. Addiction is due to a number of plastic changes or neuroadaptations throughout 
the brain that are responsible for the cognitive behaviours necessary for maintaining the 
cycle of addiction. The neurobiological changes that underpin these cognitive deficits is 
the next topic of this section.
(5) Mice that do not possess mu receptors do not self-administer opioids (Becker et al., 2000).
(6) PET studies have shown that opioid receptors are increased in people withdrawing from 
cocaine (Zubieta et al., 1996), opioids (Williams et al., 2007) and alcohol  
(Heinz et al., 2005).
(7) Dopamine antagonists which block the release of dopamine prevent the reinforcing effects 
of drug use in animals. While rats treated with dopamine antagonists fail to associate the 
effects of drug use with the context in which the drugs were given (Hyman, 2005).
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Molecular and cellular changes in addiction
There is increasing evidence that chronic drug use, and the changes in dopamine 
signalling outlined above, produce neuroadaptations in the molecular and cellular 
neurocircuitry that maintain addiction, especially in the mesolimbic dopamine system. 
Chronic drug use leads to plastic changes at the synapses in key neural circuits that are 
believed to be responsible for characteristic addictive behaviours discussed below.
There has been significant research since the early 1970s to identify the molecular and 
cellular processes that can strengthen or weaken the connectivity between neurons; a 
process first hypothesised to exist as early as 1894 by the pioneering neuroscientist, 
Ramón y Cajal (Kauer and Malenka, 2007). This process is now referred to as synaptic 
plasticity. This refers to the molecular and cellular process by which information, 
experience or learned responses are stored in the brain. 
The molecular machinery for synaptic plasticity was first observed in the excitatory 
glutamate synapses of the hippocampus (Bliss and Lomo, 1973). This molecular process 
is referred to as long-term potentiation (LTP) and describes how observed behaviours 
or learning can be encoded through molecular and cellular changes in neural 
connectivity. Synaptic plasticity is an activity-dependent process that allows synapses to 
be strengthened (LTP), or weakened (long-term depression or LTD). LTP is the signalling 
process which allows the synaptic connection between two neurons to be strengthened. 
The most widely studied and best understood form of LTP or synaptic plasticity is 
N-methyl-D-asparate receptor (NMDAR)-dependent LTP. (8) The co-occurrence of NMDAR 
activation due to presynaptic glutamate release while the post-synaptic membrane is 
significantly depolarised sets off a signalling cascade that strengthens the synaptic 
connection. The activation of the NMDAR allows calcium to enter the postsynaptic 
neuron, triggers the intracellular signalling cascade which results in an increase in the 
number of α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole propinonic acid receptors (AMPARs) 
in the post-synaptic membrane. This signalling cascade also produces morphological 
changes of the neuron that appear to be essential for the LTP of the synapse. This change 
in the synapse allows a form of information, whether it be an experience of an event or 
a learned response, to be encoded in the brain. The process of LTP is best captured in 
the phrase: ‘neurons that fire together, wire together’. The molecular mechanisms that 
underpin NMDAR-dependent synaptic plasticity are depicted in Figure 7. These synaptic 
(8) The signalling processes involved in synaptic plasticity are extremely complex and can 
vary somewhat in different regions. This research is also in its infancy so there is significant 
uncertainty about the specific details. Much more research is required. Consequently, only 
a brief overview of this area of research is provided, with a focus on areas where there is 
consensus. The NMDAR-dependent LTP is discussed to give readers a greater appreciation 
of the kinds of molecular and cellular changes that are involved in synaptic plasticity. This 
section is only intended to give the reader an understanding of how chronic use of addictive 
drugs interferes with molecular and cellular processes in order to produce the psychological 
behaviours characteristic of addiction. For a more detailed discussion of synaptic plasticity 
in addiction, see (Kauer and Malenka, 2007).
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changes also involve a number of fundamental cellular processes, such as intracellular 
signalling, gene regulation and expression, protein synthesis and trafficking, membrane 
organisation and excitability, and neuronal morphology.
The association between synaptic changes and learning and memory was first described 
in hippocampal neurons, a region important in remembering the details or facts of 
events (declarative memory). It has been argued that addiction is a form of pathological 
learning and memory (Kelley, 2004; Hyman, 2005; Hyman et al., 2006). However, it is 
becoming apparent that the plasticity of LTP, and the complementary LTD that involves 
a weakening of synaptic connectivity, are basic molecular processes that occur at most 
synapses throughout the brain, including the mesolimbic reward pathway, and cortical 
regions. They are involved in strengthening or weakening synapses that are associated 
with a wide variety of cognitive functions. 
Figure 7: NMDAR-dependent long-term potentiation
Reprinted from Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Volume 8, ‘Synaptic plasticity and addiction’, Kauer 
and Malenka (© 2007) with permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 
Highly simplified schematic diagram of the process 
of synaptic plasticity observed in the brain’s gluta-
matergic neurons. N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor 
(NMDAR)-dependent long-term potentiation (LTP) 
has been observed in many different brain regions. 
It is dependent upon the co-occurrence of postsy-
naptic NMDAR activation during significant mem-
brane depolarization, which then initiates internal 
signalling molecules, such as calcium/calmodulin-
dependent protein-kinase II (CaMKII). These signal-
ling molecules result in the insertion of a α-amino-
3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole propionic acid 
receptor (AMPAR) into the postsynaptic membrane 
— a major mechanism underlying LTP expression. 
There are several other types of synaptic plasticity 
that have been observed. We will not discuss them 
here, but they all involve a network of complex 
molecular and synaptic changes, similar to those 
depicted in the Figure (see Kauer and Malenka, 
2007 for a more complete discussion).
There is now increasing evidence that the processes involved in synaptic plasticity are 
involved in the development and maintenance of addiction, and provide the molecular 
mechanisms for the neuroanatomical changes that underpin the psychological 
behaviours characteristic of addiction, such as craving, impaired impulse inhibition 
and relapse (Kauer and Malenka, 2007). Many of the molecules implicated in LTP 
and LTD have been shown to be involved in the synaptic plasticity due to drug abuse 
(Kelley, 2004). Blocking NMDARs has been shown to prevent the formation of addictive 
behaviours, and synaptic changes in animal models (Kauer and Malenka, 2007). 
Presynaptic 
terminal
AMPARNMDAR
Dendritic 
spine
Expression: postsynaptic 
insertion of AMPARs
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Drugs of abuse can co-opt synaptic plasticity mechanisms in the neural circuits involved 
in reward and reinforcement (Kauer, 2007) in regions of the mesolimbic dopaminergic 
reward pathway, including the VTA and the NAcc. Other limbic regions, including the 
prefrontal cortex, also undergo neuroadaptations that result in addiction. Synaptic 
plasticity within the VTA is responsible for the initial acute responses to drugs of abuse, 
as well as long-term adaptations in regions innervated by the dopaminergic neurons of 
the VTA (Kauer, 2007; Volkow et al., 2000). 
The development of more deeply ingrained addictive behaviours in response to 
chronic drug use over longer periods of time are the result of plastic changes in the 
downstream regions, such as the NAcc and other limbic regions. Synaptic plasticity 
within these regions result in the formation of strong, long-lasting associations between 
the reinforcing aspects of drug use and the various cues, both external and internal, 
connected with drug use (Calabresi et al., 2007). It is these long-lasting changes that 
appear to underpin the experience of drug craving, the motivation to use drugs, and 
relapse on re-exposure to experiences associated with drug use or under stress. The 
study of the synaptic plasticity of addiction is a relatively new endeavour. By identifying 
the molecular and cellular changes that maintain addiction, it is hoped that it will be 
possible to develop novel pharmacological drugs by reversing or reducing some of these 
changes. This will increase our ability to treat and prevent addiction (Calabresi et al., 
2007). The psychological characteristics of addiction, and the neuroanatomical changes 
that underpin it will be discussed below.
Compulsion, craving and inhibitory control
In recent years, neuroimaging research has studied changes in regions of the frontal 
cortex of addicted individuals. Of particular interest has been the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) and the anterior cingulate gyrus (aCG), which it is hypothesised are involved 
in craving and compulsive drug taking, and loss of control over drug use, respectively 
(Volkow and Fowler, 2000; Volkow et al., 2003). These behaviours are often thought to 
define addiction. The OFC provides internal representations of the saliency of events and 
assigns values to them. This allows an individual to compare the likely consequences of 
pursuing different goals (Schoenbaum et al., 2006). The aCG is involved in the inhibition 
of impulses to act (Volkow et al., 2004b; Yucel and Lubman, 2007). 
Imaging studies have shown that reduced dopamine activity in the NAcc is correlated 
with changes in activity in the OFC and the aCG (Goldstein and Volkow, 2002; 
Volkow et al., 2000; Volkow and Li, 2004). Exposure to drugs and drug-related cues 
dramatically increases dopamine activity in the OFC and aCG of addicted individuals 
(see Figure 8). The increased metabolic activity in the OFC and aCG of active drug users 
in response to increased dopamine activity is thought to partly explain craving. Addicts 
show increased activation in the OFC when presented with drug cues, memories of past 
drug experiences or their drug of addiction. The degree of activity in the OFC and aCG 
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is correlated with the subjectively reported drug craving (Volkow and Fowler, 2000; 
Volkow et al., 2004b; Risinger et al., 2005). 
Changes in dopamine activity in the OFC also accompany the process of withdrawal 
(Volkow et al., 1991). As an addicted drug user undergoes detoxification, metabolic 
activity within the OFC changes from being extremely high to extremely low. Exposing 
addicts during withdrawal to either their drug of choice or drug-related cues produces 
hyperactivity within the OFC that is correlated with self-reported drug craving. OFC-
induced craving appears to be responsible for the compulsion to take drugs. These 
changes within the OFC can persist into abstinence explaining why many abstinent drug 
users report continued urges to use drugs and relapse in response to drug-related cues.
Figure 8: Plastic changes in the neuroanatomy of addiction
Reprinted from Trends in Molecular Medicine 12, ‘Drug Addiction: the neurobiology of disrupted 
self-control’, Baler and Volkow (© 2006) with permission from Elsevier.
This is a schematic diagram of the neuroanatomy of addiction, which depicts the plastic changes 
that result from chronic drug abuse and produce addiction. (a) The sagittal view of a brain 
depicting four circuits that are postulated to have key roles in addiction: (1) the prediction of 
reward and pleasure (red) involve the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and ventral pallidum (VP); 
(2) memory and learning (purple), occur in the amygdala (Amyg) and hippocampus (HIP); 
(3) motivation, drive and salience evaluation (green) occur in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC); and 
(4) cognitive control (blue), in charge of restraining cravings, located in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) and anterior cingulate gyrus (aCG). (b) A hypothetical model of addiction. Chronic drug 
use increases the salience value of a drug (red) and its associated cues (purple) in addiction 
(right) when compared to the non-addicted brain (left), whereas the strength of inhibitory control 
is weakened (blue), setting up the stage for an unrestrained motivation (green). This results in the 
repeated use of drugs despite the consequences it causes, and attempts to stop.
Executive control and cognitive impairment
To the lay person, addicts’ continued use of drugs despite adverse consequences seems 
self-evidently to reflect impaired ‘executive control’, that is, an impaired ability to reason 
and rationalise decisions and actions. It is only recently, however, that the neural centres 
of executive control and cognitive decision-making have been implicated in addiction 
(a) (b) NON-ADDICTED BRAIN ADDICTED BRAIN
NO GO
GO
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(Goldstein and Volkow, 2002; Bechara, 2005; Goldstein et al., 2007). The decision to 
continue to use drugs involves the selection of goals from a range of choices. The ability 
to represent goals, value and select different sequences of actions is thought to depend 
on the maintenance of goal representations within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Roesch 
and Olson, 2004; Rolls, 2004).
Hyman (2005, 2006) has suggested that the ability to update information within the 
PFC, select new goals and avoid the compulsive repetition of a particular behaviour or 
thought is controlled by dopamine release. It is hypothesised that changes in dopamine 
signalling can affect our ability to make new goals or choose different behaviours. 
This appears to be confirmed by computational studies of a type of dopamine firing 
(called phasic) (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2006). This suggests that addictive drugs 
provide a potent signal that disrupts normal dopamine-related learning in the PFC. 
Natural rewards, with relatively low dopamine signalling, may fail to open the PFC gate, 
powerfully biasing the behaviour of addicts towards drug use and away from normal 
everyday activities. This hypothesis is supported by neuroimaging studies. Cues that 
predict drug availability take on an exaggerated incentive salience because of dopamine 
release in the nucleus accumbens and prefrontal cortex. As a result, drug-seeking 
behaviour is strengthened by dopamine effects in the prefrontal cortex (Robbins and 
Everitt, 1999; Berke and Hyman, 2000; Berke, 2003).
In addition to increased motivation to use drugs, addicted individuals have cognitive 
impairments that prevent them from recognising the consequences of their drug use and 
inhibiting impulses to use drugs. Recent imaging research has highlighted changes in 
the PFC. In particular, changes in the dorsolateral PFC, and the aCG, seem to prevent 
addicted individuals from considering options other than drug use or for inhibiting drug 
use (see pp. 40–42), thereby prolonging use and delaying cessation. The results of 
neuroimaging studies are supported by neurocognitive tests that have found impaired 
attention and reduced executive control in addicted individuals (Bechara et al., 2001; 
Goldstein and Volkow, 2002; Fillmore, 2003; Hester and Garavan, 2004; Bechara, 
2005; Goldstein et al., 2007; Yucel and Lubman, 2007). 
Several commentators have argued that in addition to the more rational cognitive 
processes of analysing and balancing different action options, decision-making also 
includes affective and visceral processes (Paulus, 2007). There is an increasing emphasis 
of the role that introception — the awareness or sensation of the body — plays in 
driving us towards choosing certain actions (Damasio et al., 2000; Craig, 2002). The 
insular cortex appears to be central in bodily perceptions or feelings, and in the case of 
addiction, how it plays a key role in explaining why cravings have the ability to capture 
or steer our thinking and acting. See ‘Representing bodily urges’, (p. 44) for further 
discussion of introception of drug craving in the insular cortex.
In October of 2007, the journal Science ran a special section on the neurobiology of 
decision-making (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007; Kording, 2007; Paulus, 2007; Sanfey, 
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2007; Stern, 2007), that explained how actions that individuals select are the result of 
interactions between a number of complex and highly integrated hierarchical neural 
processes that are distributed throughout the brain (from the ‘primitive’ parts of the 
mid-brain to the more recently evolved cortical regions) (Paulus, 2007). This includes 
a number of neurocognitive processes which are discussed throughout Chapter 2 of 
this report: (1) assessment and planning; (2) motivation and personal preference; and 
(3) internal bodily state and the response to an event (Paulus, 2007). Chronic abuse of 
addictive drugs appears to have an impact on many, if not all, of these functions.
Memory, learning and habits
Key areas of the brain involved in learning have also been implicated in addiction 
(Everitt and Robbins, 2005). Addiction involves learning new habits so it is not surprising 
that changes in the neural pathways that underpin the learning and memory of habitual 
behaviours (or conditioned responses) are involved in the development of addiction. The 
neural system involved in the formation of habits is the mesolimbic pathway, a region of 
the brain that includes the NAcc, amygdala, hippocampus, and the striatum (caudate 
and putamen). These memory systems are implicated in: conditioned incentive learning 
(NAcc and amygdala); habit learning (the caudate and putamen); and declarative 
memory (the hippocampus).
As noted above, drug-related cues can elicit craving in abstinent drug users and trigger 
relapse (O’Brien et al., 1998). Animal studies of Pavlovian conditioning consistently 
show that a single exposure to a conditioned stimulus is enough to reinstate addictive 
behaviours in animals that have been abstinent for long periods of time (Gold and 
Koob, 1989). In particular, areas of the limbic system, primarily the hippocampus and 
the amygdala, have been shown to be critical in the acquisition, consolidation and 
expression of drug-stimulus learning that drives relapse to drug-seeking behaviours 
(Weiss et al., 2000; See, 2005). This research suggests that changes in brain functioning 
can lead to the formation of habits, and give special salience to cues and contexts in 
which drugs are used. These learned drug associations can then cue internal states of 
craving that perpetuate addiction and lead to relapse (9).
Representing bodily urges
The ability to represent the internal state of the body, or introception, is important for 
an organism to maintain homeostasis — the process which keeps the body functioning 
in a stable, generally productive condition (Damasio, 1999). Introception is also critical 
in shaping or influencing the choices we make (Damasio et al., 2000; Craig, 2002). It 
is important in helping to decide what an individual requires in a given situation to suit 
(9) More details of the different processes operating in each of these neural regions can be 
found in White, 1996; Wise, 2004; Robbins, 2002; Everitt and Robbins, 2005.
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the body’s needs (Paulus, 2007). These states are often referred to as ‘affective states’, 
because we are affected by them, and are also considered to be emotional states. 
The insula — a region of cortex that lies at the intersection of the frontal, temporal and 
parietal lobes — has been implicated in this process. The insula receives inputs from the 
cortex and the thalamus that convey information about the emotional and homeostatic 
state of the body. The insula also has projections to several cortical regions, including 
the sensory and association cortices, importantly the OFC and aCG, and the brainstem 
and limbic system, including the amygdala, hypothalamus, NAcc and striatum. These 
dense connections enable the insula to link information from the body, emotional centres 
and conscious feelings from cortical regions. The insula is involved in the conscious 
perception of the physiological state of the body. It sends this information to prefrontal 
cortical regions to influence decisions on what to do (Everitt and Robbins, 2005) and it 
also plays a role in emotions and autonomic responses.
Given the role that these functions play in addiction, it is not surprising that the insula 
itself also appears to play such a critical role in addiction (Contreras et al., 2007). 
Animal studies suggest that the insula may represent internal body states, such as 
craving, withdrawal, or the desire to take drugs, that are triggered by drug-associated 
cues (Kilts et al., 2001; Bonson et al., 2002). The role of the insular cortex in the 
experience of drug craving is seen in neuroimaging studies which show that the insula 
is active during cue-induced craving in addicts and that its activation is correlated with 
subjective reports of drug craving (Contreras et al., 2007). 
The awareness or conscious experience of the body’s response to drugs is critical 
in the maintenance of addictive behaviours. The experience of cravings for drugs is 
a potent motivator for addicts to use drugs. Inactivation of the insula prevents drug 
seeking in rats (Contreras et al., 2007). A recent study also showed that individuals who 
had lesions in the insula cortex were able to quit smoking easily and did not relapse 
(Naqvi et al., 2007). Damage to the insula did not increase the likelihood of quitting 
but it increased the success of those who tried and reduced their desire to smoke. The 
role that introception plays in the choices we make, and the role that the insula plays 
in this process, particularly in addiction, is receiving increasing attention in addiction 
neuroscience. Targeting these regions may lead to new medical treatments and may 
help clinicians to develop psychotherapies that attempt to overcome these changes in 
cognition.
Stress and drug use
Observational studies of human addicts show that stress is a particularly potent trigger 
for relapse to drug use (Koob, 1999). Stressful events, particularly when they occur 
repeatedly, increase negative affect and thereby make an abstinent drug addict more 
likely to relapse. Chronic drug use also produces neuroadaptive changes in an  
‘anti-reward’ pathway that includes the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis 
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and the neuropeptide, corticotropin releasing factor (CRF) (Koob and Le Moal, 2005). 
Individuals in acute drug withdrawal show increased activity of CRF in the HPA and 
regions of the limbic system, and increased release of noradrenaline and dynorphin, 
all of which are associated with relapse to drug use. CRF receptor antagonists have been 
shown to reduce excessive drug taking (Koob and Le Moal, 2005).
Stress and stress hormones can directly affect the natural reward pathways making 
individuals more vulnerable to developing drug addiction. While both acute and chronic 
stress affect the dopaminergic reward pathway, the effect they have over time, and their 
impact on drug use are quite distinct. Acute stress triggers the release of dopamine in the 
neural reward pathway (Marinelli and Piazza, 2002). The rapid increase of dopamine in 
the mesolimbic reward pathway can motivate drug seeking in dependent individuals in 
the short term, which may lead to relapse (Marinelli and Piazza, 2002). 
While chronic stress releases hormones that trigger the release of dopamine into 
the NAcc (Stamford et al., 1991), the repeated increases in stress hormones, and 
consequently dopamine, sensitises the reward system over a long period of time 
(Marinelli and Piazza, 2002). Chronic stress results in neuroadaptations within the 
reward pathway that dampen dopaminergic activity and reduce sensitivity to normal 
rewards. The neuroadaptations to chronic stress are thought to be due to a reduction 
in the number of dopamine receptors. These neuroadaptations also lead to the 
development of anhedonia, or the inability to experience pleasure (10). This sensitisation 
of the reward system makes former addicts who experience stress more responsive to 
drugs of abuse, and therefore, more vulnerable to the development of addiction if they 
use drugs (Marinelli and Piazza, 2002). The sensitisation can also persist well after 
the stress has abated. Genetically based heightened sensitivity to stress or anxiety can 
make individuals more sensitive to the effects of stress and hence more vulnerable to 
developing addiction. This is discussed in greater detail below.
Vulnerability to addiction: genetic and neuropsychological factors
This section briefly summarises research on two related topics: studies of twins and 
genetic association studies which indicate that genetic factors (such as individual 
differences in drug metabolism and neurotransmitter responses to drug effects) contribute 
to individual differences in vulnerability to addiction; and neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging research which suggests that genetic differences in addiction vulnerability 
may also underlie individual differences in cognitive performance that influence 
vulnerability to addiction.
(10) This sensitisation of the reward system due to chronic stress, the down-regulation of the 
dopamine receptors and the development of anhedonia is thought to be involved in some 
cases of depression and suggests why dopamine agonists that aim to ameliorate this effect 
are effective in the treatment of depression. This discussion is beyond the scope of this 
report. For further information, see Willner, 1997; Willner, 2005.
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Genetic susceptibility to addiction
Familial studies have consistently shown that addiction ‘runs in families’ (Merikangas 
et al., 1998), suggesting that there is a substantial genetic contribution to addiction 
vulnerability (Ball and Collier, 2002; Ball et al., 2007). Addiction is among the most 
heritable of the complex psychiatric disorders (Goldman et al., 2005), despite the 
facts that an individual must engage in drug use for the genetic predisposition to be 
expressed, and that the decision to use a drug can be influenced by personal choices 
and social policies. Evidence from twin and adoption studies suggest that 40–60 % 
of the risk of developing substance abuse disorders is due to genetic factors, with the 
percentage depending on the substance (Nestler, 2000; Uhl et al., 2004). Some studies 
suggest that the genetic contribution to addiction to some substances, such as cocaine, 
may be over 70 % (Goldman et al., 2005).
An individual’s inherited genetic make-up can influence addiction risk in a number of 
ways. Genes may affect: the way in which individuals respond to particular substances 
(e.g. drug metabolism, absorption and excretion and activity or sensitivity to drugs); 
behavioural traits that influence an individual’s willingness to try drugs (e.g. risk-taking 
behaviour, impulsivity, novelty seeking); or the likelihood of developing problem use or 
dependence if they use drugs (e.g. how rewarding they find the effects of drugs) (Rhee 
et al., 2003). This suggests two broad types of genetic predispositions to addiction: 
(1) genetic profiles that make some individuals more likely to find the acute effects of 
drugs rewarding and (2) genetic profiles that make individuals more or less susceptible 
to developing addiction if they use drugs. 
Significant environmental events, such as adolescent physical or sexual abuse, can 
interact with genetic susceptibility to increase the risk of developing psychiatric 
disorders (Nestler et al., 1996; Nestler, 2000; Caspi et al., 2005; Goldman et al., 
2005; Ball et al., 2007). These studies provide convincing evidence that both genes 
and environment play a significant role in the development of addiction  
(Ball et al., 2007). 
Despite the strong evidence of genetic contributions to addiction vulnerability, attempts 
to reliably identify specific addiction susceptibility genes have been disappointing to 
date. Large-scale linkage and association studies have identified numerous promising 
candidate genes that confer vulnerability to addiction (Ball and Collier, 2002; Tyndale, 
2003) but few of these alleles have been consistently replicated and many of the 
associations are modest (Tyndale, 2003). Most of the candidate genes identified so far 
are associated with the activity of dopamine and the dopaminergic system, dopamine 
receptors and transporters, (11) or proteins which influence the pharmacological activity 
or metabolism of addictive drugs. 
(11) For example the catechol-O -methyl transferase (COMT) and dopamine receptor 2 (DRD2).
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Addiction is a complex disorder so there are likely to be many genes associated 
with addiction risk, most of which make a small individual contribution to risk 
(Khoury et al., 2003; Tyndale, 2003; Hall et al., 2004a; Khoury et al., 2004; 
Ballet al., 2007). The most plausible hypothesis is that there are a substantial 
number of genes that are involved in the initiation, adoption, persistence and 
cessation of drug abuse, each of which carry a small relative risk (Lerman 
and Berrettini, 2003). The effects of these types of genetic profiles will depend on 
environmental cues and triggers, such as stress, opportunity to use different drugs, 
peer and parental drug use and so on.
Improved understandings of genetic contributions to the development of addictive 
disorders raise the possibility that we can prevent the onset of drug use and addiction 
in high risk individuals. By identifying those who are genetically vulnerable to addiction, 
it may be possible to prevent addiction by vaccinating individuals against the rewarding 
effects of drugs of abuse. Psychopharmacotherapies could also be tailored to an 
individual’s genomic vulnerabilities (pharmacogenomics and pharmacogenetics) to 
allow more effective and efficient addiction treatments. By identifying genes and 
genetic products involved in the development of addiction, such as initiation, problem 
drug use, tolerance, withdrawal, dependence, craving and relapse, it may also be 
possible to develop treatments aimed at an individual’s genetic and neuropsychological 
vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerabilities to addiction: a confluence of the genetic and the social
In addition to the genetic susceptibilities, there are social factors that make some 
individuals more likely to develop an addiction than others. These include socio-
economic background, exposure to parental drug use, peer drug use and early exposure 
to drugs, physical or sexual abuse, poor performance at school, and mental disorders 
such as conduct disorder and anxiety and depressive disorders that develop during 
adolescence (Hawkins et al., 1992). 
Genetically inherited resilience to alcohol addiction
The strongest evidence for vulnerability or resilience to addiction concerns a 
gene, aldehyde dehydrogenase 2 (ALDH2), which encodes a variant of the 
enzyme involved in the metabolism of ethanol (Thomasson et al., 1991; Chen et 
al., 1999). The ALDH2 gene encodes for a less active variant of the metabolic 
enzyme. Individuals who are homozygous for the ALDH2 allele (i.e. have two 
copies) are more likely to experience facial flushing, nausea and headaches if 
they drink alcohol. A high prevalence of these alleles is thought to explain the 
lower incidence of alcoholism in some East Asian populations (Nestler, 2000). 
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Both genetic and environmental susceptibilities to developing addiction are mediated 
by neuropsychological changes in the brains of drug users. Genes implicated in 
addiction are thought to produce changes in the structure or function of specific 
neural circuits during development that affect an individual’s responsiveness to the 
effects of drug use. The fact that the addiction liability of different drugs (i.e. their 
neuropharmacological properties) correlates with the genetic risk of addiction suggests 
that genetic vulnerabilities to addiction are mediated by neurobiology (Goldstein and 
Kalant, 1990; Goldman et al., 2005). Environmental stressors and early exposure to drug 
use, particularly during adolescence and early development, can also have significant 
neuropsychological effects that leave individuals vulnerable to substance abuse or 
addiction (Volkow and Li, 2005).
Brain imaging studies suggest that vulnerability may be due to: a decreased sensitivity 
to natural reinforcers; disrupted activity in control circuits; sensitivity to conditioned 
drug stimuli; responses of motivation/drive circuits to drugs; and neurobiological factors 
involved in the modulation of these circuits (Volkow and Li, 2004). These changes are 
thought to be mediated by changes in dopaminergic signalling. 
As already discussed, differences in dopamine circuits are thought to underlie individual 
differences in responsiveness to drug effects that, in turn, influence vulnerability and 
resilience (see pp. 32–37). This variation in responsiveness to drugs is largely due to 
genetic make-up. Dopamine activity is also affected by environmental events since stress 
can increase dopamine release in the NAcc (Koob, 1999) and levels of the dopamine 
receptors (Papp et al., 1994). Studies in primates show that dopamine activity is also 
affected by position in the social hierarchy (Morgan et al., 2002). 
Dopamine function also influences predispositions to self-administration of drugs in 
animals. Genetic manipulation of the dopamine receptor, DRD2, markedly affects 
drug self-administration. Low DRD2 levels might predispose an individual to use drugs 
to compensate for decreased activation of the reward circuit, whereas high DRD2 
levels might be protective. Genetic upregulation of DRD2 receptors in rats reduces 
alcohol consumption, suggesting a target for treatment with drugs or environmental 
manipulations that increase DRD2 expression. The fact that many non-addicted 
individuals also have low DRD2 levels suggests that low DRD2 only predisposes to 
addiction.
Other behavioural traits or cognitive capacities unrelated to the dopaminergic reward 
pathway are also thought to influence vulnerability to addiction. Functional MRI imaging 
of individuals who are impulsive find differences in the corticolimbic behavioural arousal 
and control circuits that are affected by addiction (Brown et al., 2006). Cognitive control 
is another relatively stable trait that is an important predictor of life success that plays 
an important role in the development of addiction (Eigsti et al., 2006). Individuals 
with disorders of impulsivity such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or 
cognitive impairment are more likely to develop substance abuse disorders   
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(Lynskey and Hall, 2001). There is also a high incidence of substance abuse among 
individuals with anxiety or depressive disorders in whom drug use may be a failed 
attempt to self-medicate dysphoric (unpleasant) symptoms (Khantzian, 1985). 
Chronic drug use can also produce anxiety and depressive disorders. The causal 
relationship between addictive and affective disorders can probably occur in both 
directions, and to varying degrees in different individuals.
Neuropsychological research suggests that the brains of adolescents and young adults 
may be developmentally more vulnerable to addiction and substance abuse than those 
of older adults (Volkow and Li, 2005). Mesocortical tracts that are involved in cognitive 
processing, executive control and motivation are not fully developed in the adolescent 
brain (Sowell et al., 2004) (12). In fact, the PFC does not fully mature until the early 20s 
(Gogtay et al., 2004). The neuroanatomical connections between the amygdala and  
PFC — the circuit responsible for cognitive control over emotions — are not fully 
developed until adult life (Cunningham et al., 2002). 
These observations have two major implications. First, as the regions of the brain 
responsible for impulse inhibition and reasoning about consequences are not fully 
developed, adolescents are more likely to engage in risky behaviours such as drug 
use, find it more difficult to inhibit impulses, engage in novelty seeking, and suffer 
from a temporal myopia that prevents a full appreciation of the future consequences 
of their behaviour (Volkow and Li, 2005). Secondly, the developmental immaturity of 
the adolescent brain means that adolescents may be particularly vulnerable to the 
neurobiological changes that occur as the result of chronic drug use. Neuropsychological 
changes at such a developmentally sensitive period can reduce the individual’s cognitive 
capacities in overcoming addiction. This could explain why epidemiological studies show 
that people who engage in substance abuse in early adolescence are more likely to 
develop addiction and less likely to recover than those who delay drug use until early 
adulthood. 
(12) Myelination of the mesocortical tracts, a cellular process that enables neurons to signal 
quickly and efficiently, is not complete in the adolescent brain.
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Chapter 3
The treatment of addiction
Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall and David Nutt
Introduction
Neuroscience research is uncovering the neurochemical mechanisms that produce the 
behavioural and cognitive problems observed in those with an addiction. This includes: 
the pharmacological sites at which drugs act (e.g. receptors); the neurochemicals 
involved in the metabolism (e.g. enzymes) and trafficking of drugs (e.g. transporters)  
that regulate their activity within the brain; and the molecular changes that occur  
in the brain as a result of continuous use of addictive drugs over long periods of time  
(see Chapter 2). As our understanding of addiction deepens and becomes more detailed, 
it opens up the possibility for a wider range of powerful new technologies to treat 
and, more controversially, to prevent addiction. Because the neurobiological changes 
underpinning addiction can vary between individuals and over time, neuroscience may 
allow clinicians to target new treatments to the most appropriate individuals and at the 
most appropriate times. 
Addiction has traditionally been treated by a combination of psychosocial and 
pharmacological treatments. The most widely used and effective pharmacological 
treatments remain ones that were developed before the explosion of neuroscience 
research on addiction. These can be grouped into two types: (1) drugs that either block 
the addictive drug from working (e.g. naltrexone as relapse prevention for heroin 
dependence) or make its use unpleasant (e.g. disulfiram for alcohol dependence); 
or (2) drugs that replace the addictive drug with a less harmful version of the 
drug (e.g. substitution treatment using methadone and buprenorphine for heroin 
dependence, or nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) for smoked tobacco). These 
treatments may be used as a short-term measure to help wean individuals off all drugs 
(e.g. drug-assisted withdrawal from opiates using clonidine) or they may be used over 
the long-term as either a replacement or prophylaxis against a return to the use of the 
(usually illicit) drug of abuse.
Neurobiological research on addiction has provided a stronger rationale for the use of 
these pharmacological treatments of addiction. It is the impact that neuroscience has on 
our view of addiction, and those addicted, that may raise as many ethical and social 
concerns as the actual technologies themselves. As with any new technology, the way in 
which it is used will affect the benefit and harm that it produces.
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Researchers are also developing new pharmacological approaches unlike those currently 
in use. These include drugs to enhance cognition and memory so addicted individuals 
can choose not to use drugs, and drugs that manipulate synaptic plasticity. Researchers 
are also developing novel immunological approaches, such as drug vaccines which 
bind to the drug and prevent it acting in the brain. Neurological techniques are also 
emerging as possibilities, such as deep brain stimulation of centres involved in reward 
and transcranial magnetic stimulation that applies electromagnetic currents to manipulate 
brain function and cognition. The advantages and disadvantages of each new method 
of treatment will need to be evaluated to establish their safety, effectiveness, and cost-
effectiveness and to identify any potential harms or misuses of these approaches. 
In addition to the novel pharmacological and neurological treatments discussed in this 
section, neuroscientists are currently studying 80 or so neurotransmitter, receptors, 
transporters and neural hormones from which new approaches to treating addiction 
may emerge (Hyman, 2005). The therapeutic potential of these large number of new 
pharmacological targets for addiction treatment is yet to be realised. A great deal of 
research will be required before the safety and efficacy of these treatments can be 
evaluated and their potential impact on society assessed. 
While the emerging treatments offer the potential to significantly improve the outcome 
of addiction treatment and reduce the harm it causes, they also have the potential to be 
used in ways that raise ethical and social concerns that need to be carefully considered. 
Following on from Chapter 2, this section will describe a number of the most promising 
technologies emerging from neuroscientific research on addiction, how they are likely 
to be used, and their potential to be effective and to cause harm. The ethical and social 
implications of the use of these technologies will then be explored in Chapter 5. 
While psychosocial approaches to treatment are a vital aspect of addiction treatment, 
they will not be discussed at length in this report. The aim of this report is to analyse 
the potential impact on new technologies from neuroscientific and genetic research 
of addiction on European society. This omission should not be taken to suggest that 
psychosocial treatments are not effective or important in the treatment of addiction. 
They form an essential component of addiction treatment that will continue to be used 
in combination with new pharmacological approaches (EMCDDA, 2007b). Successful 
addiction treatment will require combinations of behavioural strategies and drugs that 
remediate brain circuits damaged by drug abuse. This will require strategies to promote 
the plasticity of dysfunctional brain circuits, similar to those used to improve reading in 
children with learning disabilities and to rehabilitate adults after brain injury. 
Addiction psychopharmacology and treatment implications
Advances in genomic and molecular biology, such as the ability to clone and sequence 
receptor subtypes, transporters and endogenous agonists, has significantly increased 
our ability to develop novel and specific treatments for addiction to a variety of 
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substances. The pharmacokinetic sites of action for many drugs of abuse have been 
identified. For most of these drugs, the molecular sites of action are neurotransmitter 
receptors and transporters that regulate neurotransmitter activity at the synapse 
(Nutt, 1996; Iverson et al., 2007). Drugs of abuse work by mimicking the effect of 
endogenous neurochemical signalling. For example, heroin produces its effect by 
mimicking the action of endogenous opioid neurochemicals (e.g. endorphins and 
enkephalins) (Nutt, 1996). 
These discoveries have enabled scientists to identify and specifically target relevant 
receptor or transporter sites with drugs that either block (antagonists) or facilitate 
(agonists) activity at this site. Antagonists are typically those drugs which block the 
action of the addictive drug (e.g. naltrexone blocks the effect of heroin), while agonists 
are typically drugs which mimic the effect of the addictive drug. The use of agonists 
in substitution treatments (e.g. methadone for heroin dependence) and of antagonists 
in relapse prevention are discussed in greater detail below.
The use of genetic manipulation techniques in animal models has also greatly increased 
our understanding of the functional role that these molecules play in the development of 
addiction. Genetic manipulation in a developing animal allows researchers to observe 
the effect of increasing (e.g. overexpression mutants) or blocking (e.g. transgenic 
knockouts or dominant-negative mutants) the activity of a specific molecule. These 
techniques help us to understand the role that these molecules play in the onset and 
progression to addiction, and in affecting responses to drug use; information that assist 
researchers in discovering potential new therapeutic agents. 
The advent of psychopharmacological neuroimaging techniques have also been 
invaluable in understanding the impact of functional changes within humans. 
Neuroimaging of addiction in humans has been critical in linking developments in 
animal research with our understanding of addiction in humans. By unravelling the 
various pharmacological processes that underpin the phenomenon of addiction, 
these discoveries have provided a number of novel and promising sites for intervention. 
These discoveries also point towards a more rational approach to addiction treatment, 
and to more encompassing theories of the brain mechanisms underlying addiction 
(Nutt, 1996; Nutt et al., 2007c). 
Pharmacological treatments of addiction can be classified into those that:
•	 block	the	target	drug	from	binding	to	its	site	of	action;
•	 interfere	with	acute	and	chronic	central	dopaminergic	response	to	addictive	drugs;	
•	 interfere	with	other	neurotransmitter	systems	related	to	the	reward	pathway	
(e.g. opioids, cannabinoids, glutamate/GABA, and the stress response); and
•	 minimise	the	harmful	effects	of	drug	abuse.
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Pharmacological treatments that block drug binding
The traditional approach to the pharmacological treatment of addiction involves using 
drugs that interfere with or block the site at which the drug of addiction acts (e.g. mu-opioid 
receptor for heroin). These medications have been most effective in the treatment of addiction 
to opioids (e.g. methadone, buprenorphine and naltrexone). Nicotine replacement therapy 
(NRT) is the most common form of substitution treatment, but is not particularly effective (up 
to 82 % relapse rates). No agonists have proven effective in treating stimulant addiction 
(Hyman et al., 2006). Opioid antagonists (e.g. naltrexone, nalmefene) have also been shown 
to have utility in preventing relapse in alcohol dependence (Volpicelli et al., 1995). The use 
of antagonists to treat addiction has been less effective for addiction to stimulants, such as 
amphetamines and cocaine, possibly because the wrong antagonists have been used (only 
dopamine DRD2 antagonists are currently available for clinical use — see below). 
Table 1: Molecular targets of drugs of addiction and pharmacological approaches 
(current and theoretical). Adapted from Lingford-Hughes and Nutt, 2003.
Drug Primary 
target
Primary 
action
Agonist 
(substitution)
Partial agonist Antagonist 
(relapse 
prevention)
Opiates Mu opiate 
receptors
↑ dopamine Methadone
LAAM
Buprenorphine Naltrexone
Naloxone
Nalmfene (3)
Stimulants
Cocaine DAT ↑ dopamine Bupropion (1) D3 ligands  
(BP-897) (1)
GR12909 (1)
Amphetamine DAT ↑ dopamine Bupropion (1) D3 ligands  
(BP-897) (1)
D3 receptor 
drugs(1)
Nicotine Nicotinic ACH 
receptor
↑ dopamine NRT Mecamylamine (1)
Sedatives
Alcohol GABA/
glutamate
↑ GABA
↓ glutamate
BDZs (2) BDZ partial 
agonists (1)
Acamprosate (4)
Naltrexone(4)
BDZs GABA ↑ GABA Longer half-life 
BDZs
BDZ partial 
agonists (1)
Flumazenil
Cannabis CB1 receptor ? dopamine 
? opiates
None None Rimonabant
Ecstasy Serotonin 
transporter
↑ serotonin SSRIs (1) Serotonin 
drugs (1)
SSRIs (1)
BDZs, benzodiazepines; CB1, cannabinoid 1; DAT, dopamine transporter; ACH, acetylcholine; GABA, 
gamma-aminobutyric acid; LAAM, Levomethadyl acetate; SSRIs, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors. 
(1) Theoretically effective but no clinical trial data. 
(2) Controversial, risk of dependency. 
(3) Not available throughout the EU. 
(4) Used to maintain abstinence.
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Different pharmacological agents have different sites of action and affect different 
neurotransmitter systems. All treatments which act by blocking the direct binding of the 
abused drug fall into one of three approaches: (1) agonist; (2) antagonist; and (3) partial 
agonist. These three approaches are described below. A detailed description of treatments 
for all drugs of addiction is beyond the scope of this report. However, a brief description of 
each approach, their potential for effective treatment, as well as their limitations is provided 
below. A summary of the most common drugs used in the treatment of addiction, and their 
primary action and application is provided in Table 1 (Lingford-Hughes and Nutt, 2003). 
Agonists
Agonists are drugs that act in a similar way on the same receptors as a drug of abuse 
and produce similar effects. Treatment involves replacing the abused drug with one 
that is: safer (less likely to produce adverse outcomes); has slower pharmacokinetics 
(meaning that it will bind for longer); or a stronger affinity for the receptor site  
(so it will not be readily shifted from the site by the abused drug). The aim of treatment 
is to block the actions of the drug of addiction, providing some protection against the 
acute adverse effects of the drug (e.g. overdose in the case of heroin addiction). These 
drugs should also have slow rates of brain uptake and clearance, thereby providing 
relatively stable and more enduring concentrations of dopamine in the brain  
(e.g. oral methadone). 
The aim of agonist treatments is to replace the unsupervised use of an illicit drug (e.g. heroin) 
of unknown strength and purity, with a safer, pharmaceutical grade drug (e.g. methadone) 
in a regulated manner which offers the potential for support and education. The advantage 
of agonist treatments is that they reduce the incidence of acute adverse effects of drug 
use, such as overdose and the spread of BBV. Agonists can also prevent or minimise the 
symptoms of withdrawal, and reduce craving for the drug of addiction, which leads to 
greater retention in treatment programmes and increased treatment compliance. 
Agonists are often used in substitution treatment programmes where the aim of treatment 
is long-term maintenance. The most well known is methadone maintenance therapy 
(MMT). Agonists may also be prescribed for shorter periods to help addicts become 
abstinent by reducing the symptoms of withdrawal. Agonists have a number of social 
advantages as well, in that they reduce the incidence of drug-related social harm, such 
as crime, theft and violence.
The disadvantage of agonists is that they have the potential to cause similar harm as the 
abused drug, especially if they are used in large doses or diverted to the black market 
and used by drug naïve individuals who lack the drug tolerance of chronic drug users. 
Agonist treatments are therefore provided under strict controls and restrictions which can 
make treatment difficult and unattractive (e.g. daily supervised dosing). Also, because 
agonists produce a similar reinforcing effect to the target drug, they are also addictive 
(e.g. methadone and buprenorphine for heroin dependence).
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Agonist substitution has not been as successful in the treatment of addiction to stimulants, 
except for comorbid treatment of ADHD. This is most likely because the agonist has to 
block nearly all of the dopamine agonist transporter (DAT) in order to interfere with 
cocaine’s effects, or may reflect the importance of changes in other neurotransmitter 
systems such as norepinephrine. Drugs which increase dopamine can also cause 
additional health problems, particularly concerning the heart, and they can be abused. 
Opponents of the prescription of agonists also argue that this leads to increases in illicit 
drug use by sending a message that recreational drug use is an appropriate behaviour 
and reducing the deterrent effect of punitive drug policies. There is very little reliable 
evidence to support either of these claims.
Antagonists
Antagonists are drugs that bind to the pharmacological site of action but do not 
produce the reinforcing effects of the addictive drug or its agonists. Antagonists work by 
blocking the receptor sites at which the drug of addiction acts (e.g. naltrexone for heroin 
addiction), thereby reducing its rewarding effect. Antagonists must also be: safe; have a 
long half-life (meaning that they remain bound in the brain for long periods, reducing 
the dose frequency), and; possess a strong affinity for the receptor site so that they 
cannot be easily shifted by the drug of addiction. 
Antagonists are most often employed as a prophylaxis against relapse because they 
block the reinforcing effect of addictive drugs as long as they are taken (see below). The 
advantage of antagonists is that they are generally safer than agonists when used as 
intended; they are not reinforcing or addictive; and they can also reduce acute adverse 
effects of the abused drug (e.g. overdoses). Their safer profile means that they can be 
provided with fewer controls and regulations than agonists. 
A problem with antagonists is that they can precipitate withdrawal symptoms because 
they block the activity of the drug of addiction. Thus, initiating their use requires that 
addicts have not been detoxified and are drug free. Because antagonists do not have 
any rewarding effect, people often stop taking them and then relapse to drug use, with 
a higher risk of a drug overdose in the case of opiates because users are no longer 
tolerant to opiates. New slow-release formulations of these drugs (e.g. naltrexone 
implants that reportedly last between one and six months) have been developed in 
order to overcome these compliance issues. These treatments are often promoted for use 
in some form of coerced treatment (Caplan, 2006), a practice that raises a number of 
ethical concerns that will be discussed in Chapter 5 (see pp. 93–99).
Partial agonists
Partial agonists are drugs that bind to the site of action and produce less of a reinforcing 
effect than full agonists (e.g. buprenorphine for opioid dependence, varenicline for 
nicotine). Like their pharmacological cousins, partial agonists must have a long half-life 
and a strong affinity for the binding site in order to block the effects of the addicted 
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drug. Partial agonists also possess many of the advantages of both the full agonists and 
antagonists and so may provide an effective form of treatment that will benefit both 
society and the individual. More empirical data is required on their safety and efficacy. 
The main advantage of partial agonists is that as they have some reinforcing  
effects they are therefore more likely to retain people in treatment than antagonists. As 
their agonistic effects are minor, they are much less likely to cause acute adverse effects. 
Their safer profile also means that they can be provided under less prohibitive restrictions 
than full agonists: they can be given in larger doses, and may be provided with less 
supervision and with takeaway doses. They also provide some protection against the 
harmful effects of the drug of addiction such as overdose. 
Despite these positive features, partial agonists do pose a number of risks. As they 
produce a small agonist effect, they can still produce overdoses and they are addictive. 
It is also not clear yet whether partial agonists are as effective in reducing illicit drug use 
as full agonists (Lingford-Hughes et al., 2004). Partial agonists may not be as effective as 
full agonists in reducing the urge to use a drug of abuse in some individuals because of 
their attenuated rewarding effects. It is important that the partial agonists are used with 
care, and that each is evaluated on its merits.
Treatment aims and philosophy
Agonists and partial agonists may be given for greatly varying lengths of time, depending 
upon the philosophical aims of the treatment programme. Pharmacological treatments 
may be used over short periods of time to assist addicted individuals to withdraw from 
their target drug. This is often referred to as detoxification. The aim of detoxification is 
to achieve abstinence from all drugs. Agonists or partial agonists may also be used for 
longer periods to encourage less harmful forms of drug use as substitution treatment 
(also referred to as replacement or maintenance therapy). Treatments that primarily aim 
to reduce the harm associated with illicit drug use (also referred to as harm minimisation 
or harm reduction) involve the use of other rewarding or reinforcing drugs. Substitution 
treatment for opioid dependence, using either methadone or buprenorphine, is commonly 
available in Europe and generally considered an important element in the response 
to this type of drug problem. However, historically this approach has been considered 
controversial and sometimes viewed as condoning drug use. This view still persists at least 
to a limited extent in some countries today, although substitution treatment for opioid 
problems is available in nearly every EU Member State (EMCDDA, 2008). 
A longer term form of addiction drug treatment that has not generally been regarded as 
controversial is the use of antagonists for relapse prevention. The aim of relapse prevention is 
to prevent the use of any recreational drugs, rather than reducing their harm. It is therefore 
more acceptable to those who believe that treatment programmes that offer any form of 
rewarding drug are immoral and send the wrong ‘message’ to society about drug use.
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These different treatment approaches lie along a continuum of treatment philosophy from 
abstinence to harm minimisation, with drug-free detoxification at one end and agonist 
maintenance for harm minimisation at the other. Harm reduction strategies also include 
some of the newer approaches to treating addiction, such as reducing the toxic effects 
of chronic drug use or finding safer forms of drugs to use (see pp. 117–20). The growing 
acceptance of the view that addiction is a chronic disease has seen a shift in research 
towards approaches that aim to treat addicted individuals over a long period. This 
approach is not always well reflected in social policies towards addiction that sometimes 
still focus on abstinence in the short term as a primary goal.
Pharmacological treatments targeting the dopaminergic response to drugs
Drugs which target the dopaminergic system have not yet proven effective in treating 
addiction. This may be because drugs used so far have targeted the wrong dopamine 
receptor (e.g. DRD2). New treatments may also need to consider changes in other 
modulatory neurotransmitter systems. The central role that dopamine plays in a range 
of behaviours and cognition has always meant that it would be difficult to develop an 
effective dopaminergic drug to treat addiction that did not also produce serious adverse 
side effects. 
The use of agonists to treat addiction to stimulants (by binding to the DAT in order to 
increase dopamine activity) has been unsuccessful. The DRD2 selective agonists tested 
have not proven effective. Pharmacological agents targeted at the other dopamine 
receptors appear more promising. Preliminary studies of the dopamine receptor 1 (DRD1) 
agonists have been promising (Baler and Volkow, 2006), as has a partial agonist of the 
dopamine receptor 3 (DRD3) in treating cocaine dependence (Pilla et al., 1999; Lingford-
Hughes and Nutt, 2003). 
Another approach to treat addiction has been to block the acute dopaminergic response 
to addictive drugs by blocking dopamine receptors. Neuroleptic drugs (traditionally used 
in the treatment of schizophrenia) that block the DRD2 receptor reduce the reinforcing 
effects of drugs in animal models (Hyman, 2005), but this effect has not yet been 
reproduced in human addicts. Neuroleptics are also not well tolerated by addicts  
who are particularly sensitive to the extrapyramidal effects of DRD2 blockers,  
(e.g. disorders of movement and motor control such as those seen in Parkinson’s disease) 
(Hyman, 2005). 
Given the role that dopamine plays in everyday motivation, blocking DRD2 receptors is 
also likely to decrease sensitivity to natural reinforcers. One drug that affects dopamine 
activity and has proven effective in the treatment of nicotine addiction is bupropion 
(Zyban) (Jorenby et al., 1999). Its exact mechanism of action is still uncertain although it 
appears to act by inhibiting the uptake of dopamine and noradrenaline (Ascher et al., 
1995). Bupropion is also a nicotine receptor antagonist. Clinical trials are under way to 
investigate the use of bupropion in the treatment of methamphetamine addiction.
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Pharmacological interventions in systems related to the reward pathway
Given the mixed results from directly interfering with dopamine, an alternative approach 
has been developed to target related neurotransmitter systems that are involved in 
reward (Lingford-Hughes and Nutt, 2003). These related circuits indirectly affect the 
reward pathway by: regulating either dopamine cell firing or the release of dopamine 
in the NAcc (e.g. opioids, and the amino acids, glutamate and GABA); or interfering 
with the postsynaptic response to dopamine stimulation (e.g. cannabinoids) (Iverson et 
al., 2007). Interventions in these processes provide some novel and promising treatments 
to emerge from neuroscience research. More empirical data is required before the 
safety and efficacy of these potential treatments can be established. Pharmacological 
interventions in each of these related systems are discussed below.
Opioids
Recent research has suggested that changes in the opioid system play an important role 
in all forms of addiction, not just opiate addiction. There are three receptor subtypes 
that mediate the effects of endogenous opiates. Neuroimaging studies suggest that 
changes in the mu opiate receptor levels may be fundamental in addiction (Zubieta et al., 
2000). The kappa receptor may also play a role. Stimulation of kappa receptors reduces 
dopamine release in the NAcc that may be responsible for feelings of dysphoria. Delta 
antagonists reduce self-administration of alcohol in rats, and so may play an important 
role in reinforcement (Lingford-Hughes and Nutt, 2003). 
The fact that naltrexone is effective in the treatment of addiction to substances other 
than opiates highlights the role that the opioid system plays in addiction. As discussed 
previously, naltrexone is a long-acting opioid receptor antagonist which blocks the effect 
of opiates like heroin. Naltrexone has been shown to be effective in the treatment of 
alcohol dependence, probably because it blocks the actions of endogenous endorphins 
that are released by alcohol (Herz, 1997). Naltrexone has also been shown to be effective 
in the treatment of obesity (addiction to food) (Volkow and Wise, 2005) and gambling. 
It is one of a number of anti-craving drugs that have become a focus for research 
(O’Brien, 2005) and that are being promoted as effective treatments for addiction.
The amino acid neurotransmitters: Glutamate and GABA
Many of the neuroadaptations that occur in addiction involve changes in the prefrontal 
cortex that have numerous connections with the dopaminergic reward pathway. 
Activity in these cortical circuits is mediated by the amino acid neurotransmitters, 
glutamate and GABA. These neurochemicals accordingly represent promising targets 
for pharmacological intervention. Studies have begun to look at whether drugs that act 
on these systems reduce drug self-administration in animals (Kalivas and Volkow, 2005). 
Treatments which affect the glutamate and GABA systems may also prove effective 
in the treatment of stimulant addiction, which has been largely resistant to existing 
pharmacological treatment approaches.
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The amino acid, glutamate, is the principal excitatory neurotransmitter in the brain. The 
glutamatergic system is well placed to influence dopamine signalling because its neurons 
in the prefrontal cortex and amygdala make reciprocal connections with the dopaminergic 
mesolimbic reward pathway. The glutamate receptor, N-methyl-D-aspartic acid (NMDA), 
appears to play a particularly important role in addiction to nicotine, cannabis, alcohol 
and benzodiazepines (Wolf, 1998;  Lingford-Hughes and Nutt, 2003). Antagonists of 
the NMDA receptor inhibit sensitisation to stimulants and the development of opioid 
dependence (Trujillo and Akil, 1995; Lingford-Hughes and Nutt, 2003). Co-treatment with 
the NMDA blocker, dizocilpine, also attenuates tolerance to opioids (Trujillo and Akil, 
1991). There also appears to be a compensatory increase in the numbers of glutamate 
receptors in alcohol addiction that may explain the hyper-excitability seen in alcohol 
withdrawal. Acamprosate, a drug shown to be effective in treating the withdrawal 
symptoms of alcohol addiction, decreases glutamate release (O’Brien, 2005). Not all 
NMDA antagonists are clinically useful because some produce hallucinations and psychotic 
symptoms. N-acetylcystein (NAC), an activator of cystine-glutamate exchange, is currently 
in Phase 1 clinical trials for cocaine dependence (LaRowe et al., 2006).
GABA-enhancing drugs maintain abstinence by preventing cue- and drug-induced 
increases in dopamine. Two antiepileptic drugs have shown promise in this area. 
Topiramate shows promise in treating alcohol, opiate and cocaine addiction (Kampman 
et al., 2004; Myrick and Anton, 2004; Zullino et al., 2005), while another antiepileptic, 
gamma vinyl GABA (vigabatrin) might also be effective (Brodie et al., 2005). Baclofen, 
a muscle relaxant which acts via the GABA-B receptor, has been shown to reduce the 
reinforcing effects of amphetamines and to reduce cocaine self-administration in rats 
(Campbell et al., 2002; Brebner et al., 2005). 
As discussed above (see pp. 38–40), glutamate, and to a lesser extent GABA, are 
involved in the molecular processes, such as LTP and LTD, that are responsible for the 
synaptic changes that maintain addiction. Neuroscientists are also currently investigating 
the signalling molecules within each neuron that produce the internal cellular processes 
that lead to synaptic plasticity, such gene expression or gene upregulation, protein 
synthesis and protein trafficking (Calabresi et al., 2007). The molecules that sustain 
these processes may yet prove to be significant targets for the treatment of addiction, 
by helping to reverse or ameliorate the neuroadaptations associated with addiction 
(Calabresi et al., 2007). A great deal of research is required before this hope may be 
realised, but it holds significant promise, particularly for addictions that do not yet have 
an effective pharmacological target.
Cannabinoids
The cannabinoid receptor (CB1) system is believed to be involved in the neural processes 
underlying reward, learning and memory, suggesting that it might also be a potential 
pharmacological target in the treatment of addiction. Drugs which act on the cannabinoid 
system have recently been shown to reduce the reinforcing effects of various drugs 
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of abuse. The CB1 cannabinoid receptor modulates dopamine cells and postsynaptic 
responses from dopamine stimulation, and can therefore influence the reinforcing effects 
of drugs. The CB1 antagonist, Rimonabant, appears to attenuate the reinforcing effects 
of various drugs of abuse. Rimonabant was originally developed as a treatment against 
schizophrenia, as cannabis can lead to psychosis, and later obesity and the metabolic 
syndrome (Van Gaal et al., 2005). Preclinical studies suggest that it may also be effective 
for the treatment of nicotine addiction (Le Foll and Goldberg, 2005).
Pharmacological treatments for chronic changes in dopamine activity
Chronic drug use also produces neuroadaptations in other neural systems that can 
significantly affect an individual’s ability to refrain from using drugs (Baler and Volkow, 
2006). There has consequently been an increased effort in recent years to develop 
pharmacological treatments that ameliorate these neuroadaptive changes. Given 
that these changes affect cognitive processes such as executive control, memory and 
conditioned response, and responses to stress, these drugs may be more effective when 
combined with cognitive behavioural therapy.
Corticotropin releasing factor stress response
Since stress is a potent trigger for relapse, dampening the stress response may be a 
way of reducing relapse to drug use (Bruijnzeel and Gold, 2005). The stress response 
is mediated by CRF in the HPA axis and amygdala. Drugs, such as CRF antagonists, 
which can interfere with the stress response may prevent relapse. Drugs which block CRF 
activity have been shown in animals to block the initiation of drug use and stress-induced 
reinstatement of drug seeking behaviour for a variety of drugs (Koob, 1999; Koob and 
Le Moal, 2005; Baler and Volkow, 2006). Dynorphin is another molecule in the stress 
pathway that is being targeted. 
Oxytocin is a neuropeptide hormone that is involved in the formation of relationships 
(Pitman et al., 1993; Insel, 2003; Heinrichs and Gaab, 2007) and the development of 
trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Domes et al., 2007a; Domes et al., 2007b). Recent research 
has suggested that it may be a possible target in the treatment of addiction (Kovacs et 
al., 1984; Sarnyai and Kovacs, 1994; Kovacs et al., 1998; Sarnyai, 1998). Oxytocin 
is released by the posterior pituitary and has been shown to reduce stress, dampen 
HPA activity (Kovacs and Telegdy, 1988; Devries et al., 2007), and reduce dopamine 
transmission. Oxytocin also inhibits the development of tolerance to addictive drugs 
and reduces the symptoms of withdrawal from morphine in rats (Kovacs et al., 1984; 
Kovacs et al., 1998).
Memory manipulators and cognitive enhancers
Pharmacological treatments which either enhance or dampen memories associated with 
drug use have also been investigated as addiction treatments. The use of the adrenergic 
beta blocker, propranolol, interferes with the formation and recall of emotionally salient 
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memories, and may be effective in the treatment of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
(Pitman et al., 2002). Propranolol may also prove to be effective in reducing conditioned 
responses to drugs such as cocaine (Kampman et al., 2001; Milekic et al., 2006). 
Memory enhancers have been suggested as an adjunct to psychotherapy because of the 
effectiveness of a similar approach in the treatment of phobias. 
Drugs which improve alertness and attention, such as modafinil, a drug used to treat 
narcolepsy, have been suggested as treatments for stimulant addiction. Modafinil 
appears promising in the treatment of cocaine addiction (Dackis et al., 2005) (1). The 
development of effective treatments for Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s diseases which 
increase memory and attention, may also provide novel approaches to the treatment of 
stimulant addiction (e.g. ampakines). 
Pharmacological approaches to minimise the harmful effects of drug use
Research is under way to develop new forms of drugs which reduce the toxic or harmful 
effects of drug use (e.g. toxicity of alcohol for liver and neural tissue). Nutt (2006), for 
example, has suggested that neuroscientists should develop a less toxic, water soluble 
GABA-agonist that would produce the euphoric effects of alcohol without its neurotoxic 
and hepatotoxic side-effects (Nutt, 2006b). An analogous approach has been suggested 
with tobacco harm reduction in which cigarette smokers would be encouraged to switch 
from smoking to much less hazardous oral tobacco products, such as snus (Gartner 
et al., 2007). Snus has been treated to remove the primary carcinogens and because 
it is orally consumed, has a substantially reduced incidence of adverse health effects 
(e.g. lung cancer). To date, these approaches remain controversial and it is likely that 
there would be considerable opposition to any attempt to market a safer alternative to 
illicit drugs like heroin or cocaine. 
An alternative approach to harm reduction is using other drugs to mitigate the 
acute negative effects of particular drugs of abuse. One suggestion is to use drugs 
to prevent memory loss associated with alcohol intoxication (Nutt, 2006b). A 
similar strategy is used in the prescription of combined pharmacological treatments 
of addiction with the aim of reducing the abuse potential of the treatment. One 
example is the combination of a small dose of an opioid antagonist, naloxone, 
with buprenorphine (marketed as Suboxone) to reduce injecting use of the diverted 
drug. Because of its low oral biodisponibility (3 to 10 %) naloxone does not affect 
the reinforcing properties of buprenorphine when taken orally but precipitates 
withdrawal if the product is injected. It remains to be seen if this will prove effective. 
A summary of all the main treatments for drug addiction in use or development are 
listed in Table 2.
(1) Modafinil, while not addictive, has an abuse liability. It is already reportedly being abused 
by long-distance drivers to drive for longer and by athletes in competition.
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Table 2: A summary of current or developing treatments of addiction 
Proposed targets Medication Clinical effectiveness 
for
Interfere with the reinforcing effects of a drug
Substitution treatments Methadone
Buprenorphine
LAAM
Nicotine replacement
Heroin
Heroin
Heroin
Nicotine
Trigger aversion Disulfiram Alcohol (cocaine)(a)
↓ dopamine release Topiramate Alcohol (cocaine)
(antiepileptics) (Gabapentin)
(Gamma-vinyl-GABA)
(Cocaine)
(Cocaine)
Non-dopamine targets
mu-opiate receptors 
cannabinoid receptors
Naltrexone
Rimonabant
Alcohol and heroin
(being tested for weight 
loss, nicotine and others)
GABA receptors (Baclofen) (Alcohol and cocaine)
Interfere with drug delivery to the brain Vaccines Nicotine and cocaine 
(heroin in development)
Interfere with drug metabolism Methoxsalen Nicotine
Compensate for long-term effects of drugs
Interfere with conditioned responses Antiepileptics (above)
Glutamate
Acamprosate(b)
(Modafinil)(b) 
Alcohol (cocaine)
Alcohol (cocaine)
Strengthen saliency of natural reinforcers Enhance DA function
Bupropion
(deprenyl + nicotine)
Nicotine
(Nicotine)
Interfere with stress responses (CRF antagonist) Not tested
Interfere with withdrawal Clonidine
Benzodiazepines
Antiepileptics
Propanolol
Heroin
Heroin
Alcohol
Medications for which there is only preliminary clinical data are identified in brackets to differentiate them 
from those for which there is proven efficacy.
(a) The effects in cocaine addiction are not understood but do not seem to be mediated by triggering 
aversive responses.
(b) Mechanisms of action are not properly understood.
Source: Elsevier; Academic Press: Trends in Molecular Medicine  
http://www.us.elsevierhealth.com/article.jsp?pageid=388.
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Novel approaches to drug treatment
Immunotherapies
Immunotherapies represent a new strategy in the development of addiction treatment. 
These are in the form of vaccines against the effects of nicotine, cocaine and heroin that 
act by binding to the target drug in the bloodstream and preventing it from reaching 
the brain. Drug vaccines are primarily intended to be used in relapse prevention but the 
term ‘vaccine’ also raises expectations about their potential use to prevent drug addiction 
when used as a prophylactic treatment (e.g. in combination with genetic screening 
of adolescents for addiction susceptibility). The effectiveness of such an approach is 
uncertain and even if successful, it would raise a number of ethical concerns that will be 
addressed in Chapter 5 (see pp. 111–14).
Depot or slow release formulations
Researchers are developing implantable slow release or long-acting formulations of 
naltrexone and buprenorphine. This will make it possible to reduce dosing from a daily 
event to a monthly or even half-yearly implantation, overcoming the problems of poor 
compliance with antagonists and diversion of agonists and partial agonists if take-
away doses are given. Implantable antagonists are a particularly attractive option for 
proponents of legally coerced treatment of addiction. 
Neurosurgery and deep brain stimulation
A novel, so far rarely used, treatment for addiction is neurosurgical ablation of brain 
structures implicated in addiction. Neuroscientists in Russia and China have used 
neuroscience research of the effects of chronic drug use on the nucleus accumbens 
and the cingulate gyrus to justify the stereotactic ablation of these regions (Gao et al., 
2003; Medvedev et al., 2003). Neurosurgery is the most invasive and permanent form 
of treatment used and is often only considered appropriate in a few severe conditions 
where there are few options which have been tried unsuccessfully. It is generally 
considered a treatment of last resort, requiring careful consideration (Valenstein, 
1973; Valenstein, 1986; Hall, 2006). The ethical implications of the social and political 
context in which these treatments have been used will be discussed in subsequent 
sections.
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is another form of neurosurgery that has been suggested 
as a treatment of addiction (BBC News, 2007). It involves the insertion of electrical 
stimulating electrodes deep into the brain regions involved in addiction, such as the 
insula. When the electrodes are stimulated, activity in these areas can be manipulated. 
The use of DBS in these areas has so far only been trialled in obsessive compulsive 
disorder (Gabriels et al., 2003), although DBS has been used in the treatment of 
Parkinson’s Disease and is currently being trialled in the treatment of depression. While 
this treatment is not as damaging as ablative neurosurgery, it does present considerable 
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risks and can result in permanent damage. The side effects of this novel treatment are 
also unknown. Some patients with Parkinson’s Disease who have been treated with DBS 
have developed impulsive behaviours that appear similar to impulse disorders  
(Frank et al., 2007). A patent has also been placed on the use of intracranial (vagal) 
nerve stimulation as a treatment for addiction.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a far less invasive treatment that involves 
placing a small magnetic coil against an individual’s skull in order to block or enhance 
neural activity in a particular cortical region (Machii et al., 2006). The coil produces a 
strong magnetic field that can change neuronal electrical activity (Pascual-Leone et al., 
2002). By manipulating cortical activity, it is hoped that TMS might prove to be a useful 
treatment for a range of psychiatric disorders, including addiction (Ridding and Rothwell, 
2007). TMS raises fewer health and safety concerns than neurosurgery or DBS because 
it does not involve physical penetration of neural tissue (Anand and Hotson, 2002). 
However, it has been shown to cause psychotic and epileptic symptoms in a minority of 
patients (Wassermann, 1998; Machii et al., 2006). 
TMS is capable of producing significant behavioural changes. Studies have shown 
that a session of TMS can have a significant impact on the decisions individuals make 
(Fecteau et al., 2007), and may enhance cognition and memory (Illes et al., 2006a). A 
recent pilot study has shown that a session of high frequency repetitive stimulation of the 
right prefrontal cortex can reduce craving in cocaine-addicted subjects (Camprodon et 
al., 2007). This technique appears promising but requires more research to evaluate its 
safety and efficacy.
Neuroimaging for prevention and treatment of addiction
Neuroimaging using fMRI, PET, single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), 
magnetoencephalograph (MEG), and electroencephalograph (EEG) are non-invasive 
techniques that enable researchers to identify functional and structural abnormalities in 
the brains of addicted individuals. Neuroimaging has played a critical role in increasing 
understanding of the neurobiology of addiction. It has been suggested that these 
techniques might also be used in preventing addiction and developing more effective 
treatments (Volkow and Li, 2005). 
As with genetic screening, neuroimaging might be used to identify neuropsychological 
vulnerabilities that predispose some individuals to developing addiction if they abuse 
drugs (e.g. poorly functioning inhibitory control circuits). Neuroimaging may also help 
to identify neuropsychological deficits that are the primary source of an individual’s 
inability to stop using drugs (e.g. enhanced salience, poor executive control). This would 
allow clinicians to target specific pharmacological treatments to individuals that would 
hopefully have a better chance of success. 
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Psychosocial treatment of addiction
Psychosocial interventions such as cognitive behavioural therapy, motivational 
interviewing, drug counselling, and 12-step support groups provide an important 
adjunct to pharmacological and medical treatments in achieving a long-term 
successful outcome. While psychosocial treatments are outside the scope of this 
report, it is important to acknowledge the need for greater attention and investment 
in psychosocial treatment and research. Advances in neuroscience and cognitive 
psychology showing cognitive deficits in impulse inhibition and a pathological 
focus on drug use in addiction highlight the importance of psychosocial therapies 
that aim to ameliorate these cognitive deficits (Volkow and Li, 2005). 
Neuroscience may also help in designing therapies which are more effective for 
addicted individuals with particular kinds of cognitive deficits. The neuroscience 
of addiction vulnerability during adolescence may assist in driving social policies 
for dealing with addiction, such as prohibitions on alcohol and tobacco use in 
minors, and the importance of early education on the dangers of drug use. One 
particular ethical concern in relation to psychosocial treatments of addiction is that 
simplistic brain disease models may lead to the neglect of psychosocial approaches 
in favour of more biological approaches to treatment, sometimes referred to as 
‘medicalisation’. This concern will be discussed in Chapter 5 (see pp. 106–09).
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Chapter 4
Human rights, ethical values 
and the implications of current addiction research 
Benjamin Capps and Richard Ashcroft
Introduction
Ethics is the domain of inquiry whose task it is to formulate and interpret the most 
appropriate principles to guide human conduct. These philosophical and applied 
enquiries, when related to neuroscience, have been termed ‘neuroethics’, although the 
methods of analysis and theoretical frameworks used in these inquiries are not unique to 
this field. 
There is a bewildering diversity of approaches to this task, resulting in a wide variety of 
ethical theories which purport to provide rationales for common moral rules (Rachels, 
1999; Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). Policy rarely appeals directly to any single 
moral position; and for this reason, it is possibly unwise to rely only on any one doctrine 
(and all its many manifestations) to shape ethical analyses of the implications of research 
on addiction neurobiology. The basis of European bioethics has been characterised by 
at least three ethical approaches which have presided over the debates: human rights, 
dignity and utilitarianism. In this report, it is suggested that the first of these — human 
rights — has a particular prominence in EU policy. Such an approach is not without 
controversy, and there are two principal debates in this regard: the moral basis of human 
rights and the role of government in applying such principles. Such debates are beyond 
the scope of this report, which intends to present the ethical arguments in respect to 
neuroethics. 
From a human rights perspective, the following principles could be taken to be 
requirements for treatment to be regarded as ethical: 
1) There should be rigorous evidence of the safety and effectiveness of the treatment 
that is provided; 
2) Effective treatment should be provided safely in well-structured, well-resourced and 
well-managed treatment programmes;
3) Human rights law should be clearly understood and prioritised over the competing 
claims of the public interest. A balance must be found between these competing 
claims and this should be expressed in the ethical values of autonomy, liberty, privacy 
and consent;
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4) Restricting individual rights in the public interest must only be done for compelling 
reasons based on empirical, clinical and scientific evidence;
5) Policies should observe the ethical values of respecting patients’ autonomy by 
defining the constraints of their liberty and by ensuring that they give free and 
informed consent to participate in treatment, protecting their privacy of information; 
6) Treatment programmes should ensure that dependent persons have equitable 
access to treatment which maximises its effectiveness for each individual (by 
matching patients to the treatment that meets their individual needs and situation), 
and ensures that they do not bear a disproportionate social burden in accepting 
treatment; 
7) It is important that pharmacological treatment should not be used to compensate 
for poor social policies that lead some to drug abuse and addiction, contribute to a 
general erosion of human rights, or inappropriate ‘public interest’ drug policies that 
may be over-focused on the negative and criminal impact of drug addiction.
Ethics and addiction
The promise of neuroscience and genetic research raises major ethical and social 
issues (Safire, 2002; Hall et al., 2004b; Farah, 2005; Illes, 2006; Ashcroft et al., 
2007). These can be considered under two broad headings: (1) ethical issues that 
arise from neuroscience and genetic research on addiction; and (2) the broader social 
and ethical implications of the potential technological applications of neuroscience 
(e.g. for therapeutic, preventive, and enhancement purposes). This part of the report is 
concerned with (1). In Chapter 5, questions arising under (2) are discussed in respect to 
the novel developments in addiction neuroscience and genetics that may impact upon the 
treatment and prevention of addiction, and policies to reduce drug use.
Various ethical approaches have been applied to locate and reflect on the ethical issues 
in neuroscience research, and to frame and justify policy responses. A number of ethical 
values have emerged as being fundamental in balancing individual and public interests; 
and of particular importance have been issues of autonomy, liberty, privacy, consent 
and equality. These ethical values may be framed within a broad conception of human 
rights, and by balancing such rights with the public interests, a framework may be 
developed which can inform our responses to addiction and the emerging findings from 
current research. A possible framework is suggested in the box on p. 74. The sections 
that follow explore how these highlighted ethical values are affected by the key role of 
choice in drug use, and the possible ways in which the environment and genes affect an 
addict’s neuropsychological capacity for decision-making, as understood by addiction 
neuroscience.
In modern liberal democracies there tends to be an emphasis on the public good; 
this involves a proportional response to addicts’ behaviour. For example, policies 
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entirely based on the ‘moral’ or ‘sceptical’ model may not take into account the social 
circumstances of drug use, the lack of effectiveness of punitive measures, and the benefits 
of treatment and reintegration. On the other hand, the ‘medical’ model may be used to 
downplay the criminal behaviour of some drug users. Therefore, while autonomy is a 
guiding premise in respecting the rights of individuals, individuals do not have rights to 
do as they please; their actions must be guided by responsibility towards others. Thus, 
in some situations, where individuals are incapable of controlling their actions, or acting 
in a way which may harm themselves or others, punitive measures may be justified. 
However, given the complexity of drug addiction, the scientific evidence would strongly 
point to the need for a balanced use of the medical model with other perspectives when 
considering which policy options are appropriate. This would ensure that both human 
rights and the public good are both adequately protected (see box below). 
Developing a balanced drug policy
Developments in neuroscience suggest that a balanced approach is required in 
addiction policies. The justification for such an approach is grounded in the medical 
model of addiction and the requirement for punitive measures. Currently, policies 
tend to be often weighted towards the deployment of criminal responses to addiction. 
On the one hand, most states have laws that prohibit adults from using cannabis, 
cocaine, and heroin. These laws are justified on paternalistic grounds that they 
prevent adults from harming themselves or others. On the other hand, if one accepts 
that paternalism is sometimes ethically acceptable (e.g. if one supports compulsory 
seatbelt laws or the regulation of pharmaceutical drugs), a major ethical problem 
remains in explaining why adults are permitted to use other substances, like alcohol 
and nicotine, which also cause a great deal of harm to users (Husak, 2004). 
There is no obvious neurobiological justification for the fact that some psychoactive 
substances are legal while others are not (Ashcroft et al., 2007). Nor does the 
legal status of these drugs necessarily directly correspond to the relative harms 
caused by their current levels of use (Room, 2007). 
Some neuroscientists (e.g. Blakemore, 2002; Iversen, 2002; Nutt, 2006a; Iverson 
et al., 2007; Nutt et al., 2007b) are hopeful that their research will facilitate the 
development of policies towards drugs that reflect their prevalence of use and their 
capacity to harm users and others. The extent to which developments in this direction 
are likely, however, is questionable in the current context of strong policy support 
for the international drug control conventions and considerable opposition in most 
developed societies to any liberalisation of policies towards illicit drugs. Indeed, 
arguably it can be more easily imagined that advances in addiction neuroscience 
could be selectively used to justify more coercive policies towards illicit drug use in 
the name of preventing adolescents from acquiring a ‘chronic brain disease’. 
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Taking all of the possible developments in neuroscience together, it is evident that an 
increasing influence of a ‘global’ economy on the development, manufacture and supply 
of drugs by ‘online’ and small-scale ‘garage’ agents make simple ethical choices difficult. 
These developments are likely to pose an important challenge for both European and 
inter-regional regulatory policies. This shift of focus from traditional sources of drug 
research and development, such as ‘visible’ biotech companies, to manufacturers and 
suppliers of illicit drugs, such as international cartels and ‘garage’ industries within 
the expansion of global markets, such as the Internet, is likely to challenge traditional 
approaches to regulation (Reidenberg, 1996). Long-established approaches which focus 
on drug trafficking control are likely to be increasingly challenged by these novel and 
more ‘invisible’ supply networks. Furthermore, attitudes based on the harm caused 
by drugs could potentially also be challenged by the development of ‘safer’ or non-
addictive substances (Prinz, 1997). Drug-control policies may therefore be required to 
confront the need of putting into place a regulatory framework for the development, 
evaluation and use of novel drugs. This would involve questions of whether regulation is 
effective, legitimate and if its design is optimal (Brownsword, 2004). To some extent this 
problem is already developing as regulators are increasingly faced with the problem 
of distinguishing between products sold often over the Internet as food supplements, 
alternative medicines, cognitive enhancers and even legal and supposedly ‘safer’ 
alternatives to illicit drugs (EMCDDA, 2008).  
 
Human rights framework for addiction policy
Human Rights
1)   Protection and provision of necessary goods required for human life (e.g. health, 
housing)
2)  Procedural rights to allow fair representation under law and to lead one’s life 
free from arbitrary constraints: e.g. (from the ECHR) Right to a Fair Trial, Right to 
Equal Treatment.
Ethical Values
1)  Autonomy 
Refers to a person’s capacity for self-determination.
2)  Liberty 
Condition in which an individual has the ability to act according to his or her 
own will within a coercive — but stabilising — framework of law.
3)  Privacy 
Ability of an individual or group to keep their lives and personal affairs out of 
public view, or to control the flow of information about themselves.
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4)  Consent 
Intentional mediation of relationships with one another or to put in place new 
relationships, and to signal their intentions and wishes.
5)  Equality 
Equal treatment by the law and in medical care.
The Public Interest
Referring to the ‘general welfare’, contrasts with individual interest (protected as 
human rights), under the assumption that what is good for society may not be 
directly good for a given individual and vice versa.
Autonomy in addiction
By definition, addiction is a disorder in which an individual’s control over their drug use 
is impaired. People with an addiction continue to use drugs in the face of enormous 
negative consequences and despite often expressing a wish that they could stop. This 
perspective is codified in the diagnostic criteria for substance dependence or addiction, 
in which a loss of control over drug use is central, and drug use is compulsive and at 
the expense of all other goal-directed activities, such as working or caring for children 
(World Health Organization, 1993b; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This 
definition of addiction is contested by some commentators who are sceptical about the 
existence of addiction and see drug use as a decision that users make (see Chapter 1: 
‘Sceptical versus medical models of addiction’, p. 25) (Szasz, 1975; Dalrymple, 2006; 
Satel and Lilenfeld, 2007). The effect of drug use and addiction on autonomy is of 
fundamental importance to this debate which, as discussed in Chapter 4, is also central 
to the expression of one’s rights. 
Autonomy is becoming increasingly more important in research on addiction (Levy, 2006). 
For much of the 20th century, drug-dependent persons were seen as autonomous, self-
governing individuals who wilfully, knowingly, and voluntarily engaged in criminal and 
immoral behaviour (Gerstein and Harwood, 1990; Peele, 1998; White, 1998). As discussed 
in Chapters 1 and 2, the presumed autonomy and responsibility of such individuals has 
been called into question by recent genetic and neuroscientific research on addiction 
(Leshner, 1997; Volkow and Li, 2004). It is increasingly argued, most notably by the directors 
of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the National Institute on Alcoholism 
and Alcohol Abuse (NIAAA), who fund a significant proportion of all current research on 
addiction, that addiction is a ‘chronic, relapsing brain disease’ (Leshner, 1997, p. 45). 
The brain disease model of addiction challenges the traditional belief that drug use is 
always a voluntary choice by arguing that prolonged drug use results in long-lasting 
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changes in brain structure and function that undermine voluntary control (Leshner, 1997; 
Volkow and Li, 2004). These neuroadaptations can persist for months — possibly years 
— after abstinence and may explain why many abstinent drug addicts relapse (Volkow 
and Li, 2004). Neurocognitive studies have also shown that addicted individuals display 
cognitive deficits in decision-making tasks (Jentsch and Taylor, 1999; Grant et al., 2000; 
Bechara, 2001; Rogers and Robbins, 2001; Fillmore, 2003; Hester and Garavan, 2004; 
Bechara, 2005; Yucel and Lubman, 2007). A more detailed discussion of this research 
can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.
These results are used to support a neurobiological account of how addictive drugs 
subvert endogenous reward circuits that are essential to survival, thereby giving drug use 
an overriding motivational salience that works to the detriment of all other goal-directed 
activities (Dackis and O’Brien, 2005). According to proponents of the medical model, 
these brain changes also explain why addicts continue to use drugs despite tolerance to 
their pleasurable effects and in the face of serious adverse consequences. The ‘chronic 
and relapsing brain disease model of addiction’ therefore suggests that addicts have 
difficulty in understanding or considering the long-term consequences of drug use and 
have a diminished ability to control their drug use as a result of neuropharmacological 
changes in their brains.
Although extreme, if taken literally, the ‘chronic and relapsing brain disease model’ 
could be used to argue that those with an addiction lack the autonomy to make informed 
choices about drug use (informed consent). As some researchers have suggested (see 
box p. 77), the choice to enter treatment or to participate in research (Cohen, 2002; 
Charland, 2002) can be referred to as informed consent. This model could also be 
used to justify the inappropriate use of coerced treatment (see pp. 93–99), the use of 
treatments whose proponents are overly optimistic about their ability to ‘cure’ addiction, 
or the use of highly invasive treatments, such as neurosurgery (see box p. 108). It 
may also encourage a reliance on medical or biological approaches to treatment, 
referred to as ‘medicalisation’ (see pp. 106–109) at the expense of possibly more 
effective psychological or social policies to tackle drug use. The impact that addiction 
neuroscience is having on our understanding about these issues is discussed below.
Neurobiological research on addiction has significant contributions to make in 
understanding whether addicts are autonomous or not, and therefore responsible for their 
actions (see box p. 77 for an example of this). The debatable status of addicts before the 
law has thrown open a complex response to their criminal activities: both in consuming 
(and continuing to do so) an illicit drug and in engaging in criminal behaviour while 
intoxicated or in order to fund drug use. Criminal responses to drug use differ between 
the Member States (1). A large part of the debate concerns the addict’s capacities, such 
as capacity to consent, or to take responsibility for their actions. Responses have varied 
(1) See the EMCDDA website for up-to-date information on current drug policies of the Member 
States: http://eldd.emcdda.europa.eu/ 
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between the treatment of addiction as a medical condition and criminal justice approaches 
which assume that drug users should take responsibility (and pay) for their ‘choices’. 
At the start of this report it was emphasised that the ‘medical’ and ‘moral’ models have 
a large part to play in the development of appropriate responses to addiction. It is clear 
from the neuroscience of addiction that decision-making is impaired by addiction. However, 
it is generally not so impaired that those addicted lack autonomy, or forfeit their ability 
to express their liberty by virtue of the fact that they are addicted. Policy responses to 
addiction need to find a balance between restricting the liberty of those who cause harm to 
others as a consequence of drug use and taking measures, such as treatment, which aim to 
maximise an addict’s autonomy. This issue is discussed in greater detail in the next section.
The arguments of Charland and Cohen interpret the DSM-IV criteria that describe ‘loss of 
control’ and ‘compulsive’ behaviour in absolute terms. However, the DSM-IV criteria that 
they rely on do not constitute evidence. Charland’s argument is based on the testimony 
of a single reformed heroin addict who claimed that heroin users are unable to say ‘no’ 
to an offer of heroin. In fact, overwhelmingly this view is not supported by empirical 
evidence, as illustrated by:
•	 Swiss	heroin	trials	(a	clinical	trial	of	prescribed	injectable	heroin	to	severe	heroin	
addicts) were not inundated with untreated heroin addicts seeking ‘free heroin’. This 
was clearest in a randomised controlled trial of immediate versus delayed entry to 
heroin maintenance (with the delayed entry group given access to usual treatment, 
methadone maintenance or abstinence) (Perneger et al., 1998). The researchers 
Do opioid-dependent individuals possess autonomy?
The ‘chronic and relapsing brain disease model’ of addiction has prompted some 
ethicists to question the capacity of opioid-dependent individuals to consent to some 
forms of treatment for their dependence (Charland, 2002; Cohen, 2002; Elliott, 
2002; Roberts, 2002; Caplan, 2006). It is argued that heroin addicts are unable 
to make rational decisions about whether to accept an offer of heroin either in the 
setting of a research study (Cohen, 2002), or in a clinical trial of heroin maintenance 
treatment (Charland, 2002). Charland argues that heroin addicts are incapable of 
saying ‘no’ to heroin: ‘their decision is not truly theirs’ (Charland, 2002, p. 43). 
Based on their reading of the neuroscience literature, these ethicists argue that heroin 
addicts are ‘neurochemically driven’ to take heroin; they are ‘hijacked’ by the drug. 
These arguments, if accepted and directly applied, would raise ethical objections to 
addicts participating in research or clinical trials that involved consumption of their 
drug of addiction (e.g. trials of injectable heroin), or its agonists (e.g. methadone). It 
would raise similar doubts about the capacity of opioid addicts to freely consent to 
substitution treatments (e.g. MMT) (Carter and Hall, 2008). 
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intended to recruit 40 patients in each group but only recruited 24 and 27 patients, 
respectively. Moreover, when those who were allocated to delayed entry to heroin 
treatment were offered the choice at the end of six months, two thirds of the group 
decided against receiving heroin (Perneger et al., 1998). Severely dependent treatment 
refractory Swiss heroin addicts were thus capable of saying ‘no’ to an offer of 
prescribed heroin. 
•	 Many	addicts	are	able	to	control	their	drug	use	in	certain	circumstances,	without	
assistance and for varying periods in order to reduce their tolerance; to take time out 
from the rigours of their lifestyle; or respond to changes in life situation (e.g. birth of 
a child, input from friends, family and employers).
•	 Returning	Vietnam	veterans	were	able	to	quit	opioid	use	without	treatment	once	back	
in the U.S. (Gerstein and Harwood, 1990).
In order for ‘addiction’ to plausibly deny the autonomy of opioid-dependent individuals, 
this internal ‘neurochemical drive’ must be irresistible and absolute. The neuroscience 
evidence that Charland and Cohen rely on is not as clear as they suggest:
•	 evidence	for	‘compulsive’	drug	use	emerged	from	highly	controlled	laboratory	animal	
studies that arguably have a limited application to human compulsive behaviour or 
the contexts in which humans typically use drugs. 
•	 human	neuroimaging	and	neurocognitive	research	shows	that	addicts	as	a	group	
show changes in brain function that are associated with a reduced ability to control 
drug use and they perform more poorly in neurocognitive tests of decision-making 
than non-addicts. These studies demonstrate a tendency for addiction to diminish 
neurocognitive capacity and function in some but not all addicts. Significantly, not 
all those who are addicted display these cognitive deficits while some non-addicted 
people do (Bechara et al., 2001; Bechara, 2005). 
In summary, neuroscience research on addiction does not prove that addicts lack 
autonomy: while their autonomy is clearly impaired in some situations, particularly 
during withdrawal or intoxication, addicts retain some degree of control over their drug 
use and hence, some degree of autonomy. The aim of treatment should be to increase 
patient decision-making capacity and autonomy (Spriggs, 2005) rather than prevent 
addicts from participating in research and treatment that may be of benefit to them.
Informed consent and addiction
Consent refers to the capacity of agents to act according to their will, or to understand 
the consequences of an outcome, usually in relation to a decision to agree to enter 
treatment or participate in research. The question as to whether an addict possesses 
autonomy is central to whether they have the capacity to give consent. To give consent is 
to exercise one’s autonomy.
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When drug-dependent individuals seek treatment, they are often in a desperate 
state psychologically, socially, financially and physically. Addicts may also be 
neurocognitively impaired when they are intoxicated or in withdrawal. Given that many 
people who are addicted do not wish to be treated, they are often under some degree 
of social duress or external coercion to enter treatment. There can also be conflict 
between the interests of the person seeking treatment and the community who regularly 
funds the treatment programmes and decides how they are run. This can influence what 
people are required to consent to when they enter treatment and how their consent is 
obtained.
Informed consent is the formal process by which individuals agree to enter treatment 
in the full knowledge of its possible risks and benefits and in the absence of duress or 
coercion (Faden et al., 1986; Roberts, 2002; Walker et al., 2005). Individuals must be 
fully informed about the options open to them in order to be able to make autonomous 
decisions and therefore express their human rights. The process of informed consent is 
generally understood to require that an individual: 
1) has the capacity to understand treatment and communicate their wishes; 
2) is fully informed of the risks and benefits of treatment, as well as those of other 
treatment options; 
3) is free of internal or external coercion in making their decision (Faden et al., 1986; 
Roberts, 2002; Walker et al., 2005); and 
4) has equal access to all effective forms of treatment that are appropriately provided 
(Carter and Hall, 2008) (2).
The minimum requirements for obtaining informed consent to the treatment of addiction 
are provided in the box on p. 80. Surprisingly, there has been very little research into: 
how informed consent is obtained in the treatment of addiction; participants’ perspectives 
on the consent process; the impact that particular consent procedures have on treatment 
outcomes; or how these procedures might be improved (Sugarman et al., 1999; Walker 
et al., 2005). There has been some limited research on the capacity of individuals with 
an addiction to give internally uncoerced consent and to understand the consequences 
of agreeing to research (Harrison et al., 1995; Fureman et al., 1997). More research is 
urgently required. Promising research that attempts to develop neurocognitive tools that 
may help both researchers and clinicians to assess an individual’s ability to provide free 
and informed consent is under way (Hazelton et al., 2003; Cairns et al., 2005; Hotopf, 
2005; Smith et al., 2006).
(2) This last provision, which is not included in traditional formulations of consent, is 
particularly relevant in the provision of drug dependence treatment where there are 
competing social and political forces that determine what treatment options are available, 
and the manner in which these treatments are provided.
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Minimum requirements for ethical consent to addiction treatment
Addicts can differ markedly both in the severity and length of their addiction, as 
well as in their social, financial and psychological circumstances (Roberts, 2002). 
They will also differ in their willingness to overcome their addiction (Walker et al., 
2005). An informed consent process that is too narrow and rigid, epitomised by 
signing a medico-legal consent form, can therefore gloss over the complex nature 
of consenting to enter addiction treatment, making it difficult to ascertain whether 
consent is free and informed. This is especially true when an individual’s capacity 
to consent may change dramatically over time. Adopting too narrow a view of the 
consent process may also lead to poorer treatment outcomes. 
The autonomy of addicts in making choices about their drug use is undoubtedly 
impaired when they are acutely intoxicated or experiencing severe withdrawal 
symptoms. A strong argument therefore exists that addicts who enter treatment 
while intoxicated or in withdrawal should not be asked to sign detailed treatment 
contracts on admission to treatment. The worst of drug withdrawal symptoms should 
be reduced by medication (or have abated as a result of completing withdrawal). 
Patients should also be given time to consider their treatment options before they 
are required to make long-term or far-reaching decisions that are often implied by 
signing a treatment contract. 
Once patients have stabilised, they should be provided with enough information 
to make a decision that is in their own interests. Given that there are a number 
of external social factors which influence what and how treatment is offered, the 
type of information provided during consent is likely to be critical, both to the 
outcome for the individual, and to ensure that the process of consent conforms with 
appropriate ethical requirements. 
From an ethical perspective, it is important that the treatment chosen reflects the aims 
of the individual rather than those of the staff or the wider community. The issues 
around the justification for compulsory treatment are addressed later in this report. 
To allow the patient to make an informed choice about what sort of treatment they 
are entering, information is required about (Carter and Hall, 2008):
•	 the	treatment	programme	(e.g.	its	aims,	risks	and	benefits,	and	costs);
•	 programme	rules	and	regulations	(e.g.	information	on	drug	testing	regimes,	
responses to positive urine samples, the intended length of treatment, costs, 
where and how often drugs are to be dispensed and the involvement of the 
criminal justice system and rights to privacy and confidentiality);
•	 the	effectiveness	of	the	programme	and	the	likelihood	of	competing	alternative	
treatment options;
•	 their	freedom	to	refuse	treatment	or	seek	treatment	elsewhere.
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Liberty and addiction
Liberty is the condition in which an individual has the ability to act according to his 
or her own will within a coercive — but stabilising — framework of law. Liberty is 
premised on the notion that each individual can have a different conception about what 
is good for them, and therefore they should have the freedom of choice. Their choices 
are, however, restrained by the state which upholds individual rights and equality 
of opportunity. Such coercion is justified, or so it is maintained, because different 
conceptions of the good will inevitably come into conflict, and therefore social stability 
calls for rules to govern each others’ private lives in the public sphere (Capps, 2007). 
Liberties can thereby be justly removed on the grounds that they are not human rights 
(Kramer, 2002, pp. 10–20). Liberty therefore refers to the freedom to engage in some 
activity without hindrance from others, so long as the expression of one’s liberty is not to 
the detriment of others’ human rights.
A commitment to liberty demands that individuals accept certain sacrifices — especially 
to exercise self-restraint — in their day-to-day lives. This means that each individual is 
responsible for their actions, and they are expected to observe rules pertaining to their 
actions. Liberty calls for a legal system which enforces rules according to the public 
interest, which in turn reflects on, and provides for, a stable existence for all citizens. 
Thus, in systems of rights, individual ‘choices’ are often qualified by the public interest, 
which include the justification of interference. This relationship is expressed in various 
human rights instruments. For example, the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 states that rights 
may be justifiably suspended:
‘in accordance with the law and as is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ (Article 8, Right to respect for 
private and family life; similar statements accompany the other Articles of the Act).
When one breaks legally enforceable rules, they should expect that they will be dealt 
with fairly before the law, through a system of adjudication that may deprive them of 
some of their liberties. Thus, human rights frameworks recognise the value to individuals 
of their personal liberty and their ability to exercise their autonomy, and hence they 
recognise the need for an appropriate justification for any interference in the enjoyment 
of these.
Equality and addiction
Equality expresses a social benchmark which prescribes that in pluralistic cultures, where 
there are competing conceptions, each individual will be treated equally in morally 
relevant ways. This will extend to treatment under the law. Given that there are no 
established criteria of what moral aspects count as relevant, proactive measures normally 
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aim to reduce inequality. This has significant implications for the operation of the law 
(e.g. a right to a fair trial, and rights against some degrading or tortuous punishments) 
and for individual autonomy (such as equality of resources, welfare and freedom). This 
amounts to a requirement that policies not discriminate between individuals on the 
grounds of sex, race or social status, and contribute to and affirm social and economic 
equality. This latter condition is particularly relevant to how individuals are given fair 
access to medical interventions. Questions of distributive justice are important, and are 
subject to detailed analysis below.
With regard to addiction, the moral and medical models have very different implications 
for how addicted individuals and drug users are dealt with by the law. On the one hand, 
the ‘moral’ or ‘sceptical’ model is likely to place an emphasis on the criminal aspects of 
drug use, and thereby consider addicts and illicit drug users to have forfeited claims to 
equality and opportunity during the course of social ‘punishment’. Importantly, such a 
position may have more to do with an idea of equity, in the narrow sense of the term, 
which has its basis in the principle ‘to give each his due’. Such measures may not take 
account of prior failings in equality and opportunity, or the role of luck in maintaining a 
‘moral life’.
On the other hand, the medical model takes account of the observations that addicted 
individuals, by virtue of their condition, require ‘additional’ state assistance — such 
as medical care, social support to enable employability, and guidance in their 
responsibilities — above what a non-addicted person might receive. Equality, in this 
case, may lead to measures which attempt to raise the status of addicts to a more 
equitable level.
Privacy and addiction
Privacy is perhaps best understood as a bundle of rights that an individual or group 
have to keep their lives and personal affairs out of public view, or to control the flow of 
information about themselves (e.g. protect confidentiality). Protection of privacy is not 
an absolute moral principle, and therefore, a balance has to be found between privacy 
and other ethical considerations (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007, p. 28). Thus, 
strengthening privacy rules should not indicate that drug users’ privacy or confidentiality 
should not be over-ridden by justified legal measures. As already stated, privacy stems 
from rights which entail certain duties, and therefore responsibility in living one’s life 
includes obligations to the community — not a right to do as one wants. 
With a better understanding of neurobiology comes a greater capacity and power to 
pry into the innermost secrets of the brain, mind and selfhood. For some, this is an 
alarming development, that has been described as the use of pharmacotherapy to 
expand the ‘… drug war battlefield … to a new terrain directly inside the bodies and 
brains of drug users’ (Centre for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics, 2004, p. 6). Some 
commentators have even argued that the ability to directly monitor brain activity is a 
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‘threat to cognitive liberty’ (Centre for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics, 2004, p. 4). 
Similar claims have been made about genetic screening. These bold claims need to be 
justified by an objective evaluation of what technologies such as neuroimaging are 
actually able to find reliably. The ethical implications of being able to monitor brain 
activity through functional neuroimaging is discussed in greater detail later in this report 
(see ‘Neuroscience, prediction and privacy’, p. 117).
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New developments in the treatment of addiction
Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall, Benjamin Capps and Ruud ter Meulen
Introduction
Neuroscience research of addiction holds the promise of providing a number of novel 
treatment technologies that may significantly reduce the impact and prevalence of 
addiction and drug abuse. However, along with the considerable potential for good 
comes a potential for significant harm. As with any new technology, the impact that these 
novel developments have upon the individual being treated, and the rest of European 
society, will depend on how they are used. 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, addiction is a complex neurobiological, mental and 
social disorder. The use of new technologies is complicated, not simply by the complexity 
of the disorder, but by the tension between a goal of treating a neuropsychiatric 
condition and the goal of protecting society from the harmful behaviour of drug users. 
This balance is further complicated by the social and moral attitudes held by many 
towards those who are addicted to drugs. It is accordingly important to carefully 
consider the ethical motivation for intervention and the social context in which these 
technologies are used. 
Establishing a human rights framework requires balancing individual and public 
interests. In the previous chapter, it was suggested that this could be achieved by 
committing to ethical values which strike a balance between these two competing 
interests. In the context of this report, the ethical values of autonomy (empowering 
individuals to make worthwhile choices about their lives), liberty (the freedom to act 
according to one’s choices but within the constraints of a fair socio-legal system), 
privacy (the power to protect the flow of information about oneself), and consent 
(the power to modify inter-agent relationships), are central to the ethical use of new 
technologies arising from neurobiological research on addiction. 
Of central importance to this task is a consideration of how neuroscience research on 
addiction influences our understanding of addiction and in particular, our understanding 
of the autonomous decision-making capacity of the addicted individual. This has 
important implications for how society attempts to engage or encourage addicted 
individuals into treatment, particularly those who may not want to be treated. A review 
of the literature on the neuroscience of addiction reveals that chronic drug use does 
impact upon the neurocognitive systems involved in making decisions and controlling 
behaviour. However, this impact does not prevent absolutely the ability for addicted 
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individuals to choose not to use drugs. While neuroscience does provide a strong 
justification for the need for medical treatment and intervention, it does not suggest 
that this intervention should override the autonomous decision-making capacity of the 
individual, based solely on their being addicted. 
Individuals with an addiction should be treated in the same manner as other members 
of society within the dictates of law and fundamental rights and with respect to access 
to appropriate medical and social supports. The choice of treatment available to the 
addicted should be dictated by a need to treat their condition and not as a form of 
extrajudicial punishment. This is particularly relevant to policy decisions regarding the 
use of substitution or replacement therapies where their use may be limited, or provided 
in ways that are not motivated by the desire to treat. A corollary of this argument is that 
treatments should be provided in a way that does not further harm society. Treatments 
often involve the use of drugs which can cause harm to society if misused.
This section uses the ethical framework developed in Chapter 4 to analyse how the 
neuroscience research and technologies outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 could be used in 
a way that allows for the greatest benefit, while protecting society and individuals from 
unanticipated consequences or misuses. This section provides a detailed analysis of the 
competing issues that impact on how technologies are used. The analysis has led to the 
following observations on the use of emerging technologies for the treatment of addiction 
in a number of circumstances, which are summarised below:
Coerced treatment
1. The use of some form of coercion or persuasion is a legitimate part of ethical 
treatment of addiction, and necessary in order for a state to fulfil its human rights 
obligations of offering the highest possible attainable standard of healthcare, 
ensuring equity, and enabling addicted individuals to express the full state of their 
autonomy and liberty. It is also important in recognising that some crimes committed 
by some addicted individuals arise from their addiction.
2. However, any use of legal coercion should not override whatever autonomous 
decision-making capacity addicts have. It should also be motivated by a desire to 
treat the individual, and not used as a form of cost-cutting (treatment being generally 
cheaper than imprisonment) or as a form of extrajudicial punishment. 
3. Consequently, individuals who are legally coerced into treatment should be offered 
a dual-constrained choice: first, a choice of whether to enter treatment or not, with 
refusal leaving them to face criminal proceedings for their crime like any other 
individual charged with the same offence; and secondly, a choice of treatment 
from a range of effective options that are available to the wider community, which 
could include for those addicted to opioid drugs substitution or maintenance 
therapy.
87
Chapter 5: New developments in the treatment of addiction 
4. While new prophylactic technologies which aim to block drug use are an important 
treatment option, they should only constitute one type of treatment among a choice 
of many. In making a choice about treatment, addicted persons should be given 
accurate information about the advantages and disadvantages of each, including 
their likelihood of success.
 Medicalisation of addiction
1. Neuroscience research has made significant advances in our understanding of the 
nature of addiction, and the cognitive and behavioural changes that underpin it. 
This will potentially lead to more effective treatments, and more appropriate social 
policies, although it should be noted that success has been limited to date. 
2. Enthusiasm generated by developments in this area needs to be tempered by an 
acknowledgement of the role that social and psychological factors play in initiation 
of drug use, the development and expression of addictive behaviours, the way 
that society responds to addiction, and the proven effectiveness of some existing 
responses. 
3. Addiction neuroscience may help us to understand the biological and cognitive 
aspects of addiction, but does not reduce the importance of the social and 
psychological in the way in which society responds to it. Acknowledging this is 
important in preventing neuroscience research from being used to promote unproven 
or dubious ‘cures’ for addiction (e.g. neurosurgery, ultra-rapid opioid detoxification) 
which may be marketed to vulnerable and desperate addicts, and where evidence of 
their safety or efficacy may be limited or absent.
Pharmacological relapse prevention
1. Relapse to drug use is the norm in persons treated for addiction. Pharmacological 
treatments that help to reduce relapse, such as naltrexone implants, may prove to be 
an important innovation but they need to be properly evaluated in controlled clinical 
trials before being used clinically.
2. Clients need also to be made aware of any potential side effects (e.g. detection, 
dysphoria), the likelihood of success, and in the case of opiate addiction, 
the potential for overdose should they cease treatment and revert to heroin use, 
or try to override the implant.
3. The offer of these implants under legal coercion should include the choice of other 
treatment options.
Preventive vaccination
1. Vaccines which provide an immunological block against drug activity are another 
novel development which may prove to provide prophylaxis against relapse.
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2. More speculatively, vaccines may protect those who are identified as vulnerable to 
addiction (e.g. genetic or psychological screening), particularly during adolescence 
when many forms of addiction begin.
3. Preventive use of genetics and vaccines is limited to the predictive power of the 
screening technology. Wide-scale genetic screening for the entire population is not 
feasible on the basis of present data.
4. Some parents may wish to vaccinate their children, particularly if there is a family 
history of drug addiction but enthusiasm for these preventive technologies must 
be tempered by an acknowledgement of the limited protection that these vaccines 
may provide. Unlike normal vaccines, they are likely to be short-lived, requiring 
boosters, and can be overridden by using larger doses of the addictive drug or by 
using another drug. Preventive vaccination could also prove to be counter-productive 
and the cost versus benefits of any developments in this area require considerable 
scrutiny.
Drug testing
1. Drug testing can be an important part of managing an effective treatment, or 
monitoring the effectiveness of a particular treatment programme. But drug testing 
is only as good as the responses to the test results. A strong argument can be made 
that drug tests should be used to provide better treatment, and not used as a form of 
extrajudicial punishment, within the constraints of protecting society from further harm.
2. All information gathered as a result of drug testing should remain private, and 
treated with the same regard for confidentiality as other medical records.
Neuroscience and privacy
1. Neuroimaging has enabled researchers to gain insight into the neurobiological 
contributions to behaviour, cognition and personality. It is important that the claims 
made reflect what neuroimaging is able to show. Reports should acknowledge the 
important technological limitations and experimental caveats associated with this 
technology. Often neuroimages only show trends of difference between groups of 
people.
2. All neuroimaging results should remain private as for all other medical information.
Psychopharmacological harm reduction
1. Neuroscience holds out the possibility of developing safer forms of currently addictive 
drugs. Should this happen, a number of controversial and difficult issues are likely to 
arise for policy making and regulation. It will be necessary to consider any  
new drug on its merits, based on a cost/benefit analysis of the harms that any new 
substance is likely to cause, or alleviate.
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Personal health and the public interest in addiction treatment
Addiction affects an agent’s autonomy and ability to consent. The treatment of drug 
dependence is complicated by two additional issues. First, many of those addicted 
who seek treatment are involved in the criminal justice system because they have been 
arrested for offences committed to fund their drug use. As a result, they may be coerced 
into treatment (thus directly losing their autonomy and liberty through the actions of a 
third party) to reduce the adverse effects that their behaviour has on society. Second, 
many drug-dependent persons are not able to pay the costs of their treatment. In 
many developed countries, this usually means that drug treatment is provided either by 
charitable non-government organisations (NGOs) or by governments, with a small private 
sector catering to wealthy addicts. This is particularly true of opioid addiction (1). The 
NGO sector has traditionally provided drug-free forms of treatment such as residential 
rehabilitation programmes, self-help groups and outpatient counselling. Government 
programmes have more often provided pharmacologically-based treatments such as 
agonist maintenance treatment. These programmes have often been funded because they 
provide a cost-effective form of treatment, with the largest cost savings arising from the 
fact that these programmes have been shown to substantially reduce crime among opioid-
dependent persons. Importantly, these treatment programmes have also been shown to be 
effective in reducing the physical and social harms associated with drug abuse, such as 
overdose, crime and violence. These treatment programmes can therefore be referred to as 
‘harm reduction’ programmes (Ward et al., 1998; Hall et al., 2006) (see pp. 94–95).
The fact that pharmacological treatment of addiction serves mixed personal, public 
health and public order goals complicates its provision. As noted above, it often involves 
interactions between the health and criminal justice systems, in which conflicts can arise 
between different professions and their distinctive priorities (e.g. law enforcement, clinical 
staff, and public health). The same can be true for conflicts between public health and 
personal medical care professionals who observe different aims, methods of acting, 
and guides according to their professions. The use of pharmacological treatments 
means that maintenance treatment falls under the umbrella of medicine as these drugs 
are prescribed by physicians. Yet, as noted, the justification for public funding of 
maintenance treatment for drug dependence often depends at least in part upon the 
public health and public order benefits (via reduced criminal activity) that they produce 
(Hall et al., 2006). 
Clinical medicine ‘focuses on the treatment and cure of individual patients’, while public 
health medicine ‘aims to understand and ameliorate the causes of disease and disability 
(1) The following analysis is based largely on the experience of opioid-dependence treatment. 
This is because there has been considerable effort in the last century to develop treatment 
programmes for opioid addiction and because opioids are the only drugs for which a 
variety of different pharmacological treatments are available (e.g. agonist, antagonist, 
partial agonist).
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in a population’ (Childress et al., 2002, p. 170). While ‘the physician-patient relationship 
is at the centre of medicine’, public health involves ‘interactions and relationships among 
many professionals and members of the community as well as agencies of government’ 
(Childress et al., 2002, p. 170). The latter involves many government institutions, and 
a likely consequence of their involvement in drug policies is use of the criminal justice 
system to coerce patients into treatment, amplifying opportunities for conflict between 
the competing goals of addiction treatment. The tensions between these competing goals 
calls for management structures which can appropriately balance the medical needs of 
addicted individuals, their rights and the public interest (the public health and criminal 
justice responses). 
Public ambivalence about maintaining addicts on agonist drugs and a desire to limit 
any potential negative impact on the wider community of substitution treatment often 
results in the development of standards, rules and regulations for this form of treatment 
that:
•	 are	intended	to	minimise	the	risk	of	non-addicted	persons	entering	treatment	(e.g.	by	
demanding evidence of an extensive history of dependence and documented failure 
at abstinence treatment);
•	 aim	to	prevent	the	diversion	of	addictive	drugs	intended	for	substitution	treatment	to	
the black market where they may be used inappropriately and result in physical or 
psychological harm, overdose deaths or further addiction;
•	 result	in	programmes	which	specify	the	frequency	of	urine	testing	and	may	require	
patients to be excluded from programmes if they provide ‘dirty’ urine samples;
•	 or	that	may	place	time	limits	on	treatment	or	insist	upon	a	goal	of	abstinence	from	all	
drugs being achieved within some arbitrary period (e.g. one or two years).
These regulatory frameworks may have unintended medical effects that may have a 
negative impact on the health of some addicts. For example, these types of regulations 
may: discourage dependent persons from seeking treatment until their condition is 
chronic, reduce programme retention because of the onerous requirements made of 
patients, or force stable patients to withdraw from treatment and return to illicit drug use 
(Ward et al., 1992). 
Ethically acceptable and effective agonist maintenance treatment of dependence 
requires programme rules and regulations that balance patient and community safety 
while permitting patients to remain in and benefit from treatment. The goal should be 
to provide effective treatment which is based on a multifaceted strategy that addresses 
all of the needs of the individual. It is important that treatment choices made by those 
seeking help are not limited by the ideological viewpoints of the staff that operate 
individual treatment programmes, even if some treatment services work within a 
particular model of care. Individuals who receive support and counselling must have 
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access to appropriate pharmacological drugs if required, while those in maintenance 
and relapse prevention programmes should not be limited to just pharmacological 
strategies. Treatment services should also recognise that the circumstances and needs of 
their patients may change as their treatment progresses, and this will require a flexible 
response.
Distributive justice: balancing the burden of disease and treatment
The justification of the public funding for addiction treatment programmes in terms of the 
public benefits is important in obtaining support. However, there is a danger that public 
policies that are beneficial to the majority may impose unfair burdens on a vulnerable 
minority. An important aspect of ethical analysis of drug dependence treatment is 
ensuring that public policies do not unfairly burden or discriminate against a vulnerable 
minority in order to serve the public good (2).
Distributive justice is a difficult and emotively charged issue in the case of addiction 
because drug use and drug policy have negative impacts on both society and 
the dependent individual. This raises important questions about the distribution of 
responsibility between society and the addicted individual. For treatment to be ethical, 
it should demonstrate that it is effective in reducing negative outcomes for both society 
and the individual. However, it would be arguably unethical to use pharmacological 
treatment of dependence as a form of compensation for inappropriate social policies 
or the neglect of vulnerable populations, no matter how effective the treatment was in 
improving the status quo. 
Those who receive treatment, particularly when it is publicly funded and subsidised, 
also arguably have a responsibility to engage in a reasonable treatment programme, 
to meet its aims and to avoid behaviour that adversely affects society. The remainder of 
this section is focused on analysing: (1) the impact that society and social policy has on 
drug use, the responsibility of society to reduce this impact and the ethics of providing 
pharmacological treatment to a vulnerable population, and (2) the responsibility 
of addicts to engage and comply with treatment, and what measures society may 
reasonably take to ensure compliance with this obligation.
The ethics of pharmacological treatment of vulnerable populations
Few public issues have produced a global consensus in the way that prohibition of the 
recreational use of illicit drugs has, particularly for what are regarded as the ‘harder’ 
drugs such as heroin and cocaine. While there is disagreement around the margins, such 
as exactly which drugs should be illegal, and how to treat those that use and become 
(2) Such a public policy would be justified on a purely utilitarian analysis as already outlined, 
however this report takes the more generally held perspective that that there are other 
important ethical principles that need to be respected and balanced against the greater 
good.
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dependent on illicit drugs, most nation states have enacted laws that prohibit or restrict 
their use. These restrictive policies are designed to protect the majority of society who 
do not use illicit drugs for recreational purposes and discourage their recreational use. 
These policies are effective in reducing rates of recreational illicit drug use but arguably 
they also can result in aggravating or causing problems for the small minority of those 
who continue to use illicit drugs. Discussion on the fairness of pharmacological treatment 
of drug dependence therefore needs to consider the impact that the illegality of these 
drugs has on those who use them. 
An analysis of the arguments for and against the prohibition of illicit drugs is beyond 
the scope and not the intention of this report. While acknowledging the debate in this 
area which raises important and interesting ethical and policy issues, the remainder of 
the report accepts the current legal status of illicit drugs in the majority of EU Member 
States. This acknowledges the reality that the global policy of prohibiting recreational 
illicit drug use is not likely to change and it ensures that our arguments have the 
potential to affect the ethical provision of treatment for drug dependence under current 
legal regimes. 
Policies that govern the treatment of dependence need to acknowledge the social, 
biological and psychological factors that can lead to addiction. While it is important 
that drug treatment programmes are available, it is also important to ensure that 
pharmacological treatment does not become a surrogate for social policies that 
neglect certain populations. This is particularly pertinent given the strong association 
between social disadvantage, family history of violence and drug use and the 
presence of comorbid psychiatric disorders, and emerging evidence of genetic and 
neuropsychological vulnerabilities to addiction (Hall et al., 2006). While social 
differentials in addiction risk do not free from blame those who use drugs, they do create 
an onus on social policymakers to be mindful of these social differentials and to work 
to reduce them, in the interests of ethical drug policy, and in order to reduce addiction. 
Social policies that are based on solidarity and social responsibility should provide 
more humane and less punitive treatment for those who become dependent and use 
interventions that aim to reduce the social disadvantage and adversity that increases 
the likelihood of addiction. This may include ensuring equal opportunities exist for those 
disadvantaged through public investments in education, family education and support, 
and social welfare (Spooner and Hall, 2002). 
Reciprocal obligations for individuals receiving treatment
As argued above, a solidarity-based approach puts emphasis not only on the 
responsibility of society, but also on the responsibility of the addicted individuals. 
Those with an addiction still have some capacity to make choices, as was discussed 
earlier. They therefore arguably have some obligations to comply with the reasonable 
demands of treatment. Society is justified in expecting that drug-dependent individuals 
who engage in treatment adhere to treatment demands and do not act in ways that 
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adversely affect society. For example, while methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) 
has been shown to be relatively safe and effective in reducing opioid use, it can lead 
to overdose if methadone is diverted to opioid-naïve users. In the UK during the 1990s, 
poorly regulated methadone programmes lead to the diversion of methadone onto the 
black market resulting in fatal methadone overdoses involving persons not in treatment 
(Hall, 1998). The same may occur with the new pharmacological agents that are likely 
to be used to treat addiction to stimulants and other illicit drugs. This risk highlights the 
importance of delivering treatments in ways that protect the person receiving them and 
the broader society. It indicates the need for regulations, procedures and treatment 
requirements in the provision of treatment that protect both patients and the wider 
community. 
A broad set of ethical principles are relevant to treatment regulations that impose 
obligations on those who enter treatment. These include: (1) not unduly violating the 
privacy and autonomy of individuals; (2) ensuring that the responses made to individual 
lapses in meeting objectives are proportional in relation to the overall treatment goals 
sought; (3) being mindful and consistent with the ability of individuals to meet their 
obligations (including actively helping individuals to do so); and (4) being sensitive 
to the situation of the individual, with regard to both internal (neurophysiology and 
neuropsychology) and external (social) circumstances. 
Coerced treatment of drug abuse and addiction
There is reasonable evidence that those who enter pharmacological treatment for drug 
abuse will benefit from the treatment and the longer they remain in treatment, the better 
off they will be (Gerstein and Harwood, 1990; Ward et al., 1998). The fact that many 
drug-dependent persons do not wish to enter treatment has led to the use of various 
forms of coercion to encourage them to enter and remain in treatment. This raises the 
questions: to what extent can legal coercion be used ethically and effectively in the 
treatment of drug addiction and if so, under what conditions is it ethical to do so?
There are different forms of coerced treatment for drug addiction that vary in the amount 
of force used, and therefore in the degree to which they contravene an individual’s liberty, 
freedom and autonomy. Mild informal coercion includes social pressure from friends 
and family to enter treatment (Maddux, 1988). More formal coercion (not involving 
criminal proceedings) may come from employers and government agencies who make it a 
condition of continued employment that an addicted person undergoes treatment (Weisner, 
1990). Legally enforced forms of coercion involve the use of the criminal justice system to 
enforce entry to treatment on pain of imprisonment (Klag et al., 2005).
Social coercion is an effective motivation for addicts to enter and complete treatment 
(Room et al., 1991; Hasin, 1994; Wild et al., 1998). Addiction puts an enormous emotional 
and financial burden on families so it is not surprising that pressure from loved ones 
(e.g. highlighting the destructive impact of a person’s drug use or threatening to end a 
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relationship if they continue to use drugs), can motivate those who still have strong social 
ties to seek treatment. Many addicts do not appreciate the impact that their drug use has 
on themselves or their friends and families; pressure from friends and family to cease their 
drug use often provides an external indication that their drug use is problematic. 
Unfortunately, for some long-term drug abusers, such important social ties have lost 
either influence or significance in their lives so more coercive forms of intervention 
may be required. When this is the case, they require formal non-criminal coercion and 
negotiation between agencies or employers and the individual and the ethical guidelines 
for how these programmes should operate need to be codified in the appropriate laws 
(e.g. industrial relations). 
While informal social coercion and formal non-criminal coercion represent very important 
motives for entering treatment, they arguably raise fewer ethical issues in the treatment of 
dependence than legally coerced treatment. In both these cases, the dependent person is 
relatively free to agree to treatment or suffer the threatened consequence (such as loss of 
employment or relationship). The coercive pressure in these situations arguably does not 
deprive them of their liberty or deny their autonomy. The form of coercion that raises more 
ethical concerns is court sanctioned coercion in which the threat of imprisonment is used to 
motivate entry into, or compliance with, addiction treatment. 
The case for legally coerced treatment
One of the major justifications for the use of legally coerced treatment is that 
treating offenders’ drug dependence will reduce the likelihood of their re-offending 
(Gerstein and Harwood, 1990; Inciardi and McBride, 1991). Studies have shown 
quite convincingly that treatment for heroin dependence significantly reduces 
criminal and violent behaviour while addicts remain in treatment (Hubbard, 1989; 
Gerstein and Harwood, 1990; Bell et al., 1992; Ward et al., 1992). The use of drug 
treatment programmes as an alternative to incarceration has also been motivated 
by the failure of prison terms to reduce drug use and drug-related crime and the 
over-representation of drug dependent people in prisons (Pedic, 1990; Stathis, 
1991; Stathis et al., 1991; Hall, 1997). 
Medical models of addiction highlight the causal role that addiction plays in leading 
to imprisonment and the high rates of relapse to use after release (Gerstein and 
Harwood, 1990). The advent of HIV/AIDS has provided an additional argument for 
treating drug abuse (Dolan et al., 1996). By keeping injecting users out of prison, 
there is likely to be a reduction in the transmission of infectious diseases such as HIV 
and hepatitis C virus (HCV). Those injecting drugs in prison may be at a significantly 
increased risk of contracting blood-borne viruses because of a lack of access to 
sterile injecting equipment in most prisons (Dolan et al., 1996; Small et al., 2005; 
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Wood et al., 2005). The incidence of HIV and HCV is also generally significantly 
higher in prison populations than the wider public (Dolan, 1999; Dolan et al., 
2006). The ethical, correctional and public health arguments for drug treatment 
under coercion are reinforced by the economic argument that it is less costly to treat 
offenders who are drug dependent in the community than it is to imprison them 
(Gerstein and Harwood, 1990). 
Legal coercion covers a wide range of strategies for getting individuals into 
treatment programmes. The most coercive is compulsory treatment programmes, 
such as civil commitment programmes in the US and Sweden where individuals 
are sentenced by the court to enforced addiction treatment in a secure facility for 
an extended period of time (Weisner, 1990; Farabee and Leukefeld, 2001). While 
such treatment strategies were used frequently in the past in the US, these civil 
commitment programmes now appear to have fallen out of favour arguably in 
part because of the difficulty in ethically justifying such deprivation of liberty, and 
because of evidence suggesting that newer legal options for coerced treatment are 
more effective (Wild, 1999) (1).
The form of legal coercion that has become increasingly popular within the 
criminal justice system is the use of diversionary programmes that offer drug- 
dependent persons treatment as an alternative to imprisonment at various stages 
in the criminal justice process. In the first instance, treatment may be offered as 
an alternative to being prosecuted with an offence prior to being charged by 
police. This is not an ideal method of coercion as it falls outside judicial oversight. 
It is possible that relying on the discretion of the police may open the way for 
individuals being coerced into treatment for reasons other than criminal behaviour, 
such as odd or unconventional behaviour or being a member of an ethnic minority 
(Hall, 1997). 
Legally coerced treatment is most often advocated for persons charged with or 
convicted of an offence to which their drug dependence has contributed. It is 
generally offered as an alternative to imprisonment in order to have legal sanctions 
deferred, reduced or lifted, or as a condition of parole (Rotgers, 1992; Klag et al., 
2005). Suspension of legal sanctions is usually made conditional upon successful 
completion of a treatment programme, with the threat of imprisonment if the person 
fails to comply (Hall, 1997; Spooner et al., 2001). Each of these forms of legally 
coerced treatment have different legal and social consequences for the offenders 
subjected to them, requiring varying degrees of deprivation of liberty, restraint and 
hardship. The ethical validity of the use of these forms of coercion will be outlined 
below.
(1)  While civil commitment statutes were created throughout the 1960s in the US, no state is currently 
committing significant numbers for drug treatment (Gostin, 1993).
96
Addiction neurobiology: Ethical and social implications
When is coerced treatment ethical? 
Careful consideration of ethical issues is critical when the state uses the threat of 
imprisonment to encourage drug-dependent persons to seek treatment. Coerced treatment 
of addiction should operate within a constitutional and legal framework which protects 
the civil liberties of the people being coerced (Klag et al., 2005). It is important that 
treatment does not override an individual’s basic human rights in order to achieve 
broader social goals (Anderer, 1992; Bersoff, 1992; Wexler, 1993; Kleinig, 2004). 
Coerced treatment for addiction may be justified by appealing to either of two ethical 
principles: paternalism or the public interest. Addiction is a harmful behaviour in which 
to engage; it impacts negatively on an individual’s health and social welfare, with a 
significantly increased mortality and morbidity. Coerced treatment of addiction could 
therefore be justified for paternalistic reasons: that is, on the grounds that it is in the best 
interests of the individual. This would involve coerced treatment for the addict’s ‘own good’. 
Two forms of paternalism can be distinguished on the basis of the degree of coercion 
involved. Treatment that is provided against an individual’s wishes, where the individual 
is deemed competent to make this decision is referred to as hard paternalism. When an 
individual is deemed incapable of making a competent decision, treatment is imposed 
because it is argued that their condition prevents them from making informed decisions 
on their own behalf. This form of coerced treatment is referred to as soft paternalism. It 
is soft paternalism that is most likely to be used to justify coerced treatment in the case of 
addiction.
In many countries, people with serious mental illnesses can be compelled to accept 
treatment under certain circumstances, usually after some form of judicial or quasi-
judicial review. Society does not, however, generally treat people suffering from other 
medical conditions against their will, unless the individual lacks the capacity to give free 
and informed consent to treatment, as in minimally conscious patients. While there is a 
strong beneficent justification for providing treatment, respect for an individual’s liberty 
to make their own decisions about treatment generally overrides the beneficent drive to 
intervene (Dworkin, 1972; Childress et al., 2002). This would prevent the use of coerced 
treatment using a hard paternalistic justification. 
The use of paternalistically coerced treatment could be justified if addicted individuals 
were seen to suffer from a brain disease that robbed them of their autonomy and 
impaired their capacity to consent to treatment, as has been argued by some bioethicists 
(Charland, 2002; Cohen, 2002; Elliott, 2002; Dackis and O’Brien, 2005). This 
justification would be similar to the forced treatment of minimally conscious patients 
or children, or mentally ill adults where consent to treat is obtained from a surrogate, 
usually the next of kin. However, as argued above, this soft paternalist rationale for 
coerced addiction treatment would be based on a misrepresentation of the neurobiology 
of addiction. While addicts’ decision-making is impaired, they retain some degree of 
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control over their drug use which undermines the soft paternalistic justification of coerced 
treatment. 
The second principle that can be used to justify coerced treatment of drug abuse and 
addiction is to protect the social welfare or the public good. The public good claim for 
the use of coerced treatment depends upon the negative impact of drug dependent users 
on society (e.g. via drug dealing and other criminal activity to finance their drug use). 
The ethical justification of coerced treatment in order to protect the public good therefore 
becomes a distributive justice issue: that is, providing a fair distribution of the costs and 
benefits of drug use and drug treatment. This analysis arguably creates an obligation 
on society to provide treatment, and an analogous obligation on drug abusers to accept 
treatment under certain circumstances. This has been the most commonly used justification 
for coerced treatment of addiction (Hall 1997). The question is: when or under what 
circumstances is coerced treatment justified in order to protect the public good?
Some authors reject any form of treatment under coercion for drug dependence. Radical 
libertarians such as Thomas Szasz and Theodore Dalrymple deny that drug dependence 
exists, arguing that all drug use is always voluntary (Szasz, 1975; Dalrymple, 2006). 
According to Szasz, the law should not prohibit adults from using any drug, and any 
drug user who commits a criminal offence should be punished. The punitive policy 
consequences of Szasz’s libertarianism often enjoys more public support in developed 
countries than the proposal to legalise the use of all currently illegal drugs. 
Others, such as Newman, accept that drug dependence exists but oppose compulsory 
drug treatment on the grounds that it does not work (Newman, 1974). If treatment under 
coercion were ineffective (as Newman claims), then there would be no ethical justification 
for providing it. Of course, even if treatment under coercion is effective, it does not follow 
that it should be provided. For example, the community might place a higher value on 
punishing than rehabilitating offenders (Hall, 1997). 
A consensus view on drug treatment under coercion prepared for the World Health 
Organization (Porter et al., 1986) concluded that coerced treatment was legally and 
ethically justified if and only if: (1) the rights of the individuals were protected by ‘due 
process’ (in accordance with human rights principles); and (2) if effective and humane 
treatment was provided. Due process would require some form of judicial oversight of 
the coerced treatment process. In the absence of such due process, coerced treatment 
could become de facto imprisonment without judicial oversight. In the absence of 
humane care and effectiveness, coerced ‘drug treatment’ would not meet the World 
Health Organization (WHO) ethico-legal standard.
The uncertain benefits of coerced treatment have led some proponents to argue that 
offenders should be allowed two ‘constrained choices’ (Fox, 1992). The first constrained 
choice would be whether they participate in drug treatment or not. If they declined to 
be treated, they would be dealt with by the criminal justice system in the same way 
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as anyone charged with the same offence. The second constrained choice would be 
given to those who agreed to participate in drug treatment: this would be a choice 
of the type of treatment that they received. There is some empirical support for these 
recommendations in that there is better evidence for the effectiveness of coerced 
treatment that requires some degree of ‘voluntary interest’ by the offender (Gerstein and 
Harwood, 1990). 
The constrained choice condition has three implications. First, as they are regarded 
as effective and generally available to those outside of the prison or judicial setting, 
a strong argument exists that pharmacological treatment options, including agonist 
maintenance, should be included in the range of options that are offered to coerced 
addicts. There has been a tendency for coerced treatment programmes to only offer 
‘drug-free’ abstinence-oriented treatments which could prevent coerced addicts from 
accessing the forms of treatment that may be most likely to benefit them (Hall, 1997). 
Second, pharmacological treatment options should not be the only options available; 
there should be a range of drug-free treatment options available for those who do 
not wish to use pharmacological treatments. Third, the safety, effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of whatever forms of treatment offered should be rigorously evaluated 
(National Research Council, 2001).
Ethical issues in coerced addiction treatment also arise from the interaction between the 
correctional and drug treatment systems (Sheldon, 1987; Skene, 1987; Platt et al., 1988; 
Reynolds, 1992; Rotgers, 1992). A major problem is the conflict between the expectations 
of correctional and treatment personnel about the effectiveness of drug treatment and 
their understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities. 
Treatment staff usually regard the drug offender as a client, that is, as someone who 
should be involved in treatment decisions and the confidence of whose personal 
information should be respected. Treatment staff expect that their clients will have 
relapses to drug use which should be dealt with therapeutically rather than punitively. 
Correctional and judicial personnel, by contrast, often expect treatment to produce 
enduring abstinence. They see treatment as something directed by the court, and hence 
regard drug use in treatment as an offence that treatment staff are legally obliged to 
report. When these expectations of treatment effectiveness are not met and there is 
little communication between courts and treatment services, judges and magistrates 
may become sceptical about the value of coerced treatment and reduce their use of it 
(Baldwin, 1979; Skene, 1987). 
The effective and ethical use of coerced drug treatment accordingly requires a shared 
understanding of the likely benefits of treatment and a clear statement of the roles 
of correctional and treatment staff. The latter should include agreement upon their 
respective responsibilities for monitoring and reporting upon an offender’s progress 
in drug treatment. These issues need to be addressed in written protocols that govern 
interactions between courts and treatment personnel. 
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Is compulsory addiction treatment ethically acceptable?
Compulsory treatment — unconditional, enforced entry to addiction treatment 
— does not offer a drug-dependent individual any choice. This type of coerced 
treatment involves an extreme violation of an individual’s autonomy and liberty. 
Mandatory treatment has generally involved the confinement of individuals in 
specialised drug-treatment facilities, or prison hospitals, usually with the goal of 
attaining abstinence from their drug of addiction (Weisner, 1990; Gostin, 1993; 
Farabee and Leukefeld, 2001; Klag et al., 2005) (1). Upon successful completion of 
an abstinence programme, individuals may be released from the facility into some 
sort of intensely supervised outpatient facility. Failure to comply with any condition 
of the programme usually results in being readmitted to a secure inpatient facility 
(Gostin, 1993). 
Because compulsory treatment involves a maximal deprivation of liberty, it 
requires a correspondingly greater ethical and legal justification than other forms 
of coerced treatment. Arguably, this includes stronger evidence that this form of 
treatment is effective and that the consequences of not treating the person are 
serious and very likely to occur (Aronowitz, 1967; Childress et al., 2002). Given 
the evidence presented above, it is hard to justify the use of compulsory treatment 
regimes, for either paternalistic or public good reasons (Leukefeld and Tims, 1988). 
Importantly, compulsory treatment programmes completely abolish the autonomy 
of the individual, and arguably constitute a violation of civil liberties in a manner 
that contravenes the UN Bill of Human Rights. Coercive diversion strategies, by 
contrast, are less restrictive because they involve constrained choices. They are 
accordingly less ethically objectionable than compulsory treatment. A choice not 
to enter treatment would leave the person to face the judicial system, but with their 
civil and human rights intact. 
Another concern with the use of compulsory treatment is the effect that this 
has on the ability for those seeking treatment to find it. It makes little sense if 
providing treatment places for compulsory treatment reduces the availability of 
places for those voluntarily seeking them (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1983; 
Hall, 1997). Also, compulsory treatment programmes can increase the burden on 
programmes that are effective, well-funded and well resourced. It can also affect 
staff morale and have a negative impact on what might otherwise be successful 
treatment centres (Hall, 1997).
(1) Antagonist treatments such as naltrexone detoxification or maintenance are the favoured 
pharmacological treatment methods in such situations. The advent of sustained release formulations 
of naltrexone or opioid vaccines may be particularly attractive to proponents of compulsory 
treatment regimes (Caplan, 2006). The ethics of these forms of treatment will be discussed below.
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Treating vulnerable populations
The negative impact that addiction and drug abuse has on others in society can 
complicate treatment. This is particularly true of two groups within society where the 
harms caused to others raise strong emotions: pregnant women and prisoners. These 
two populations are particularly vulnerable to unjustified discrimination that can lead to 
neglect of their basic human rights and poor treatment outcomes.
Addiction treatment during pregnancy
The treatment of substance abuse or addiction during pregnancy presents difficult 
challenges. Substance abuse during pregnancy is a significant problem. In the USA, 
almost 5 % of pregnant women under the age of 44 have abused illicit drugs in the last 
month, 10 % have abused alcohol; and up to 18 % of pregnant women are smokers 
(SAMSHA, 2004). The use of licit and illicit drugs during pregnancy can have adverse 
effects on the mother and the developing foetus (Nordstrom-Klee et al., 2002; Day and 
Richardson, 2004). 
Substance abuse during pregnancy can increase the risk of medical complications during 
birth (Huestis and Choo, 2002) and produce neurocognitive deficits in children that may 
persist for the life of the individual. Individuals born to substance using mothers may suffer 
from significant structural brain abnormalities (e.g. significant neuronal loss and smaller 
brains). Alcohol use in pregnancy may produce a foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) that is 
associated with behavioural and cognitive impairment (Ikonomidou et al., 2000; Olney, 
2004). Persistent attentional and cognitive deficits may appear in early adolescence 
as a result of prenatal cocaine exposure (Singer et al., 2004a). Memory and attention 
may be impaired as a result of structural changes in subcortical regions in the children 
of methamphetamine abusing mothers (Chang et al., 2004). Also, children born to a 
substance using mother may experience withdrawal symptoms after birth (Godding, 2004).
Most jurisdictions will impose limits on the autonomy of individuals when their behaviour 
results in a significant and likely harm to others. An extreme example is the overriding of 
a competent patient’s refusal of treatment as the only way of preventing the spread of an 
infectious disease. Although such measures involve a serious interference with autonomy, 
authorisation is normally justified through compelling counter-concerns of the public 
interest. The case of pregnant mothers is different, however, because the counter-claim is 
not for the interests of the public, but those of the foetus. With regard to the mother’s use 
of drugs, two issues come to the fore: the foetal interests and the maternal lifestyle. Both 
signal a duty on the part of the mother towards the unborn child, and a state-mandated 
limit to the freedom of the personal behaviour of the mother. 
In the case of the former, in many jurisdictions the criminal liability of the mother has been 
lacking — the foetus does not have a legal status in the eyes of the law and therefore there 
is no statutory basis for any criminal charge (Mason et al., 2005). Likewise, there have 
101
Chapter 5: New developments in the treatment of addiction 
been few courts willing to protect the interests of the foetus to the extent necessary to 
limit the freedom of the mother. The problem, as the courts have seen it, is that protecting 
the ‘vulnerable’ foetus — even when it may be seriously harmed by the mother’s use 
of drugs during pregnancy — would restrict the mother’s autonomy to the extent that it 
would involve conflicts of fundamental rights (Mason et al., 2005). Thus, in England and 
Canada, it has been held that the courts have no jurisdiction to place controls on the 
autonomy of pregnant woman or deprive them of their liberty, right to self-determination, 
and bodily integrity (3). Furthermore, forcing mothers to undergo treatment without their 
consent, involving forced restraint and confinement, could possibly be seen as torture or 
degrading treatment, and thus may directly evoke human rights doctrine.
However, it could be argued that because society has to deal with the health and social 
consequences of babies affected by maternal drug and alcohol use, then the state has the 
right to intervene to prevent harm to the unborn. Society already intervenes in a variety 
of ways to promote the health of the foetus, e.g. by encouraging mothers to take folic acid 
supplements during pregnancy and offering antenatal classes and antenatal screening 
for major birth defects. Coercion is used to overcome the difficulty in getting pregnant 
women into treatment, or refraining from drug use while pregnant. In the USA, there 
has been significant public support for state intervention, including criminal prosecution, 
incarceration and forced treatment of pregnant women who abuse drugs (Campbell and 
Fleischman, 1992). Likewise, the foetus has been protected from the actions of the mother 
in New Zealand, where the foetus has been made a ward of the court (4).
Societies have tended to reject approaches that would penalise mothers for actions 
during pregnancy which might harm their unborn child; the notable exceptions are 
where apparently immoral behaviour has influenced opinion. For example, most 
countries allow abortion under strict controls, and have rejected so-called ‘wrongful 
life’ suits. There is a clear indication that the unborn life has different interests than 
those of born individuals: for example, the Council of Europe has stated that an unborn 
foetus does not have the same rights as a born individual, including a right to life (5). 
The spectre of eugenics and the prospect of children suing their parents for negligence 
are considered by many to be stern warnings against taking such a coercive or punitive 
approach to maternal behaviour during pregnancy.
(3) England: Re. F (in utero) [1988] 2 WLR 1288; [1988] 2 All ER 193; [1988] Fam 122 (CA). 
Canada: Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v G (1996) 138 DLR (4th) 
238. 
(4) In ‘Nikki’s Case’, the foetus was given personhood to the extent that, although the mother 
could not be ordered to do something against her wishes by the court, it could make orders 
forbidding her to do things that would harm the child (see Skegg et al., 2006). In 2006, a 
District Court confined a pregnant woman to hospital to undergo methadone treatment and 
was then held in a residential placement until the birth of her baby. The order was justified 
against her wishes by the judge on the grounds of the ‘health and safety of this young 
woman and her unborn child’.
(5) Case of Vo v. France (2004). Application No 53924/00. European Court of Human Rights.
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At the very least, in order to justify compulsory treatment of pregnant substance abusers, 
intervention must be shown to be effective and not present any additional harm. There 
are two major utilitarian objections to compulsory treatment of pregnant women: (1) the 
stress and anxiety associated with forced detention or medical intervention (Ridgely et 
al., 2004), or the experience of intense withdrawal symptoms (Fiscella et al., 2005) can 
have serious adverse effects on the mother and foetus; and (2) the threat of compulsory 
treatment programmes may deter women from presenting themselves early for prenatal 
care and pre-term health checks in order to avoid compulsory detention or intervention 
(Harwood and Myers, 2004). Both of these outcomes could adversely affect the health 
and welfare of the child and mother in ways that may offset any benefits of coerced 
treatment. Further issues concern the stripping away of the rights of the mother and the 
state’s supposed role in protecting the interests of the unborn foetus.
Emerging treatments, such as drug vaccines and implantable antagonists like naltrexone 
can be provided in ways that do not require detention. But these treatments may still 
be administered forcibly and without consent, leading to maternal stress and anxiety 
that could adversely affect the pregnancy. In this report, it has already been suggested 
that addicts do not necessarily lack autonomy at all times. Therefore, there would be no 
case of forced treatment in their best interests except in emergency situations (i.e. when 
they are intoxicated). Forced ‘treatment’ may also be considered as ‘torture’ or ‘cruel 
and inhumane treatment’ under European and Member States’ human rights law. Even 
if this treatment were to be used without the consent of the mother, these technologies 
would require a rigorous evaluation of the potential side effects — both medical and 
psychological — before being used in pregnant women. There is also the possibility 
of adverse effects on the developing foetus, such as on the activity of endogenous 
neurochemicals (e.g. endorphins and dynorphins), which are unknown, and could have 
effects that last a lifetime. An analysis of efficacy would also need to consider the effects 
of any attempts to circumvent these forms of prophylaxis, such as physically removing 
the implants (e.g. extracting subcutaneous drug implants) or attempting to overcome 
the immunological blockade of a vaccine (e.g. by consuming greater quantities of their 
preferred drug or choosing to use other illicit drugs whose effects were not blocked by 
the vaccine or antagonist). Either outcome could potentially lead to greater drug use, and 
therefore increased harm to the mother and foetus. 
The use of an addiction treatment option in consenting mothers is to be welcomed; it 
reflects the moral responsibilities towards the foetus that the mother has taken on and she 
should be supported in this endeavour. Given the potential harms from forced treatment 
of pregnant women, a strong argument exists that treatment programmes should rely 
on less restrictive and coercive forms of treatment that do not override the autonomous 
decision-making of the mother. This may involve improving engagement with clinicians 
and education, reinforcing abstinence using vouchers, offers of free prophylactic support 
to prevent relapse, less punitive responses to positive drug tests and offers of effective 
and safe substitution treatments (Ward et al., 1999). 
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Addiction treatment in prisons
A number of commentators have argued that the treatment of addiction and injecting 
drug use within prison is an area of public policy requiring reform (Jurgens and 
Betteridge, 2005). In many countries, current approaches appear often to be inadequate, 
and are largely dominated by punitive responses to prisoners who are addicted to or 
use illicit drugs. In general, and despite some innovative programmes and increasing 
policy concern, very few prisons provide effective treatment for addiction and few have 
introduced measures to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS and HCV. This is despite a 
general over-representation of addiction and drug abuse by those incarcerated and high 
rates of HIV and HCV infection within prisons (Hammett, 1988). 
In one study of European prisons, up to 34 % of those incarcerated reported injecting 
drugs during their detention and up to 21 % of these began injecting while in prison 
(EMCDDA, 2002) although considerable differences exist between prisons in respect to 
reported levels of drug use and injecting in European prisons. High rates of injecting 
drug use in prisons are seen in other countries as well (Jurgens and Betteridge, 2005). 
HIV rates in prisons are also often much higher than in the general population although 
the number infected can vary markedly between countries and prisons (Jurgens 
and Betteridge, 2005). HCV infection rates are even higher among those reporting 
drug injection (Dolan, 1999; Macalino, 2004) and in some prisons a significantly 
high proportion of inmates report sharing injection equipment during incarceration 
(EMCDDA, 2002).
Human rights declarations and legally binding instruments, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), state that restrictions on the rights of 
prisoners should only include those necessary for their incarceration. People incarcerated 
should only have the right to liberty restricted as per their sentence. They should not 
be subjected to violations of other rights, such as the right to health, life and the right 
to be free from cruel and inhumane treatment. Their punishment should not include the 
arbitrary restriction of these rights, and they should not be subject to the double jeopardy 
of ‘punishment’ for drug addiction. Prisoners should not be discriminated against 
by virtue of their status as prisoners; they are entitled to ‘equivalence’ in treatment. 
Therefore, as the WHO and United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 
guidelines state: prisoners should have access to the same medical health care that is 
available to the broader public (World Health Organization, 1993a; UNAIDS, 2006).
An increasing number of commentators have argued that these extrajudicial 
punishments not only violate the human rights of those imprisoned, but also lead to 
further harm for prison staff and the general public (World Health Organization, 
1993a; Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2004; Jurgens and Betteridge, 2005; 
UNAIDS, 2006; UNODC, 2006). Despite unambiguous directions from bodies 
such as the UNCHR, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the WHO, the rate of 
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change in this area has been slow. These guidelines animate a number of human rights 
instruments that would appear to be relatively explicit about the types of treatment and 
health programmes that should be offered to prisoners to treat addiction and reduce 
the harm of drug use (United Nations General Assembly, 1955; United Nations General 
Assembly, 1988; United Nations General Assembly, 1990). The ICCPR is also clear on 
this matter: prisoners have the legal right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading treatment or punishment and the right to the highest attainable standard of 
mental health.
Often, addicted prisoners receive little or no treatment for their condition. Many 
undergo forced, unsupervised detoxification, or ‘cold turkey’, which can produce 
intense withdrawal symptoms, including nausea and extreme diarrhoea, convulsion, 
anxiety and dysphoria, may cause serious medical consequences for pregnant women 
and their foetuses, immuno-compromised individuals, and those with other comorbid 
medical disorders (Fiscella et al., 2005). The stress of prison life, compounded by the 
onset of severe opioid withdrawal can also increase the risk of suicide, particularly 
those with comorbid mental illnesses, which are commonly found among prison 
inmates (United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 2005). 
As opiate substitution programmes are often not available in prison, prisoners 
who are stabilised on methadone or buprenorphine maintenance treatment prior 
to entering prison can be forced to go through detoxification and withdrawal. The 
failure to provide effective pharmacological treatment to ameliorate the symptoms of 
withdrawal can even be viewed as a violation of the right not to be subjected to cruel 
and inhumane treatment or punishment as forced detoxification would generally be 
regarded as unacceptable in the wider community. Given that the freedom and liberty 
of prisoners are restricted by the state, they are unable to take action themselves to 
prevent symptoms of withdrawal (Lines, 2006). This can be seen as placing a further 
ethical obligation on the state to ensure that these symptoms are treated (Jurgens and 
Betteridge, 2005).
The lack of adequate treatment may also create conditions in which there is the 
risk of increased use of drugs within prison, increasing the associated risks of drug 
overdose and HIV and HCV infection. The human rights claims for this failure are 
particularly significant for someone on a legitimate and widely accepted treatment 
programme prior to incarceration, such as methadone maintenance, who contracts 
HIV after returning to injecting drug use in prison (Gore and Bird, 1995). As stated by 
the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, ‘By entering prisons, prisoners are 
condemned to imprisonment for their crimes; they should not be condemned to HIV 
and AIDS.’ (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1996). Forced detoxification 
can also lead to overdose if individuals with no opioid tolerance relapse to opioid use 
upon release, as many do. Such an outcome could also be viewed as a violation of a 
prisoner’s right to health. 
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Attempts to reduce the risk of HIV and HCV infection due to intravenous drug use 
is also inadequate in most prisons. Few prisons currently provide access to sterile 
injecting equipment. Consequently, prisoners who inject in prison often share needles, 
or improvised injection equipment. These individuals are at high risk of contracting 
HIV or HCV. Failure to provide prisoners with methods to avoid these diseases not only 
denies them access to health measures available to the rest of society, but may violate 
the right to health and, arguably, even the right to life, given that HIV can result in 
premature death.
In addition to violating prisoners’ rights, current approaches to the treatment of 
addiction and drug use in prisons may be counterproductive from a public health 
point of view. Most prisoners are only detained for short periods of time, whereupon 
they are released back into the community, increasing the incidence of HIV and HCV. 
Prisons have consequently become an incubator of HIV and HCV in society. The 
present situation existing in many prisons can therefore be viewed as problematic 
on both ethical/human rights grounds, as well as from a utilitarian, public health 
perspective. 
Therefore, as suggested in the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) and explicitly articulated in human rights guidelines (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1988; United Nations General Assembly, 1990; World Health Organization, 
1993a), the treatment of addiction and drug abuse in prisons should consider the 
following:
1. People in prison should have access to all effective types of treatment of addiction, as 
substitution programmes, such as methadone and buprenorphine maintenance, are 
generally available in the community. Evidence from prisons which have introduced 
substitution programmes shows that they can be effective in reducing HIV and HCV 
risk behaviour and harms associated with injecting drug use (e.g. overdose) (Dolan et 
al., 1996; Dolan et al., 2006). 
2. As with community-based treatment, it is also important that adequate doses of 
methadone or buprenorphine are administered. If a punitive approach to treatment 
is adopted that results in the prescription of doses insufficient to stabilise patients, this 
will result in withdrawal and craving that may lead to use of supplemental injection 
of opioids, and therefore be counterproductive.
3. As studies have shown that injecting drugs can occur in prison, consideration is 
required as to how some harm minimisation measures for IDU, such as bleach or 
needle exchange programmes, can be provided. Overwhelming evidence shows that 
these programmes are effective in reducing HIV infections. The human rights principle 
of equivalence provides a strong argument that inmates should have access to needle 
exchange programmes, which are widely available to the general public in most 
countries. 
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4. Providing prisoners with access to drug-related education and counselling is also 
likely to be important especially given that: many are poorly educated, socially 
disadvantaged or may suffer from neurocognitive deficits, resulting from criminal and 
violent behaviour, non-fatal overdoses or their drug use. 
5. A strong argument also exists that prisoners should have access to HIV testing 
and counselling, where testing is voluntary and information remains private and 
confidential. Education has been shown to lead to decreases in harmful drug-related 
behaviour and reduced transmission of HIV.
Medicalisation of addictive behaviour
Medicalisation is the process whereby behavioural or social problems are understood 
as medical disorders that should be treated medically, often at the expense of social 
approaches. Some commentators believe that a focus on the genetic and neurobiological 
basis of behaviour will lead to a ‘medicalisation’ of stigmatised forms of behaviour 
including behavioural disorders such as addiction (Conrad, 1992; Verweij, 1999; Press, 
2006; Ashcroft et al., 2007) (6). These commentators argue that medicalisation will lead 
to an overemphasis of the biological origins of behaviour at the expense of social and 
psychological explanations. Critics of the medicalisation of behaviour believe that this 
will adversely affect people who engage in stigmatised forms of behaviour like smoking 
or other drug abuse (Caron et al., 2005). If addictions are seen as medical disorders that 
reflect neurobiological predispositions, these critics argue society will come to rely on 
medical interventions and neglect social policies that can reduce drug use and addiction 
(e.g. high taxes, restrictions on sale and access to drugs) (Merikangas and Risch, 2003; 
Caron et al., 2005; Carlsten and Burke, 2006). The legal status of drugs affects their 
price and availability in ways that affect patterns of use and the effects that drug use 
have on health and public safety and order, including criminal activities that addicts 
engage in to fund their drug use or that is associated with the production, supply and 
trafficking of these substances. 
The medicalisation of addiction may also undermine addicts’ preparedness to stop if they 
come to believe that they are unable to stop because of their neurobiological and genetic 
traits or fatalism. More evidence is needed to evaluate such claims. It may be that addiction 
neuroscience encourages individuals to seek treatment, or empowers them to make choices 
not to use drugs because there is an authoritative scientific explanation of their experiences 
(Hall et al., 2008). In the interim, information about ‘addiction genes’ should be carefully 
communicated to avoid undermining addicts’ belief in their capacity to stop using drugs. 
(6) Medicalisation of addiction does not require that scientific research finds that addiction is 
solely a brain disease that is largely the result of our genetic makeup. Rather, it requires 
that it be seen as such. There are those observers who have already made such claims. 
Attitudes towards stigmatised conditions such as addiction can often precede scientific 
evidence. Society and the scientific community need to anticipate these misinterpretations 
and misrepresentations to prevent ineffective and unethical policy responses.
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The medicalisation of addiction also raises the question: should drug policies treat 
differently those who come from different socio-economic backgrounds or have 
different genetic vulnerabilities to addiction? While the moral model often subjects 
addicts to double jeopardy, an inappropriate emphasis on genetic predispositions 
and social triggers risks could also undermine health and social responsibility. 
Social policies need to appropriately acknowledge the social, genetic and 
environmental causes of addiction. Drug using and addictive lifestyles often (but not 
always) go hand in hand with poverty and low social status. Both the medical and 
moral models raise the possibility of targeting at-risk individuals or communities, 
rather than addressing the criminal and social environments that may increase the 
risk of addiction.
Critics of medicalisation also argue that it could restrict the types of treatments 
that are provided for addiction. Pharmacological treatments and genetic tests 
could be marketed to drug addicts for commercial rather than health gains, 
as some argue has happened with NicoTest — an online genetic test that 
purports to identify vulnerability to nicotine addiction (GeneWatch UK, 2004; De 
Francesco, 2006). Alternatively, addiction neurobiology could be used to market 
invasive and doubtfully effective ‘treatments’ that are misleadingly advertised 
as ‘cures’ of addiction, and provided at high cost to addicts and their families 
(e.g. neurosurgery (see box pp. 108–109) or ultra-rapid opioid detoxification 
(UROD)). The promotion of these technologies is often given credibility by an 
uncritical use of neuroscientific research of addiction, particularly NIDA’s ‘chronic 
and relapsing brain disease model’ (see box p. 26). The Internet increases the 
ability of proponents to promote these treatments. This is particularly relevant 
for the treatment of addiction, where the consumer is often desperate to quit and 
vulnerable to exploitation.
Critics also argue that the medicalisation of addiction could change the ways in 
which society thinks about drug use and dependence, and therefore the appropriate 
means available to treat those with an addiction (Backlar, 1996; Caron et al., 2005). 
Such a view could lead to the further stigmatisation of those who are vulnerable to 
addiction, such as those that possess particular genetic alleles or mutations, or are 
positive for genetic markers associated with drug abuse (Caron et al., 2005). On 
this view, neuroscience and behaviour genetics could lead to both institutionalised 
discrimination, particularly by courts, educators and employers, and health and life 
insurers, as well as intensifying more informal modes of stigmatisation (Billings et 
al., 1992; Rothenberg et al., 1997; Hall and Rich, 2000; Anderlik and Rothstein, 
2001; Greely, 2001; Geppert and Roberts, 2005). It is not clear how realistic these 
fears may prove to be, but given their potential negative implications they merit 
further investigation and ongoing vigilance (Caron et al., 2005; Condit et al., 2006; 
Bennett and Smith, 2007).
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Neurosurgical treatments for addiction
Up until 2002–03, Russian and Chinese surgeons used neurosurgical procedures 
to treat heroin addiction, when international concern forced both countries to 
abandon the controversial treatment. Three hundred and five patients were 
reportedly operated on in Russia (Walsh, 2002) and over 500 in China (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2005). In China, stereotactic surgery has been used to destroy 
the nucleus accumbens (Gao et al., 2003), the brain region where the rewarding 
effects of opioids and other drugs appear to be mediated (Robbins et al., 2007), 
while Russian neurosurgeons lesioned an area called the cingulate gyrus; a brain 
region that has previously been removed to treat obsessional disorders (Orellana, 
2002). The aim of the surgery is to interrupt obsessional thoughts about drug 
use (Orellana, 2002). A recent report suggests that clinicians in China have 
recommenced neurosurgical treatment of opioid addiction as part of a clinical trial 
(Goff, 2005). 
These reports raise a number of important ethical concerns (Hall, 2006):
1. There is no compelling reason to use neurosurgery to treat heroin addiction. 
There are effective forms of treatment that substantially reduce illicit opioid 
use and stabilise the lives of heroin addicts (e.g. substitution or maintenance 
treatment on methadone or buprenorphine (Ward et al., 1998; Mattick et al., 
2003; Amato et al., 2005). Patients and practitioners who find opioid agonist 
maintenance morally objectionable, or who work in settings that prohibit 
its use, can use the antagonist naltrexone in oral or implantable form (e.g. 
(Krupitsky et al., 2004)). 
2. There are major concerns about the safety and efficacy of these neurosurgical 
procedures. Stereotactic neurosurgery is an invasive procedure that involves 
drilling holes in the patient’s skull and inserting electrodes deep into the brain 
to destroy the target region. Advocates of these procedures argue that they are 
less invasive and destructive than older forms of psychosurgery, and report low 
rates of complications. However, these conclusions are based on uncontrolled 
studies that do not properly evaluate the cognitive and behavioural effects of 
destroying such important neurological regions as the NAcc and aCG (Gao et 
al., 2003; Medvedev et al., 2003). 
3. There are major concerns about the effects of producing irreversible lesions in 
neural centres that are not only implicated in drug-mediated reward but in the 
control of food intake, sexual behaviour and the formation of social bonds, 
among other pleasures. What effect will these procedures have on the person’s 
responsiveness to reward, their motivation, mood state, risks of depression and 
suicide and capacity for planned action? What will happen if heroin addicts 
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attempt to compensate for the attenuated reward from heroin by increasing 
their heroin dose to levels that may be lethal in overdose? No attempt has been 
made to answer these important questions.
4. The published evaluations of the procedures were only compared to patients’ 
experiences after detoxification (Gao et al., 2003; Medvedev et al., 2003). 
Since relapse to opioid use is common after detoxification, a more informative 
comparison would have been with a more effective treatment of opioid 
addiction, such as methadone or buprenorphine maintenance. However, MMT 
is not readily available in China (Cohen, 2004) and prohibited by law in Russia 
(Krupitsky et al., 2004). There has not even been any attempt to compare its 
efficacy with oral naltrexone, which has been used in Russia, reportedly with 
better results than in western countries (Krupitsky et al., 2004).
5. There are also doubts about whether patients have given free and informed 
consent to participate in this surgery (Kleinig, 1985). Chinese policies towards 
opioid dependence are often punitive, with imprisonment and compulsory 
detoxification as first line responses. It could be argued that it is difficult to 
obtain free and informed consent within such a context.
Prevention of addiction
Predictive testing of genetic liability in addiction
In 1999, Francis Collins, Director of the US Human Genome Institute, outlined an 
optimistic vision of ‘genomic medicine’: the use of genetic information to improve 
human health (Collins, 1999; Collins, 2003). Collins foresaw genomic screening being 
used preventively to: (1) identify healthy individuals who carry susceptibility alleles 
for diseases, such as cancers and heart disease and (2) to intervene with those at 
higher genetic risk to either change their behaviour (e.g. increasing exercise or eating 
a healthier diet) or to use drugs (e.g. antihypertensives) that reduced their risk of 
developing these diseases. Collins imagined, for example, screening smokers for genetic 
susceptibility to lung cancer and counselling those at high risk to stop smoking. Similarly, 
optimistic projections have been expressed by some addiction genetics researchers  
(Uhl and Grow, 2004). 
If susceptibility genes are identified for addiction risk, then children and adolescents 
could be genetically tested and those at higher risk given preventive behavioural and 
pharmacological interventions to reduce their likelihood of using drugs (Collins, 1999). 
There is an obvious objection to this proposal in that it is not good public health policy  
to encourage people to use drugs, regardless of their genetic risk of dependence  
(Hall et al., 2002). Chronic drug use can have severe physical or psychological health 
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effects without resulting in addiction. An alternative rationale is that such screening 
would allow individuals who were at highest genetic risk of addiction to make informed 
decisions about whether to avoid drug use. Even if society places a high value on 
individual autonomy, there are a number of good reasons why on current information 
genetic screening for addiction is unlikely to be regarded as a good policy choice 
(Holtzman and Marteau, 2000). 
First, when multiple genes predispose to a common disease, individual susceptibility 
alleles only predict a very modestly increased risk of dependence (Hall et al., 2004a). 
Testing multiple genetic variants that were individually weak predictors would improve 
prediction if the results of multiple genetic tests were combined (Khoury et al., 2004). 
However, the larger the number of genes that are involved in disease susceptibility, the 
less useful most individuals will find information about their genotype (Hall et al., 2004a; 
Khoury et al., 2004). It also means that a very large number of individuals need to be 
screened to identify the few at highest risk (Vineis et al., 2001). 
Second, predictive genetic testing may have unintended adverse effects. This would be 
the case, for example, if testing adolescents for susceptibility to addiction increased their 
preparedness to try drugs, as could happen, for example, if they were prompted to test 
the accuracy of the genetic predictions (Hall et al., 2002). 
Third, screening is only ethically justifiable if there is an effective intervention to prevent 
the disorder in those who are identified as being at increased risk (Khoury et al., 2003). 
No such interventions currently exist but the prospect of preventive vaccination against 
cocaine and nicotine may raise this possibility in the future (Hall and Carter, 2004). 
Third-party uses of genetic information
Genetic information on addiction risk may potentially be used by third parties 
such as insurance companies, employers and educators, and the courts. Given 
the nature of genetic transmission, the implications of this information not only 
affect the individual being tested, but also their close relatives. This raises a 
number of ethical issues about who should be able to access this information. 
What measures should be taken to protect privacy? Under what circumstances 
should this information be shared and with whom (Anderer, 1992; Rothstein, 1998; 
Rothstein and Anderlik, 2001)?
Bioethicists’ concerns about the ethical and policy implications of genetic testing 
have been strongly influenced by experiences with genetic testing for Mendelian 
disorders, the paradigm case being Huntington’s disease (Marteau and Richards, 
1996). Because the mutations that cause this serious neurological disorder are 
strongly predictive of disease risk, genetic testing creates serious ethical dilemmas for 
affected individuals and family members (Marteau and Richards, 1996). Such testing 
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also raises real concerns about the discriminatory use of genetic risk information by 
health and life insurers and employers (Billings et al., 1992; Taylor, 1998). 
But Huntington’s disease is a poor model of the situation that arises with addiction. 
They are most likely to be polygenic disorders, involving multiple alleles of weak 
effect and environmental interactions. The predictive validity of genetic testing may 
only modestly improve upon the crude prognostic tool of family history. Discussion 
of the ethical implications of the predictive genomics of addiction has to take 
account of the most likely ways in which genomics information will be used. 
If the pessimists are right, the ethical and policy issues identified by bioethicists 
will not arise because research will not identify predictively useful alleles for 
addiction. Even in the most optimistic scenario, the predictive genomics of 
addition is unlikely to lead to genetic screening of whole populations for the 
reasons outlined above. Rather, predictive genetic testing is more likely to be 
offered to the minority of persons with a family history of early onset addictive 
disorders, perhaps 10 % of the population. Fear of genetic discrimination may 
nonetheless deter people with such family histories from having genetic tests that 
may benefit them. Similar fears may also deter individuals from participating 
in genetic research on addictive disorders, thereby impairing the acquisition of 
scientific knowledge about the prevention and treatment of these disorders. It 
remains to be seen whether community concerns about third-party use of genetic 
information prove to be a major impediment to addiction genomic research and 
future medical applications. 
Of course, it is possible to eliminate the risks of third-party use of genetic 
information by banning all genetic tests, but this policy could prevent us from 
realising any benefits that genetic testing may bring; it would also be an overly 
paternalistic and arguably unethical policy. A better approach would be to 
look for safeguards to prevent individuals’ privacy and confidentiality being 
unfairly compromised so that they need not fear breaches of confidentiality 
and privacy. The challenge will be to develop policies that allow for the use of 
genetic information to reduce the incidence of disease and improve the health and 
welfare of individuals and society, while minimising any negative consequences of 
stigmatisation and discrimination. 
Vaccines and slow release drug treatments
If it is possible to predict genetic liability to drug dependence, society will need to decide 
if it is ethical to use more coercive means to prevent adolescents from using drugs (Hall 
et al., 2002). For example, vaccines being developed against nicotine, primarily for 
smoking cessation (Ashcroft and Franey, 2004; Harwood and Myers, 2004; Hall, 2005; 
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Kosten and Owens, 2005), could potentially be used to prevent ‘high risk’ children and 
adolescents from smoking (Hall et al., 2002; Ashcroft and Franey, 2004). 
In order to be ethical, use of preventive nicotine vaccination would need to demonstrate: 
(1) the long-term benefits of the vaccine (Hall et al., 2002; Ashcroft and Franey, 2004; 
Harwood and Myers, 2004) and (2) that genetic tests accurately predict the risk of 
nicotine addiction. Given the limited predictive power of genes studied to date, and 
doubts about the long-term efficacy of preventive vaccination (Hall, 2007), it is unlikely 
that preventive vaccination would be an effective or an ethical intervention (Hall, 2005).
Immunotherapies, such as a ‘nicotine vaccine’ block the psychoactive effects of a drug 
by either stimulating the immune system to produce antibodies (active immunisation) or 
through the introduction of synthetic monoclonal antibodies into the bloodstream (passive 
immunisation) (Harwood and Myers, 2004). These antibodies bind to the target drug, 
preventing it from acting on receptors in the brain (Nutt and Lingford-Hughes, 2004; 
Kosten and Owens, 2005). Animal studies have shown that anti-drug vaccines reduce 
the rush and euphoria associated with the target drug, the amount of drug that reaches 
the brain, dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens, the rate of clearance across 
the blood-brain barrier, and the volume of drug distribution, and self-administration 
of the target drug (Hall, 2002a; Kosten and Owens, 2005). Vaccines have a very 
clear advantage over traditional small molecule agonists and antagonists in that they 
are long-lasting, highly specific, and as they remain primarily in the bloodstream, 
have no apparent central nervous system side effects. These advantages suggest that 
immunotherapies may be effective in reducing relapse to drug use, a major hurdle in 
overcoming addiction. 
Active vaccination against nicotine could reduce relapse to smoking in abstinent smokers 
during the first few months after quitting when most smokers relapse (Vocci and Chiang, 
2001). A nicotine vaccine could be circumvented by increasing the dose of nicotine but 
attenuating the rewarding effects of nicotine may be enough to reduce rates of return to 
daily smoking (Vocci and Chiang, 2001; Hall, 2002a). Similar vaccines are also being 
developed for cocaine and heroin.
The term ‘vaccine’ inevitably prompts discussion about its possible preventive use. 
Misconceptions that a vaccine will produce lifelong immunity against nicotine may 
prompt parents to vaccinate their children (Cohen, 1997). As minors, children would not 
be legally able to consent to vaccination but since parents already make choices for their 
children about other vaccines and other interventions that affect their lives (e.g. their diet 
and education), some have argued that vaccination against nicotine and other drugs is 
simply another decision that parents should be able to make on behalf of their children 
(Cohen, 1997). Given that there is a fundamental difference in vaccinations to prevent 
infection and vaccines to control behaviour, this argument is likely to be contested by 
civil libertarians and others who place a high value on personal autonomy (Hasman and 
Holm, 2004), as well as adolescents who disagree with their parents’ wishes. 
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Even if one sets aside the ethical issues, there are major practical obstacles to the preventive 
use of a nicotine vaccine in children. First, the limited period of protection provided by existing 
vaccines would require booster injections, perhaps every two or three months throughout 
adolescence (Kosten et al., 2002). Second, the fact that the vaccine could be circumvented 
by using higher doses of nicotine means that vaccination could be counterproductive if 
adolescents were prompted to test its efficacy. Third, it would be costly to universally vaccinate 
children against nicotine with a vaccine of modest preventive efficacy (Hall, 2002a).
Vaccination of ‘high risk’ adolescents seems a more plausible and less expensive option. 
The feasibility of even this approach is doubtful, however, given the low predictive 
validity of genetic screening for smoking risk (outlined above), the doubtful preventive 
efficacy of a nicotine vaccine, and the possible adverse effects of vaccination, such as 
stigmatisation of those who screened positive and discrimination against them by third 
parties, such as life or health insurance companies. 
The ‘off label’ use of a drug vaccine by a physician acting at the request of a parent 
is the most likely way in which a vaccine will be used preventively. It is difficult to see 
how this could be prevented if a nicotine vaccine is approved for therapeutic use, other 
than by education of physicians and parents about the likely limitations and possible 
disadvantages of this approach (Hall, 2002b).
In addition to these practical issues, the use of immunotherapies also raises several 
ethical concerns. Firstly, individuals would have to give fully informed consent. It is 
likely that immunotherapies would be most often used in situations that are inherently 
coercive, as treatment will often be the result of encounters with the justice system, such 
as a condition of release from prison or to avoid incarceration, in pregnant women, 
or parents involved in the child welfare system. The benefits will need to be balanced 
against rights of the individual to privacy and liberty (Ashcroft and Franey, 2004).
Secondly, vaccines may also prove counterproductive if an individual attempts to 
overcome the antagonistic action of the vaccine by increasing drug dose. Those who 
ambivalently agree to vaccination may later switch to using other possibly more 
dangerous drugs, different routes of administration (e.g. intravenous injection), or 
much higher than usual doses (Murray, 2004). Vaccines may also paradoxically make 
experimentation with drugs seem less risky, and therefore unwittingly increase drug 
use. The likelihood of this occurring should not be underestimated given the compulsion 
and motivation to use drugs displayed by some individuals, even in the face of certain 
negative consequences. The use of vaccines under any form of coercion will therefore 
require careful monitoring by the treating physician.
Thirdly, vaccines will produce long-lasting (possibly life-long) markers that will be 
detectable in the blood and urine, and may lead to false positive drug tests (Murray, 
2004). This raises the issue of confidentiality and discrimination which could discourage 
some from seeking immunotreatment. 
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Fourthly, vaccines do not ameliorate underlying problems that may be associated with 
compulsive drug use and addiction. Vaccines may be problematic if viewed as ‘magic 
bullets’. They do not deal with the underlying addictive condition (such as craving, 
loss of control or withdrawal), events that may lead to relapse, or comorbid mental 
conditions (Ashcroft and Franey, 2004). Addiction is a chronic condition and vaccines, 
like traditional addiction medications, will presumably need to be used in conjunction 
with behavioural treatments if life-long abstinence is to be achieved (Nutt and Lingford-
Hughes, 2004). Many will be wary of a treatment that prevents them from using drugs 
to either relieve withdrawal symptoms or to attenuate the symptoms of an undiagnosed 
mental illness (McGregor and Gallate, 2004), other sub-clinical conditions involving 
distress, or the effects of a stressful or abusive social situation. This is not to uncritically 
accept self-medication as an explanation of addiction (Mueser et al., 1998), but to 
acknowledge that psychological and social factors may sustain drug use in ways that 
vaccination alone will not address. Finally, the use of a vaccine may also block the 
action of agonists or partial agonists (e.g. methadone and buprenorphine for opioid 
dependence) eliminating the use of maintenance therapies while vaccination remained 
effective. Vaccines may also block the action of medications used in the treatment of 
other physiological conditions (e.g. opioid analgesics for pain relief) (Ashcroft and 
Franey, 2004). 
Relapse prevention and maintenance with depot medications
Depot medications are sustained-release formulations of current medications for 
treating addiction, most often antagonists that block the brain receptors for the target 
drugs. They involve a slow, timed release of the medication to counteract the rewarding 
effects of drugs. Depot medications have an advantage over traditional treatment 
medications as they are only required to be taken once a month, as compared to three 
to four times a week for conventional orally administered drugs. This has made depot 
medications an attractive option in preventing relapse. Sustained-release preparations 
of the antagonists naltrexone for alcohol and opioid dependence (Kranzler et al., 1998; 
Comer et al., 2002) and lofexidine for nicotine dependence (Rawson et al., 2000) have 
been developed.
If these treatments are used with patients who give free and informed consent, their use 
arguably presents no special ethical issues. Ethical issues do arise if sustained release 
antagonists are used to prevent relapse in situations where capacity to give free consent 
is compromised. Depot medications raise similar ethical questions as vaccines (see 
pp. 111–13) if used under coercion, as has recently been advocated (Caplan, 2006). 
Depot antagonists also present similar safety concerns if addicts change to using other 
illicit drugs or attempts to overcome their antagonist effects by increasing the dose of 
their preferred drug (Murray, 2004).
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Currently, in virtually all EU Member States substitution treatment is available  
for opiate dependence (Hedrich et al, 2008).  However, the availability of treatment 
varies between countries and among the general public and some policymakers 
remain opposed to the use of agonist drugs in addiction treatment. This raises a 
potential concern that the treatment choice could be limited to depot medications, such 
as the antagonist naltrexone, or that addicts will be coerced into using implantable 
naltrexone and not offered other forms of treatment, even where a good evidence base 
exists that they can be effective. In Australia, depot medications have been implanted 
in thousands of patients without clinical trials being conducted to demonstrate that they 
are safe or effective. This raises important concerns, as clearly the safety and efficacy 
of these and all other treatments, should be evaluated rigorously, as is the case for all 
other pharmacological treatments, prior to their use clinically. 
Challenges for public education
Popular understandings of the role of genetics, at least as expressed in the media, 
are often deterministic, suggesting that if you have ‘the gene for X’ you are very 
likely to develop that disorder and conversely that you will be at low risk of 
doing so if you do not have the ‘gene’ for that disorder (Khoury et al., 2000). For 
example, popular media reporting of a commercially available pharmacogenetic 
test for choosing either NRT or bupropion for smoking cessation, the NicoTest 
(www.nicotest.com), describes it as a test for ‘the smoker’s gene’ or the ‘addiction 
gene’ (BBC News, 2004; Doyle, 2004).
These views probably reflect the media focus on Mendelian disorders like 
Huntington’s disease, cystic fibrosis and Tay-Sachs disease, where modes of 
genetic transmission are easier to understand (Khoury et al., 2000). If these views 
are indeed widely held, the challenge for public education will be explaining the 
personal and public health implications of polygenic disorders in which individual 
alleles weakly predict risk, and interact with each other and with the person’s 
environment. If done well, this type of public education may allay anxieties about 
the third-party uses of genetic information.
Public education will also need to avoid any unintended message that public 
health drug control strategies can be replaced by high risk genomic medicine 
strategies (Willett, 2002; Merikangas and Risch, 2003; Carlsten and Burke, 
2006). The surest way for many individuals in developed societies to reduce 
their disease risks remains to stop drug use, reduce caloric intake and increase 
exercise (Rose, 1992; Peto, 2001; Vineis et al., 2001; Merikangas and Risch, 
2003). If society is to avoid blaming individuals for their risk status we also need 
to modify our physical and social environments in ways that facilitate desirable 
changes in risk behaviour.
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Drug screening and testing
Drug testing involves biochemical testing of blood, urine, hair and saliva for drugs, or 
their metabolites. It can tell if an individual has used a drug within a particular time 
period and, in some cases, whether they are intoxicated. Many would maintain that drug 
testing does not raise any major ethical issues if a person’s drug use puts others at risk 
(e.g. when they are driving a motor vehicle, flying a plane, or operating machinery). 
In these cases, drug testing is ethically justified if there is evidence that: (1) drug use 
impairs performance in ways that endanger others; (2) the drug testing provides valid 
assessment of impairment; and (3) drug testing deters people from using drugs in ways 
that put others at risk. These conditions are satisfied, for example, when blood alcohol 
concentration is used to test for impairment in automobile, train and truck drivers, and 
pilots. 
Testing in the workplace and other settings for drug use rather than intoxication, raises 
additional ethical issues (Allsop, 1997). Workplace testing may have primary goals of 
reducing employer costs (health and sick leave) and increasing productivity, as opposed 
to ensuring the safety of employees or the public. There is very little evidence that this 
kind of drug testing achieves these goals (Allsop, 1997). Moreover, in the USA, workplace 
drug testing is often confined to testing for metabolites of illegal drugs (particularly 
cannabis which is easiest to detect) (DeCew, 1994) rather than alcohol, which is much 
more commonly used and much more likely to impair work performance. In this type of 
testing impairment has not been demonstrated (Allsop, 1997), and concerns are raised 
about the right to privacy and confidentiality, workers’ freedom to consent to testing, and 
discrimination and stigmatisation of workers who screen positive for drug use rather than 
impairment (Allsop, 1997).
There are many other populations which may be targets for screening and testing. 
The acceptance of screening requires a balance between the public good (protecting 
individuals from the irresponsible actions of others, public health goals, detecting illegal 
activities), and individual liberty and privacy. Where the balance lies often depends on 
the type of drug being tested or screened for, the context of use, and the aims of testing. 
There are substantial ethical differences between testing, for example, in schools and 
workplaces; likewise there are also different ethical considerations between testing in 
elite sports, the military service or commercial pilots.
For example, a recent study of drug testing in schools concluded that:
 ‘The use of such tests in school may undermine the confidence necessary for a good 
pedagogic and educational relationship between teachers, parents and pupils.
 Testing in schools may conflict with ethical principles such as individual autonomy 
and respect for privacy, to the extent that they are unjustified intrusions by the state 
or other authorities into young citizens’ private lives that expose them to humiliating 
or ambiguous situations.
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 Such tests may also infringe the beneficence — or doing good — principle, since it is 
doubtful whether the benefit of carrying out tests in schools for preventive purposes 
outweighs the disbenefits for the young persons concerned, and the non-maleficence 
— or not doing harm — principle, since the young persons would always suffer 
unnecessary inconvenience from being subjected to such tests’ (7).
In sports, the question of justified testing comes down to satisfying a number of issues 
surrounding drug use, as it is: (a) contrary to the spirit of sport, (b) unfair, and (c) 
dangerous for the athlete’s health (according to the World Anti-Doping Agency’s Code, 
2003) (8). Opponents of anti-doping policies question all of these criteria for existing 
drugs. They emphasise the use of coercion, the encroachments on privacy and the 
autonomy of professional competitors, and reject claims that drug use undermines the 
primacy of ‘authenticity’ and the ‘sports ethos’ (e.g. by achieving success through using 
drugs rather than via ‘natural’ means, such as training, practice and hard work) (9).
In these examples, screening and drug testing raise different ethical issues in different 
settings and when carried out with different purposes and goals. This makes it difficult to 
provide authoritative opinions on possible future developments in drug monitoring. Each 
new development will need to be considered as it arises.
Neuroscience, prediction and privacy 
Neuroimaging may prove a useful clinical tool in the diagnosis and treatment of 
addiction by identifying individuals with subtypes of addiction and comorbid mental 
disorders who may require different combinations of treatment. These uses do not 
present special ethical issues but the ability to identify the neural correlates of addiction 
may have other uses outside the clinic that do. For example, neuroimaging studies are 
able to detect dramatic changes in limbic responses to drug-related cues that would 
identify an individual as drug dependent (Childress et al., 1999). This opens up the 
possibility of discrimination and violations of privacy (Canli and Amin, 2002; Farah 
and Wolpe, 2004; Illes and Racine, 2005). It may also raise issues of consent, given 
that these neuroimaging tests could use drug cues that are presented without the 
subject’s awareness (Whalen et al., 1998) (10). Given the enormous costs associated 
with addiction, this use of the technology may be attractive to employers, insurance 
companies and courts. Because the changes in the limbic regions that respond to 
(7) Taken from Pompidou Group Expert Committee on Ethics, 2005.
(8) Available at: http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf
(9) Tamburrini, C. 2007, ‘Enhanced Bodies’, Paper presented at Enhance Final Conference, 
Bristol, 27 September. To be published as part of the Enhance Project 2005–07 
(Enhancing Human Capacities: Ethics, Regulation and European Policy). Sixth Framework 
Programme: Priority 4.3.2.3 — Deepening Understanding of Ethical Issues. Grant No 
SAS-CT-2005-017455. 
(10) It is possible to mask images by presenting them for intervals that are too short to be 
perceived consciously so that the viewer is not aware of having viewed the image while 
producing changes in neural activity that can be detected by neuroimaging.
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drug-related cues persist well into abstinence, there is the possibility that an individual 
will be discriminated against even when they are drug-free. The fairness of such a 
discriminatory policy would need to be established.
Advances in neuroimaging technologies raise the possibility of ‘reading people’s minds’ 
by using these methods to ascertain the truthfulness of what defendants or suspects tell 
the police (Farah, 2002; Foster et al., 2003; Ross, 2003). This is more of an aspiration 
than reality at present, although some entrepreneurs claim that electrophysiological 
methods can be used to tell if a person is telling the truth (Foster et al., 2003). Future 
improvements in neuroimaging may, even if imperfectly, disclose facts about a person 
that they may prefer to keep private (Ross, 2003). Advances in neuroimaging technology 
are making it possible to obtain personal information about an individual that may 
predict behaviour or identify aspects of personality (Fischer et al., 1997; Fischer et al., 
2001; Canli and Amin, 2002; Farah and Wolpe, 2004; Singer et al., 2004b; Abler et al., 
2005). The claims of entrepreneurs promoting these technologies to the public (e.g. truth-
telling, personality matching and as tests of marital fidelity) raise the issue of the need for 
appropriate consumer protection against the over or misinterpretation of equivocal test 
results and bogus claims (Caplan, 2002; Farah, 2002; Farah, 2005).
Important ethical issues would be raised if persons are compelled to undergo these 
tests by courts, insurance companies or employers. During the course of neuroimaging 
studies, up to 40 % of brain scans of research participants show ‘suspicious’ brain 
anomalies, with between 0.5 to 8 % of research brain scans uncovering clinically 
significant neuropathologies (Illes et al., 2004b; Illes et al., 2006b). The emergence 
of incidental findings from neuroimaging research can lead to discrimination, which 
complicates consent to participate in these studies (Illes et al., 2004a; Anon, 2005; Illes 
et al., 2006b). This issue is amplified if imaging is conducted under coercion.
Neuroscience investigations may also provide information that proves to be predictive of 
disease risk in the same way as genes for Mendelian disorders like Huntington’s disease 
(Greely, 2002; Foster et al., 2003). Characteristic patterns of brain activity in childhood 
and adolescence, for example, may predict increased risks of addiction later in adult 
life (Volkow et al., 2003). This possibility raises the same ethical issues (e.g. privacy and 
discrimination) that are raised by testing for alleles that predict an increased risk of 
serious neurological disease (Greely, 2002). There are also subtler questions of human 
rights to consider. The increased use of these methods lead to the development of the 
belief that a refusal of a ‘suspect’ to undertake these fMRI on civil liberties grounds is 
indicative of ‘guilt’. 
Psychopharmacological harm reduction
Neuroscience research on addiction could potentially be used to engineer safer 
recreational drugs. It may be possible, for example, to use pharmacology and 
neuroscience to engineer a recreational drug that was a safer alternative to alcohol 
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(Nutt, 2006). Nutt persuasively argues that it is technically possible to develop a gamma-
aminobutyric acid (GABA) partial agonist that possesses most of the socially desirable 
properties of alcohol with few of its disadvantages, including its biological toxicity. 
The major obstacles to any such product being introduced are social, ideological and 
regulatory. This is true for any of the ways in which such a drug may be introduced into 
developed societies; namely, by being approved for use as a therapeutic drug, or being 
manufactured and distributed by freelance psychopharmacologists.
There are major doubts about whether the pharmaceutical industry will invest the 
substantial funds needed to: (1) undertake preclinical and clinical R&D on such a drug 
and (2) to sponsor the drug’s passage through the pharmaceutical regulatory systems, 
such as the US Food and Drug Administration or its British and European equivalents. 
Attempts have been made to introduce alcohol-like drugs in the recent past. The recent 
Foresight Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs project’s survey of pharmaceutical 
executives (Ragan, 2007) suggests that the industry is now more risk averse.  
This has been partly in response to critics who have accused the pharmaceutical industry 
of ‘selling sickness’ to promote drugs such as hormone replacement therapy (HRT), 
Viagra and the serotonin selective reuptake inhibitor (SSRIs) antidepressants  
(e.g. (Healy, 2004; Moynihan and Cassels, 2005)). 
The regulatory system is also likely to discourage any attempt to introduce such a 
drug as a harm reduction intervention in alcohol-dependent patients. Experience with 
substitute prescribing for nicotine dependence reveals a regulatory double standard that 
insists upon much tighter regulations for less harmful nicotine products than are imposed 
on the far more dangerous smoked tobacco products (Stratton et al., 2001). These 
regulations provide major disincentives to pharmaceutical harm reduction approaches. 
It could be argued that the prevailing regulatory philosophy sometimes seems to be 
that a patient’s health is less important than being drug dependent, even if this means 
being dependent on a less hazardous drug or a less harmful way of using it. Safer 
recreational drugs may emerge as a by-product of basic pharmacological research or 
they may be approved for therapeutic use for an unrelated indication in which case their 
desirable properties may be discovered by amateur psychopharmacologists. If these 
drugs prove relatively easy to produce using widely available precursors, then recipes 
disseminated via the Internet may be used for home production, as has happened with 
GHB (Gahlinger, 2004) and other substances (EMCDDA (in press) Risk assessment 8: 
‘Report on the risk assessment of BZP in the framework of the Council Decision on new 
psychoactive substances’). 
The experience with GHB suggests that if this were to happen, a likely regulatory 
response would be to explore options to restrict the availability of the substances 
commonly through making it an offence to produce, sell or use it. In Europe, Council 
Decision 2005/387/JHA of 10 May 2005 provides the basis for an early warning 
system where new psychoactive substances with no medicinal use may be subject to risk 
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assessment and subsequent control (11). During the 20th century, the recreational use of 
drugs with psychoactive effects that resemble alcohol to at least some extent, (cannabis, 
ecstasy, benzodiazepines and GHB) has prompted their prohibition by classifying them 
as controlled substances under international drug control treaties (McAllister, 2000).
Clearly, the potential development and marketing of new psychoactive substances for 
recreational purposes, or as substitutes to existing commonly used illicit or licit existing 
substances, is likely to raise difficult questions on future policy in this area. Currently 
major social and regulatory barriers and challenges exist that inhibit the development 
and marketing of new psychoactive substances for recreational use. However these are 
already being challenged on a number of fronts and this is likely to continue with the 
Internet now creating a global marketplace in which regulatory frameworks in many 
areas are either complicated or under challenge. 
Moreover, there may be good public health and scientific arguments for continuing to 
explore the possibility of the development of a s´afer tipple´ or less damaging substitutes 
for tobacco or even illicit drugs. A wider public discussion of the possibility is also well 
worthwhile for its educational value in reminding citizens in developed countries that: 
their favourite recreational drug alcohol affects brain chemistry in the same way as 
many prohibited drugs; it is an extremely toxic substance when used to excess, as it so 
often is; and is a major cause of violence, injury and social disorder, especially among 
young adults.
(11) Council Decision 2005/387/JHA of 10 May 2005 on the information exchange, risk 
assessment and control of new psychoactive substances (OJ L 127, 20.5.2005, p. 32).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and possible implications  
of advances in addiction neurobiology  
for future drug policies
Benjamin Capps, Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall, David Nutt, Richard Ashcroft  
and Ruud ter Meulen
There is a consensus within European Union policy that the approach to drug control 
should be balanced, comprehensive and focus simultaneously on the need for demand 
reduction, supply reduction, the fight against trafficking and international cooperation. 
It combines action at a number of levels:
•	 within	the	framework	of	European	Community	competence	(public	health,	precursor	
control, money laundering, development aid);
•	 close	cooperation	between	Member	States	(foreign	policy,	justice	and	home	affairs);
•	 partnerships	with	Member	States,	other	states	and	international	organisations.
The potential developments mentioned in this report raise issues that are likely to 
become important for policymakers within Member States and will require careful 
consideration at European level in regard to the EU’s role. They raise important 
questions for both drug policy and human rights and may have implications for 
the future regional role of the EU in developing policies, monitoring the activities of 
Member States and taking appropriate action with regard to Member States’ policies. 
The EU itself may use monitoring and prevention technologies in controlling the criminal 
aspects of drug use (such as trafficking) and their effects on public health. The EU has 
already taken affirmative action with regard to tobacco and alcohol in respect to public 
health.
It is not the purpose of this report to comment upon the fact that some drugs 
(e.g. amphetamines, cannabis, cocaine and heroin) are illicit while others with 
similar effects (alcohol and tobacco) are not. The psychoactive substances discussed 
in Chapter 3 will be classified according to existing policies. For example, the drugs 
described in this chapter may similarly represent the ‘particular dangers inherent’ 
in existing illicit drugs; (1) a leading cautious presumption is that: ‘New psychoactive 
substances can be harmful to health’ (2). 
(1) Official Journal L 127, 20.5.2005, pp. 32–37, paragraph (1).
(2) Ibid. paragraph (4).
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There are positive uses of currently illicit drugs and some argue that the harms from illicit 
drugs have been overplayed, while those of currently licit ones have been underplayed 
(Nutt et al., 2007b). Drug policies have always been controversial, especially with regard 
to the legal status of currently illicit drugs. Much of this stems from the criminal behaviour 
that is linked to some forms of illicit drug use.
The act of using a drug and the risk of addiction have been used to justify paternalistic 
government policies that prohibit the use of some drugs (Hunt, 2003; Kleinig, 2004). 
Policies, therefore, reflect some of the harms of some types of drug use but it is the 
‘recreational’ use of illicit drugs that has largely shaped our ‘medical’ policies. There 
is compelling evidence that widespread use of many licit and illicit drugs has massive 
economic and social costs but their links to crime and social problems are not always 
straightforward. The distinction between use for therapeutic and recreational reasons has 
significant socio-political consequences.
An approach grounded in neurobiology will affect policies in ways that are difficult to 
anticipate. It may reduce the reliance on policies that aim to avoid harm and increase 
support for a disease model of addiction. It may lead to a more rational approach to the 
harms caused by drug use rather than policies based on cultural and historical agendas. 
In the best of all possible worlds, addiction neurobiology may allow us to reconsider our 
social responses to the minority of drug users who become addicted by reducing their 
stigmatisation and increasing their access to more effective psychological and biological 
treatments; but an improved understanding of the neurobiology of addiction will not 
relieve us of the obligation to prevent problem drug use in some youth populations. 
Policies will, therefore, still need to aim to reduce the number of troubled young and 
otherwise vulnerable people who are susceptible to the appeal of all forms of drug use 
by reducing the social conditions that contribute to their vulnerability.
The implications of new developments, or potential new developments in addiction 
neuroscience are likely to have implications for future drugs policy in a number of 
important areas. 
1) Neurobiological research on addiction is revealing complex interactions between 
drugs of addiction, biological responses to them, and the social circumstances of 
drug users. As this work develops over the next decade, more work will be required 
to build upon the current research by more systematically exploring the social and 
ethical implications of addiction neurobiology and its application to the treatment 
and prevention of addiction.
2) Appropriate societal responses to drug use and addiction will need to give due 
consideration to ‘disease’ models of addiction while still acknowledging the social 
conditions that lead to drug use and the choices that individuals make to use drugs.
3) Policies towards drug use and addiction will continue to need to address both their 
public health and criminal justice consequences.
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4)  The autonomy of addicts is variable so care is required in using medical, paternalistic 
and criminal measures to control and treat addiction. If an addict is conceptualised 
as being wholly without autonomy, which is not the case in lucid periods, then 
human rights and appropriate ethical values are likely to take a back seat to the 
public interest. When autonomy is seriously impaired, it may be appropriate to 
take paternalistic measures to protect addicts from harming themselves or others. 
Responses to addiction need to include both punitive measures (i.e. in response to 
the autonomy and responsibilities of drug users) and improved access to addiction 
treatment. 
5) The autonomy of addicts is impaired by their addiction but not usually sufficiently 
so to warrant strong paternalistic interventions that override their wishes. 
Treatment of addiction should aim to build on and support addicts’ autonomy 
and ensure that their consent to treatment is as informed and given as freely as 
possible.
6) A major challenge for addiction policy and ethics will be finding ways to 
educate the public about the neurobiological basis of addiction in ways that 
recognise that drug use and addiction are nonetheless affected by individual 
and social choices.
7) Strong public interest in neuroscientific research on addiction and the potential for 
misunderstandings mean that addiction neuroscientists should disseminate their 
findings responsibly and accurately, anticipate potential misinterpretations and 
proactively engage with the media and politicians.
8) While many of the prospective developments in neuroscience will support 
measures of addiction treatment, prevention and monitoring, the potential 
limitations of a neuroscientific approach also need to be considered. Although 
this report has not dealt in detail with the social responses to addiction, future 
policies should continue with those current methods that are successfully tackling 
aspects of drug addiction, while integrating potentially new methods that emerge 
from addiction neuroscience. 
9) All new treatments and preventive interventions for addiction should be 
rigorously evaluated for safety and efficacy before being introduced into 
routine practice. 
10) Equitable access to treatment should not disproportionately deny human rights, 
privacy, consent or liberty to satisfy criminal-focused public opinion. Addicts are 
already vulnerable, and often live in disadvantaged situations. This should not be 
compounded by discrimination and stigmatisation.
11) The EU’s current Drugs Strategy (2005–12) provides a balanced approach to drug 
control with a focus on both reducing illicit drug trafficking and dealing with problem 
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users. Future developments in addiction neuroscience may assist in reducing the 
prevalence of illegal drug use and levels of drug dependence while promoting 
public health and improving social conditions that are associated with drug use. To 
ensure that the benefits from any developments in this area deliver maximum benefit 
and that potential problems are anticipated and avoided, an ongoing debate is 
required that considers how novel developments in neuroscience may affect current 
and future policies at both Member State and European level.
Specific policy implications
Although developments in neuroscience offer the possibility of allowing individuals 
to be more autonomous with regard to their future decisions, care should be taken 
to minimise any adverse effects on human rights. Therefore, further research will be 
required to ensure that these developments are taken forward with adequate ethical 
safeguards for human rights and with the aim of achieving an appropriate balance 
between the ethical values of autonomy, consent, liberty, equality and privacy. 
Areas that require specific consideration include:
Genetic data
While gene chips containing personal data on susceptibilities may provide important 
medical benefits, access to such data could potentially lead to stigmatisation and 
discrimination if inappropriately used. This is currently highly speculative 
technology and it is important that it not be rolled out without sufficient empirical 
evidence demonstrating its efficacy and appropriate attention given to data 
protection issues.
Vaccinations
Vaccines and slow release formulations of antagonist drugs are potentially useful 
treatments that may assist addicts to remain abstinent. The long-term potential of vaccines 
in particular is currently unclear. However, even if this technology is successfully developed 
it will not represent a magic bullet solution to drug problems nor is it likely that they will be 
appropriate for all people with drug problems. Should developments in this area progress 
successfully, controlled evaluations will be required to establish their safety and efficacy 
and individuals who receive these treatments should give free and informed consent to 
their use.
A strong ethical argument exists that the safety and efficacy of these treatments should 
be well studied before the treatments are used under legal coercion. And that any such 
use should be separately evaluated before it is widely introduced.
The same is true for the more speculative use of vaccines in children and adolescents to 
prevent drug use and hence addiction. It would appear wise to discourage the use of 
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vaccines for this purpose until considerable clinical experience has been obtained with 
the use of vaccines in the treatment of addiction.
Depot or sustained release pharmacological treatments
Similar ethical requirements for drug vaccines are also raised by the potential use of 
drug implants. This leads to the same conclusion that the efficacy of these treatments 
should be evaluated in registered clinical trials before being used widely.
If these prostheses were to be used under legal coercion, then sound arguments exist that 
they should be offered as a range of treatment choices, which includes other options of 
proven effectiveness.
Neurosurgery and deep brain stimulation
Neurosurgery treatment of addiction is an invasive, irreversible and risky form 
of treatment. It is hard to draw any other conclusion than this. Its use should be 
discouraged in preference to using less invasive and reversible forms of psychosocial and 
pharmacological treatments. While it is less invasive, similar recommendations would 
apply to deep brain stimulation. 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
Transcranial magnetic stimulation is a non-invasive neurological treatment that appears 
to have limited adverse effects. Preliminary studies suggest that it may be effective in 
treating addiction (e.g. reducing impulsive or compulsive behaviours). More research 
should be conducted into the safety and efficacy of transcranial magnetic stimulation in 
the treatment of addiction.
Neuroimaging
Neuroimaging methods are promising investigatory tools that have and will continue to 
illuminate the neurobiological mechanisms underlying drug use and addiction. Their use 
as screening methods for forensic, employment or other purposes is premature until the 
strengths and limitations of these methods are better understood. 
Drug testing
Drug testing, when it is used, should be for the purposes of monitoring and improving 
treatment of the addicted individual or safeguarding the wider community. It is ethically 
unacceptable to use it as a form of extrajudicial punishment.
The results of drug tests should remain private and confidential. Access to this information 
should be protected from third parties, including law enforcement, unless access has been 
granted by a formal legal process (e.g. court order, subpoena or other appropriate legal 
framework), or the individual gives fully informed and uncoerced consent.
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Treatment in prisons
The principle of equivalence of care means that addicted prisoners should have access 
to drug treatment and harm minimisation measures that can help protect their health. 
The options available should generally mirror those available to the wider community. 
For opioid-dependant individuals, this would in the EU generally include some form 
of substitution treatment. Prisoners should also have access to voluntary HIV and HCV 
testing and counselling.
Both ethical and medical objections exist to forced unsupervised opioid detoxification. 
These are particularly strong for those who were stabilised on a maintenance treatment, 
prior to their incarceration.
A general principle, again with both ethical and medical justification, is that similar 
privacy protections should apply for prisoners as to the rest of the population.
Treatment during pregnancy
Pregnant women should be engaged and positively encouraged to enter treatment and 
receive early antenatal care.
Ethical objections exist to the forcible treatment for addiction of pregnant women and 
measures in this area can be counterproductive, may cause greater harm to the mother 
and child and may discourage pregnant women with drug problems from seeking help.
There is, in many countries, a need for more investment in treatment programmes 
tailored towards the needs of drug-dependent women.
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Abstinence The cessation of drug use after an extended period of 
use of an addictive drug. Abstinence in a dependent 
drug user may lead to the experience of withdrawal 
symptoms.
Addiction The repetitive engagement in an activity, such as 
drug use, gambling or eating, despite the negative 
consequences that it causes. Addiction usually 
involves intense craving for the addictive activity and 
an impaired ability to control use. These aspects of 
addiction are sometimes referred to as psychological 
dependence. Addiction also often involves the 
development of tolerance towards the drug of abuse, 
and symptoms of withdrawal upon cessation of use. 
This is often referred to as physical dependence.
Agent A person who is the subject where there is action. 
The person who performs an action. Ethical conduct is 
usually taken to presuppose the possibility that individual 
human agents are capable of acting responsibly.
Agonist A substance which binds to the same receptor as the 
target drug (in this case the drug of addiction) producing 
the same or similar pharmacological effects. 
Amygdala A small group of neurons in the limbic system of the 
brain that is involved in the processing of emotional 
information, learning and memory.
Anterior cingulate gyrus The front part of the cingulate cortex, a region along the 
medial surface between the two cerebral hemispheres, 
that is involved in decision-making and particularly 
the regulation of emotional impulses to act.
Antagonist A substance which binds to the same receptor as 
the target drug (in this case the drug of addiction) 
preventing it from having its usual effects. 
Autonomy  (Greek ‘self’ and ‘law’) The capacity for self-government. 
Agents are autonomous if their actions are truly 
their own.
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Beneficence  The ethical principle that one should aim to be good to 
others.
Buprenorphine A drug that is a partial agonist of opioid receptors.  
It is often used in the treatment of opioid dependence, 
either as a form of maintenance, or as an aid to 
withdrawal. It can also lead to dependence.
Cerebrum The two uppermost lobes of the brain that consists of a 
left and right hemisphere. An evolutionary recent part 
of the brain that sits above the more primitive parts of 
the brain, such as the mid and hindbrain. Also often 
referred to as the forebrain.
Coercion  The use of force to encourage someone to enter 
treatment. The type of force used may vary depending 
on the amount of choice that an individual has. 
Mild forms include pressure from friends and family; the 
strongest forms involve detaining individuals in treatment 
against their wishes.
Confidentiality  Ensuring that information is accessible only to those 
authorised to have access. It restricts the use of 
personal information about an individual so that it 
cannot be communicated without their consent. In 
some professions, access and use to information 
is often ‘privileged’, and therefore may not under 
normal circumstances be discussed or divulged to third 
parties.
Cortex The outer mantle of the brain, specifically the cerebrum, 
which is involved in the highest cognitive functions, such 
as conscious sensation and movement, language, and 
decision-making. 
Craving An intense and seemingly irresistible desire to 
experience the effects of drugs.
Compulsion  In addiction, compulsion refers to an experience of a 
strong, usually irresistible drive or desire to consume 
drugs that is often contrary to one’s will.
CNS depressants A class of drugs that slow central nervous system 
function, and can lead to fatal overdose in large doses 
from respiratory and cardiac failure.
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Cues, or drug cues Events which have the ability to bring up memories that 
can often trigger emotional responses. Drug cues are 
those which recall memories associated with drug use 
that often trigger intense cravings for the drug.
Detoxification Supervised withdrawal from a drug of addiction that 
allows the drug to disappear from the brain and 
body. It is nearly always accompanied by withdrawal 
symptoms that may be managed using other drugs 
(medicated) or psychological support (unmedicated).
Dignity Associated to a number of definitions. The most popular 
are that it relates to respect, esteem or worthiness of 
action; the innate value of all human beings; or the 
empowerment of agents to make decisions and choices 
about their own lives.
Distributive justice The ethical principle according to which all individuals 
should be treated fairly and there is a fair distribution of 
the risks and benefits of certain actions.
Dopamine A chemical in the brain, or neurotransmitter, that is 
central to the development of addiction. It is found 
in the regions of the brain that are involved in the 
regulation of movement, motivation, emotion and 
reward.
Dysphoria A feeling of being unwell, anxious, depressed and 
restless.
Endogenous A chemical or substance produced within the body.
Endorphins and enkephalins Forms of endogenous opioids: naturally occurring 
substances in the human brain that bind to the same 
receptors as morphine.
Equality  The principle of equal treatment by the law and in 
medical care.
Ethics The study of the concepts involved in practical 
reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, 
rationality, choice etc. (sometimes referred to as the 
study or formalisation of morality).
Euphoria A feeling of exuberance, elation and maximum well-
being.
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Fatalism The belief that a set of pre-existing circumstances or 
events predetermined a particular outcome. It is often 
used in genetics and biology to suggest a belief that an 
agent could not avoid a particular outcome, and should 
not attempt to do otherwise.
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging (or fMRI) is a brain 
imaging technique that measures changes in blood flow in 
order to visualise brain activity during particular tasks.
Forebrain The largest and most evolutionary recent division of 
the brain, including the cortex, limbic system and basal 
ganglia. It is the region of the brain involved in our most 
advanced cognitive functions.
Freedom The belief that everyone is entitled to make choices. 
The corollary of this is that persons are to be held 
responsible for the consequences of their actions. 
Freedom is closely related to the notion of autonomy.
Frontal cortex A region of the cerebrum that is involved in our most 
higher order cognitive functions, such as decision-
making and social or moral judgement.
Harm minimisation (or reduction) An approach to the treatment of addiction and drug 
abuse whose principle aim is to reduce the harm caused 
by drug use to both the individual and society without 
necessarily eliminating drug use. Harm reduction is an 
evidence-based approach towards drug policy. Needle 
exchange programmes and methadone maintenance 
treatment are two types of programme that have harm 
reduction objectives.
Heroin A synthetic opiate that is the most commonly abused 
and one of the most addictive illicit drugs. 
Hippocampus An area of the brain involved in learning and memory, 
specifically memory for the facts or details of events, 
referred to as declarative memory.
Homozygous  A term used to describe when an individual carries two 
identical copies of a gene (one from each parent) at a 
particular locus on each of the two chromosomes. An 
individual who carries two different copies of a gene is 
said to be heterozygous for this gene.
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Hypothalamus A small, but important part of the brain that maintains 
many of the body’s internal functions, such as eating, 
drinking and the regulation of hormones, such as the 
stress hormones.
Human Rights Protections of human (moral) interests (see Rights).
Informed consent A process whereby individuals are fully informed about 
a particular treatment that they are to receive, and 
where individuals are free to participate or not.
Insula cortex A region of cortex that lies at the intersection of the 
frontal, temporal and parietal lobes that is involved in 
the process of introception, or the conscious experience 
of the body. 
Introception The conscious experience, awareness or sensation of the 
body.
Liberty A condition in which an individual has the ability to act 
according to his or her own will.
Limbic system A diverse array of densely connected brain regions that 
are involved in the regulation and generation of our 
emotions and desires. These regions are also involved in 
learning and memory.
Long-term depression A molecular adaptation that occurs at the synapse 
between two neurons that leads to a weakening of the 
connection between these neurons.
Long-term potentiation A molecular adaptation that occurs at the synapse 
between two neurons that leads to a strengthening of 
the connection between these neurons.
Maintenance therapy The long-term replacement of an abused drug with its 
agonist in a regulated way to prevent relapse to more 
dangerous and illicit drug use. The most well known type 
is methadone maintenance.
Medicalisation The process whereby behavioural or social problems are 
understood as medical disorders that should be treated 
medically, often at the expense of social approaches.
Mesolimbic pathway See Reward pathway.
142
Addiction neurobiology: Ethical and social implications
Mu receptor The primary opioid receptor that mediates the 
pleasurable effects of both opiate drugs, such as heroin 
and morphine, as well as endogenous opioids, such as 
the endorphins.
Naloxone A potent opioid antagonist that is used to treat opioid 
overdose, and is included in the drug, Suboxone, to 
discourage its injection.
Naltrexone A potent opioid antagonist that binds to the target 
opioid receptors preventing heroin and other opioid 
agonists from having an effect. Naltrexone is often 
used as a form of relapse prevention. Naltrexone is 
also used to treat alcohol dependence and eating 
disorders.
Natural reinforcers Everyday activities which are reinforcing or rewarding, 
such as food, sex and relationships. Natural reinforcers 
also activate the brain’s reward pathway, but to a far 
lesser extent than addictive drugs.
Neurotransmitter A chemical produced within the neurons in the brain 
that carries signals to other neurons, usually by binding 
to receptors on adjacent neurons at the synapse. They 
are a type of signalling molecule that also includes other 
substances such as neural hormones.
Nonmaleficence The ethical principle that we should cause no harm to 
others.
Nucleus accumbens A central part of the mesolimbic reward pathway 
that encodes information related to the rewarding or 
reinforcing properties of an event, or drug, and signals 
its salience. Nearly all drugs of abuse act upon the 
nucleus accumbens, thereby reinforcing their use.
Opioid naiveté The term given to a condition in which a former opioid 
addict who has withdrawn from opioid use, loses their 
tolerance to opioids. Opioid-naive users who return to 
opioid use are at a higher risk of overdose if they inject 
their usual dose of opioid.
Orbitofrontal cortex A region of the prefrontal cortex involved in the 
attribution of salience to events, craving and the 
motivation to use drugs.
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Overdose An acute condition that results from taking too much of a 
drug. It can cause unconsciousness, brain damage and 
death (drug-induced death). It is more commonly used in 
reference to the CNS depressants, such as alcohol and 
heroin. 
Partial agonist Drugs that bind to the target receptor of a drug of 
addiction, partially blocking and partially activating the 
receptor. They can be used to treat drug dependence 
(e.g. buprenorphine for the treatment of opioid 
dependence).
Paternalism The name given to the position that persons have a 
right to act in the interests of others without the consent 
of, or even against the will of, these others. (Sometimes 
substituted by parentalism).
PET Positron emission tomography (or PET) is a brain 
imaging technique that uses radioactively labelled 
molecules to visualise brain structure and function.
Pharmacogenomics/genetics The use of genetic or genomic information about an 
individual to select the pharmacological or psychosocial 
treatments that will maximise the chance of successful 
treatment for that person.
Physical dependence A physiological state that is indicated by the 
occurrence of withdrawal symptoms when regular 
drug users abruptly stop taking the drug and 
accompanied by the development of tolerance, 
requiring higher doses to achieve the same drug 
effect.
Prefrontal cortex The very anterior of the frontal cortex of the 
brain, that includes the orbitofrontal cortex and 
the anterior cingulate cortex. It is considered the 
highest cortical area in the brain and underlies our 
most complex behaviours, including personality, 
social and moral behaviour, executive control and 
planning.
Privacy An individual’s right to keep their personal information 
and affairs confidential, and out of public view, or to 
control who has access to this information and what they 
can do with it.
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(The) Public interest Refers to competing claims made by a public concerned 
with such values as equality, happiness, security, or 
safety. There is a view that public interest, also sometimes 
held to be equivalent to the ‘public good’, is roughly 
synonymous with a definition of ‘general welfare’, and 
juxtaposed with autonomy and individual interests.
Receptor A large molecule on a cell’s surface that is a specific 
target for particular chemicals. In the brain, this is 
most often neurotransmitters, but it can also include 
hormones and other endogenous chemicals, that bind 
to it and signal what is going on outside the cell (signal 
transduction).
Reinforcement A neural process within the reward pathway that 
ensures that an activity or event is seen as salient and 
motivating. A stimulus that produces this effect within 
the reward pathway is said to be a reinforcer. Addictive 
drugs are potent reinforcers.
Relapse The resumption of regular drug use after a period of 
abstinence, often in response to drug-related cues or 
stress. Relapse is common after addicts have achieved 
abstinence.
Relapse prevention The use of a prophylaxis, usually pharmacological 
(e.g. naltrexone) or psychological support, to reduce the 
likelihood of returning to regular drug use. Most drugs 
used in relapse prevention work by preventing the drug 
of addiction from binding to its receptor. Drug vaccines 
have also been developed to reduce relapse to the use 
of some drugs of addiction (e.g. nicotine, cocaine).
Reuptake The chemical process whereby signalling molecules 
or neurotransmitters are removed from the synapse 
by transporters on the cell surface. Reuptake is an 
important process that regulates the activity of signalling 
molecules.
Reward The neural process that reinforces behaviour and signals 
that some experience, such as using drugs, is positive. 
It is usually associated with pleasure or euphoria. It is 
partly mediated by the release of dopamine into the 
nucleus accumbens.
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Reward pathway A central circuit in the brain that reinforces behaviour 
when activated. Most drugs which activate this reward 
pathway are addictive, and their effects are usually 
experienced as rewarding and pleasurable. The circuit 
includes neurons of the ventral tegmental area, nucleus 
accumbens and part of the prefrontal cortex, referred 
to as the mesolimbic pathway, and the amygdala and 
hippocampus.
(Moral) Rights Justified (strong) claims to the protection of individuals’ 
important interests. When these rights are effective, 
this protection is provided as something that is owed 
to persons for their own sakes. Not to be confused 
with contractual (weak) rights created by agreement, 
law and convention (called liberties, powers and 
immunities).
Salience The motivating quality of an event or experience. 
In contrast to reward, salient events need not be 
pleasurable. They are things that grab our attention 
and motivate us to pursue them. Salient events are also 
reinforcing.
Snus An oral form of tobacco that has been treated to 
remove the major carcinogens from traditional chewed 
tobacco. 
Stimuli Events or experiences that trigger a neurochemical 
response in the brain.
Striatum A region deep within the brain that is involved in the 
planning and regulation of movement and executive 
control pathways.
Substitution treatment See Maintenance therapy.
Suboxone  A combination of drugs used in the treatment of opioid 
dependence. Its principal ingredient is buprenorphine 
but it also contains the opioid antagonist, naloxone, to 
discourage patients from dissolving and injecting the 
drug as injecting naloxone produces opioid withdrawal 
symptoms.
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Swiss heroin trials A series of clinical trials of the prescription of injectable 
pharmaceutical heroin to long-term, treatment refractory 
heroin addicts. 
Synaptic plasticity Molecular and cellular changes between two cells 
that either strengthen or weaken their connection. 
Also see Long-term potentiation and Long-term 
depression.
Synapse The specialised junction between two neurons across 
which neurotransmitter release allows signalling 
from one neuron (the presynaptic neuron) to the next 
(the postsynaptic neuron). Molecular and cellular 
specialisations at the synapse allow for quick and 
highly regulated communication between the two 
neurons.
Thalamus The thalamus is the key relay station for all incoming 
sensory information. It is located deep within the brain, 
and is responsible for isolating important messages 
from the mass of sensory information entering the 
brain. 
Tolerance A physiological state in which an individual is 
less responsive to the effect of a drug, leading 
to the use of higher doses. Tolerance is the result 
of neurochemical changes within the brain as a 
result of regular drug use. It often leads to physical 
dependence.
Transporter  A large molecule in the cell membrane that pumps 
signalling molecules such as neurotransmitters out of the 
synapse, thereby regulating their activity.
Ultra-rapid opioid detoxification A form of opioid detoxification that reduces the 
withdrawal process to 24 hours by administering high 
doses of the antagonist, naltrexone, while the patient is 
under general anaesthesia.
Utilitarianism A set of moral theories that decide what is ethically right 
by evaluating the consequences of an action or a rule. 
The simplest form is that of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) 
according to whom right actions were those that 
produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
of people. 
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Ventral tegmental area A group of dopaminergic neurons that make up a key 
part of the brain’s reward pathway. Neurons in the VTA 
synapse on to neurons in the nucleus accumbens and the 
prefrontal cortex. 
Withdrawal Symptoms that develop when an individual abruptly 
stops or abstains from chronic drug use. The symptoms 
of withdrawal can include nausea, headaches and 
seizures, depending on the drug of addiction. Some 
drugs have very mild or no withdrawal symptoms  
(e.g. cocaine), while others cause intense discomfort  
(e.g. alcohol, heroin).
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